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ABSTRACT	OF	THE	DISSERTATION	
	
On	objective	and	subjective	visual	perception	
	
by	
	
Jeffrey	David	Knotts	
Doctor	of	Philosophy	in	Psychology	University	of	California,	Los	Angeles,	2019		
Professor	Hakwan	Lau,	Chair		
	
	
GOAL:		The	goal	of	this	dissertation	is	to	investigate	three	major	questions	in	the	field	of	
conscious	visual	perception.	First,	to	what	extent	do	objective	and	subjective	perception	
dissociate	in	normal	observers?	Second,	is	prefrontal	cortex	necessary	for	conscious	
awareness?	Third,	is	phenomenology	rich	or	sparse,	and	what	would	an	effective	operational	
approach	to	this	question	look	like?	These	questions	are	examined	in	three	sets	of	experiments	
with	human	subjects,	summarized	by	the	following	aims.	
	
AIM	1:		Investigating	the	impacts	of		binocular	suppression	and	monocular	pattern	masking	on	
the	relationship	between	objective	and	subjective	perception	in	normal	observers.	There	is	
considerable	disagreement	in	the	literature	about	whether	or	not	normal	human	observers	can	
perform	forced-choice	perceptual	tasks	unconsciously	(e.g.,	Kolb	&	Braun,	1995;	Morgan,	
Mason,	&	Solomon,	1997;	Peters	&	Lau,	2015).	In	the	first	study	of	this	dissertation,	we	
examined	whether	any	of	four	commonly	used	visual	suppression	techniques	can	facilitate	
unconscious	forced-choice	orientation	discrimination.	In	three	initial	experiments	we	looked	for	
iii	
differences	in	the	relationship	between	objective	and	subjective	perception	under	different	pairs	
of	monocular	and	binocular	suppression	techniques	by	comparing	each	pair	directly	in	an	
unbiased	two-interval	forced	choice	paradigm.	In	a	fourth	experiment,	we	examined	whether	
continuous	flash	suppression	can	facilitate	absolute	unconscious	perception	using	a	similar	
two-interval	forced	choice	task.	
		
AIM	2:		Using	decoded	fMRI	neurofeedback	to	investigate	the	role	of	prefrontal	cortex	in	the	
conscious	perception	of	color.	A	second	debate	in	consciousness	science	concerns	whether	
prefrontal	cortex	is	critical	for	conscious	visual	perception.	Some	metacognitive	theories	
hypothesize	that	the	frontoparietal	activity	underlying	perceptual	confidence	judgments	is	indeed	
critical	for	consciousness.	In	the	second	study	of	this	dissertation,	we	decoded	multivariate	
functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	patterns	corresponding	to	perceptual	confidence.	
We	then	used	neurofeedback	to	test	a	potential	causal	relationship	between	activation	of	
decoded	confidence	patterns	and	the	subjective	experience	of	color.		
	
AIM	3:		Investigating	the	richness	of	phenomenology	by	looking	for	subjective	inflation	effects	in	
dot	motion	discrimination.	A	third	major	debate	concerns	whether	visual	phenomenology	is	rich	
or	sparse.	In	the	third	part	of	this	dissertation	we	review	this	debate	and	argue	that	subjective	
inflation,	an	effect	in	which	peripheral	or	minimally	attended	perception	appears	to	be	
subjectively	richer	than	would	be	expected	based	on	objective	performance,	may	provide	an	
intermediate	answer:	phenomenology	is	sparse,	but	it	is	subjectively	inflated	such	that	it		feels	
rich.	We	then	use	a	series	of	psychophysical	experiments	to	test	the	extent	to	which	subjective	
inflation	occurs	for	random	dot	motion	discrimination	at	different	retinal	eccentricities,	and	
discuss	the	results	in	terms	of	the	richness	debate.		
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VI.	General	Introduction	
	
Background	
The	extent	to	which	objective	and	subjective	perception	dissociate	in	normal	human	vision	is	an	
open	question.	Hereafter,	objective	perception	refers	to	an	observer’s	ability	to	perform	a	forced	
choice	task	like	indicating	whether	a	grating	is	tilted	to	the	left	or	to	the	right	of	vertical.	
Subjective	perception	on	the	same	task	would	refer	to	the	observer’s	awareness	of	their	
objective	performance	(e.g.,	as	measured	by	a	confidence	rating)	or	their	rating	of	the	visibility	
of	the	grating	stimulus.	Evidence	that	these	two	types	of	perception	can	dissociate	comes	from	
clinical	cases	of	blindsight,	where	patients	with	damage	to	visual	cortex	report	no	subjective	
awareness	of	a	target	stimulus,	such	as	a	vertically	or	horizontally	oriented	line,	despite	
performing	well	above	chance	when	forced	to	guess	the	line’s	orientation		(Weiskrantz,	1986;	
Weiskrantz,	Warrington,	Sanders,	&	Marshall,	1974)	.	However,	it	is	currently	debated	whether	
such	dissociations	can	occur	in	normal	observers		(Peters,	Kentridge,	Phillips,	&	Block,	2017;	Ian	
Phillips,	2017;	Ian	Phillips	&	Block,	2016)	
	
This	is	a	critical	issue	in	the	scientific	study	of	consciousness,	because	when	attempting	to	
isolate	visual	consciousness,	which	is	generally	considered	a	subjective	measure,	objective	
measures	of	perception	should	be	treated	as	a	potential	confounding	factor		(Lau,	2008;	Lau	&	
Rosenthal,	2011)	.	Importantly,	dissociations	between	objective	and	subjective	perception	can	
occur	in	two	different	ways.	The	weaker	of	these	is	a		relative		dissociation,	also	known	as	
relative	blindsight,	in	which	objective	performance	is	matched	between	two	conditions	but	
subjective	awareness	differs		(Koizumi,	Maniscalco,	&	Lau,	2015;	Lau	&	Passingham,	2006;	
Maniscalco,	Peters,	&	Lau,	2016;	Odegaard,	Chang,	Lau,	&	Cheung,	2018;	Rahnev	et	al.,	2011;	
1	
Solovey,	Graney,	&	Lau,	2015)	.	The	stronger	case,	referred	to	hereafter	as	either	absolute	
blindsight	or	unconscious	perception,	is	that	in	which	normal	observers	can	perform	forced	
choice	perceptual	tasks	with	no	subjective	awareness.	While	relative	blindsight	is	well	supported	
by	empirical	evidence	(see	above),	evidence	for	absolute	blindsight	has	been	controversial	
(Kolb	&	Braun,	1995;	Morgan,	Mason,	&	Solomon,	1997;	Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	Therefore,	to	
deepen	the	field’s	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	objective	and	subjective	
perception,	it	is	important	to	investigate	A)	the	extent	to	which	relative	blindsight	generalizes	
across	different	psychophysical	contexts,	and	B)	whether,	using	rigorously	controlled	behavioral	
tasks,	we	can	find	any	evidence	for	absolute	blindsight	in	normal	observers.	
	
Another	prominent	debate	in	the	study	of	consciousness	regards	whether	prefrontal	cortex	
(PFC)	is	critical	for	conscious	experience		(Boly	et	al.,	2017;	Odegaard,	Knight,	&	Lau,	2017)	.	
While	some	advocates	of	first	order	theories	of	consciousness	suggests	that	PFC	activation	
reflects	not	perceptual	content	but	only	post-perceptual	reporting	mechanisms		(Koch,	
Massimini,	Boly,	&	Tononi,	2016;	Tsuchiya,	Wilke,	Frässle,	&	Lamme,	2015)	,	others	have	
pointed	out	a	wealth	of	support	in	the	literature	for	perceptual	content	being	encoded	in	PFC	
activity		(Cortese,	Amano,	Koizumi,	Kawato,	&	Lau,	2016;	Hebart,	Schriever,	Donner,	&	Haynes,	
2014;	Mante,	Sussillo,	Shenoy,	&	Newsome,	2013;	Panagiotaropoulos,	Deco,	Kapoor,	&	
Logothetis,	2012;	M.	Wang,	Arteaga,	&	He,	2013)	,	and	that	previous	failures	to	identify	this	
relationship	are	likely	due	to	insufficient	sensitivity	in	analytical	approach.	To	resolve	this	debate,	
it	is	therefore	essential	to	further	examine	the	relationship	between	PFC	activity,	perceptual	
content,	and	subjective	awareness	using	the	most	sensitive	recording	and	analysis	methods	
that	are	currently	available.	
	
2	
Finally,	there	is	another	longstanding	debate	about	whether	visual	phenomenology	is	rich	or	
sparse		(Fazekas	&	Overgaard,	2018)	.	Those	who	favor	the	Rich	view	argue	that,	taking	
changes	in	receptive	field	size	and	general	representational	capacity	outside	of	the	fovea	into	
account,		phenomenology	is	rendered	in	high	resolution	across	the	visual	field	independent	of	
attention	(e.g.,	Block,	1995,	2007,	2014;	Lamme	2003,	2010).	Those	who	favor	the	Sparse	view	
argue	that	attention	impacts	phenomenology:	where	there	is	less	attention	there	is	sparser	or	
more	compressed	phenomenology	(e.g.,		Dehaene,	Naccache,	&	Sergent,	2006;	Cohen	&	
Dennett,	2011).		While	many	have	argued	that	this	debate	is	fundamentally	irresolvable	[e.g.,	
Kouider	&	de	Gardelle,	2010;	Phillips,	2011,	2017;	Overgaard	&	Fazekas	2016],	others	have	
argued	that	the	debate	can	still	benefit	from	the	process	of	inference	to	the	best	explanation	
(Block,	2007)	.	However,	to	effectively	do	inference	to	the	best	explanation,	there	is	a	current	
need	for	more	operational	definitions	of	rich	and	sparse	phenomenology	that	can,	in	principle,	
lead	to	less	ambiguous	and	more	easily	testable	hypotheses.	
	
Dissertation	Overview	
This	dissertation	is	divided	into	three	main	chapters	(VII	-	IX).	Chapter	VII	examines	the	extent	
to	which	objective	and	subjective	perception	dissociate	for	central	orientation	discrimination	
judgments	in	a	series	of	psychophysical	experiments	using	different	visual	suppression	
techniques.	These	include	forward	and	backward	masking,	interocular	suppression,	backward	
masking	alone,	and	continuous	flash	suppression.	Both	relative	and	absolute	blindsight	are	
considered.	
	
Chapter	VIII	begins	with	an	overview	of	the	debate	about	prefrontal	cortex	and	consciousness	
(Boly	et	al.,	2017;	Odegaard	et	al.,	2017)	.	This	overview	focuses	specifically	on	the	argument	
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that	null	findings	for	associations	between	prefrontal	cortex	and	visual	consciousness	may	be	
mostly	attributable	to	underpowered	or	otherwise	insensitive	methodological	approaches.	A	
recent	study	that	involved	waking	rats	from	anesthesia	via	pharmacological	stimulation	of	the	
prefrontal	cortex		(Pal	&	Mashour,	2018)	is	highlighted,	and	a	consequently	modified	version	of	
the	mesocircuit	model	of	consciousness		(Schiff,	2010)	is	considered.	The	rest	of	the	chapter	
covers	a	real-time	fMRI	neurofeedback	experiment	in	which	we	rewarded	the	simultaneous	
activation	of	decoded	multivoxel	patterns	for	color	in	visual	cortex	and	decoded	multivoxel	
patterns	for	perceptual	confidence	in	frontoparietal	cortex	to	see	if	this	could	boost	unconscious	
color	content	in	spontaneous	brain	activity	into	conscious	awareness.		
	
Chapter	IX	starts	with	a	review	of	the	relevant	empirical	evidence	in	the	debate	about	the	
richness	of	phenomenology.	We	focus	on	studies	that	have	observed	an	effect	known	as	
subjective	inflation,	in	which	subjective	ratings	for	peripheral	or	otherwise	minimally	attended	
stimuli	appear	to	be	overestimated	based	on	objective	performance.	We	argue	that	subjective	
inflation	provides	a	helpful	operational	scheme	for	understanding	and	testing	the	richness	
debate.	We	then	put	this	scheme	to	use	in	a	series	of	psychophysical	experiments	that	examine	
objective	and	subjective	awareness	in	central	and	peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination.	We	
conclude	by	discussing	these	experiments	in	the	theoretical	frameworks	of	both	subjective	
inflation	and	blindsight	in	normal	observers:	important	similarities	and	differences	are	
highlighted,	and	future	directions	that	may	clarify	our	understanding	of	both	phenomena	are	
suggested.	
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VII.	The	Search	for	Blindsight	in	Normal	Observers:	Continuous	Flash	Suppression	and	
Pattern	Masking	
	
Abstract	
Peters	and	Lau		(2015)	found	that	when	criterion	bias	is	controlled	for,	there	is	no	evidence	for	
unconscious	visual	perception	in	normal	observers,	in	the	sense	that	they	cannot	directly	
discriminate	a	target	above	chance	without	knowing	it.	One	criticism	of	that	study	is	that	the	
visual	suppression	method	used,	forward	and	backward	masking	(FBM),	may	be	too	blunt	in	the	
way	it	interferes	with	visual	processing	to	allow	for	unconscious	forced-choice	discrimination.	To	
investigate	this	question,	we	compared	FBM	directly	to	continuous	flash	suppression	(CFS)	in	a	
two-interval	forced-choice	task.	Although	CFS	is	popular,	and	may	be	thought	of	as	a	more	
powerful	visual	suppression	technique,	we	found	no	difference	in	the	degree	of	perceptual	
impairment	between	the	two	suppression	types.	To	the	extent	that	CFS	impairs	perception,	both	
objective	discrimination	and	subjective	awareness	are	impaired	to	similar	degrees	under	FBM.	
This	pattern	was	consistently	observed	across	three	experiments	in	which	various	experimental	
parameters	were	varied.	In	a	fourth	experiment,	we	further	found	no	evidence	for	absolute	
blindsight	under	CFS.	These	findings	provide	evidence	for	an	ongoing	debate	about	
unconscious	perception:	normal	observers	cannot	perform	forced-choice	orientation	
discrimination	tasks	unconsciously.	
	
Introduction	
Whether	normal	observers	can	perform	forced-choice	discrimination	tasks	unconsciously,	i.e.,	
whether	thresholds	for	objective	performance	and	subjective	awareness	in	normal	observers	
can	dissociate	in	such	tasks,	is	controversial		(Peters	et	al.,	2017;	Ian	Phillips,	2017;	Ian	Phillips	
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&	Block,	2016)	.	This	is	an	important	issue	to	resolve,	because	a	reliable	means	of	
demonstrating	unconscious	perception	would	be	an	invaluable	tool	for	studying	the	neural	
correlates	of	consciousness	while	controlling	for	unconscious	signal	processing	confounds		(Lau,	
2008;	Lau	&	Rosenthal,	2011)	.	
	
While	the	dissociation	of	objective	and	subjective	thresholds	is	typically	thought	to	occur	in	
blindsight	(Weiskrantz,	1986;	but	see	Phillips,	2017	for	an	opposing	view),	evidence	for	the	
same	dissociation	in	normal	observers	has	been	contentious.	Some	studies	have	failed	to	
replicate	(e.g.,	Kolb	&	Braun,	1995;	Morgan	et	al.,	1986)	while	others		(Hesselmann,	Hebart,	&	
Malach,	2011;	Sahraie,	Weiskrantz,	&	Barbur,	1998;	Salti,	Monto,	Charles,	&	King,	2015;	
Vlassova,	Donkin,	&	Pearson,	2014)	have	been	potentially	subject	to	the	well-known	confound	
of	criterion	bias		(Eriksen,	1960;	Hannula,	Simons,	&	Cohen,	2005;	Lloyd,	Abrahamyan,	&	Harris,	
2013;	Merikle,	Smilek,	&	Eastwood,	2001)	.	With	respect	to	criterion	bias,	the	specific	worry	is	
that	participants	may	be	overly-conservative	when	making	subjective	ratings,	such	that	on	trials	
in	which	they	see	a	small	po	rtion	or	a	noisy	gist	of	a	target	stimulus,	they	will	still	rate	that	target	
stimulus	as	“unseen”	or	“invisible”	because	the	internal	experience	of	the	stimulus	does	not	
surpass	a	conservative	internal	criterion.	
	
A	recent	study	by	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	showed	that	when	such	criterion	bias	is	controlled	for	by	
collecting	subjective	ratings	via	a	two-interval	forced	choice	(2IFC)	task,	there	is	no	evidence	for	
unconscious	forced-choice	discrimination	in	normal	observers.	Briefly,	in	their	study,	participants	
performed	a	left/right	grating	orientation	discrimination	task	in	each	of	two	stimulus	intervals	and	
indicated	in	which	of	the	two	intervals	they	felt	more	confident	in	their	orientation	judgment.	In	
each	interval	a	series	of	forward	and	backwards	masks	(sometimes	referred	to	as	sandwich	
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masking,	but	hereafter	referred	to	as	FBM)	were	presented,	but,	unbeknownst	to	participants,	
on	every	trial,	one	of	the	two	intervals	lacked	a	target	grating.	Results	showed	that	as	soon	as	
participants	performed	above	chance	in	discriminating	the	orientation	of	the	
physically-presented	target	grating,	they	were	also	above	chance	in	meaningfully	assigning	their	
confidence	judgments	to	the	interval	that	contained	that	target	grating.	These	results	suggest	
that	when	the	potential	for	criterion	bias	is	minimized,	objective	performance	and	subjective	
awareness	thresholds	for	orientation	discrimination	do	not	dissociate	--	i.e.,	there	is	no	
unconscious	orientation	discrimination	--	under	FBM.	
	
A	concern	regarding	the	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	study	is	that	FBM	may	interfere	at	too	early	a	
stage	in	visual	processing	to	facilitate	unconscious	perception.	It	could	be	argued	then	that	if	the	
authors	had	used	a	visual	suppression	method	that	interferes	at	a	later	stage,	such	as	
metacontrast	masking	or	continuous	flash	suppression	(CFS)		(Breitmeyer,	2015)	,	then	
unconscious	perception	would	have	been	observed.	
	
We	addressed	this	concern	in	the	current	study	by	directly	comparing	different	visual	
suppression	methods	in	an	adapted	version	of	the	2IFC	paradigm	used	in	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	.	
Critically,	instead	of	varying	the	presence/absence	of	a	target	stimulus	between	the	two	
intervals,	we	presented	a	target	stimulus	in		both	intervals,	and	instead	varied	the	suppression	
method	used	to	reduce	target	visibility	between	intervals.	Specifically,	on	each	trial,	a	left-	or	
right-tilted	target	grating	in	one	interval	was	masked	by	a	monocular	pattern	masking	method	
(FBM	in	Experiments	1.1	&	1.2,	backward	masking	(BM)	in	Experiment	1.3),	while	a	left-	or	
right-tilted	target	grating	in	the	other	interval	was	masked	by	a	binocular	rivalry-based	method	
(CFS	in	Experiments	1.1	&	1.3,	interocular	suppression	(IS)	in	Experiment	1.2).		
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	Using	this	setup,	if	one	suppression	method	is	in	fact	more		permissive		of	unconscious	
processing	than	the	other	,	then	when	subjective	awareness	of	the	target	grating	is	matched	
between	suppression	methods,	there	should	be	higher	objective	discrimination	performance	
under	the	more	permissive	method.	Similarly,	when	left/right	discrimination	performance	under	
the	two	methods	is	matched	near	perceptual	threshold,	subjective	awareness	of	the	target	
grating	should	be	relatively	reduced	under	the	more	permissive	method.	In	other	words,	we	
should	find	a	difference	in	the	magnitude	of	any	dissociation	between	objective	and	subjective	
discrimination	thresholds,	or		relative	blindsight		(Lau	&	Passingham,	2006)	,	between	the	two	
suppression	methods.		
	
We	chose	to	first	compare	masking	types	directly,	instead	of	simply	attempting	a	replication	of	
the	method	in	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	with	different	suppression	techniques,	because	theoretically	
it	should	be	easier	to	find	a	relative	dissociation	between	objective	and	subjective	thresholds	
(e.g.,	Lau	&	Passingham,	2006)	than	it	is	to	find	an	absolute	dissociation	[e.g.,	the	failure	to	find	
such	a	dissociation	in	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	].	A	test	of	relative	blindsight	should	therefore	have	
higher	sensitivity	in	terms	of	being	able	to	detect	meaningful	differences	in	the	relative	
positioning	of	objective	and	subjective	thresholds	between	different	visual	suppression	methods.	
We	tested	the	hypothesis	that	such	differences	exist	using	a	different	pair	of	suppression	
methods	in	each	of	three	psychophysical	experiments.	To	anticipate,	we	found	no	such	
evidence.	However,	a	lack	of	relative	blindsight	does	not	preclude	the	presence	of	absolute	
blindsight.	Therefore,	in	a	fourth	experiment	we	replicated	the	task	used	in	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	,	
but	used	CFS	instead	of	forward-backward	masking.	Again,	we	found	no	evidence	for	
unconscious	perception.	
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	Experiment	1.1:	Continuous	Flash	Suppression	Versus	Forward	and	Backward	Masking	
Methods	
Participants	
In	order	to	determine	the	number	of	participants	that	would	provide	sufficient	power	for	detecting	
an	unconscious	forced-choice	discrimination	effect	in	each	of	the	present	experiments,	we	first	
thought	to	base	our	predicted	effect	size	on	previous	studies	by	Hesselman	et	al.		(2011)	[4AFC	
percent	correct	on	unseen	trials	=	43%,	SD	=	14%,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.29]	and	Salti	et	al.		(2015)	
[8AFC	percent	correct	on	unseen	trials	=	50.4%,	SD	=	22.2%,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.71].	However,	
because	these	effect	sizes	are	relatively	large	--	thus	requiring	relatively	few	subjects	--	in	order	
to	increase	the	likelihood	of	detecting	a	more	moderate	unconscious	effect,	we	instead	set	our	
predicted	effect	size	to	a	more	conservative	level	of	Cohen’s	d	=	0.8,	a	standard	value	for	a	
large	effect.	To	further	increase	the	odds	of	finding	an	unconscious	perception	effect,	we	set	our	
desired	level	of	power	to	1-	β	=	0.90	at	α	=	0.05	rather	than	the	standard		1-	β	=	0.80.	Based	on	
these	parameters,	and	assuming	a	two-tailed	one	sample	t-test	for	hypothesis	testing,	a	power	
analysis	showed	that	the	necessary	sample	size	was	19	participants.	
	
Twenty-six	participants	(7	female,	ages	19-39,	1	left-handed,	10	left-eye	dominant,	3	
experienced),	including	the	first	author,	gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate	in	
Experiment		1.	1.	Three	of	these	participants,	noted	as	“experienced”	above,	participated	in	
Experiments		1.	2	and		1.	3	prior	to	Experiment		1.	1.	All	participants	had	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$10	USD	or	
given	course	credit	for	their	participation.	The	data	of	five	participants	were	removed	due	to	
failure	to	pass	the	adaptive	staircasing	stage	(see	Procedure	section	below).	The	data	of	one	
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additional	participant	were	removed	after	they	disclosed	that	they	began	pushing	buttons	at	
random	during	the	main	experiment.	Therefore,	20	total	participants	(6	female,	ages	20-39,	1	
left-handed,	8	left-eye	dominant,	3	experienced)	were	included	in	the	analyses	for	Experiment	
1.	1.	This	and	all	subsequent	experiments	were	conducted	in	accordance	with	the	Declaration	of	
Helsinki	and	were	approved	by	the	UCLA	Institutional	Review	Board.	
		
Apparatus	and	Stimuli	
All	stimuli	were	generated	with	custom	Matlab	R2013a	(Natuck,	MA)	scripts	using	PsychToolbox	
3.0.12	on	a	gamma-corrected	Dell	E773c	CRT	monitor	with	a	resolution	of	1024	x	768	pixels	
and	a	75Hz	refresh	rate.	To	achieve	binocular	rivalry,	all	stimuli	were	viewed	through	a	
ScreenScope	Desktop	stereoscope.	Target	stimuli	were	sinusoidal	gratings	with	a	spatial	
frequency	of	.025	cycles/pixel	tilted	45°	to	either	the	left	or	the	right	of	vertical.	Gratings	were	
153	pixels	in	diameter	and	were	viewed	through	a	circular	annulus	of	the	same	diameter	with	a	
Gaussian	hull	spatial	constant	of	100.	The	viewing	distance	was	33	cm,	making	grating	stimuli	
approximately	6.5	visual	degrees	in	diameter.	Mask	stimuli	were	colored	Mondrian	patterns	of	
the	same	dimensions	as	target	stimuli,	and	were	created	in	Matlab	as	previously	described			(Stein,	
Hebart,	&	Sterzer,	2011)	.	Target	and	mask	stimuli	were	presented	centered	within	two	square-shaped	
boxes	or	“fusion	contours”	(one	for	each	eye,	diameter	7.4	°	),	each	side	of	which	was	composed	
of	eleven	17x17	pixel	squares,	alternating	between	black	and	white	(see	Figure	1a).	By	default,	
fusion	contours	were	horizontally	centered	within	each	left/right	half	of	the	screen	(11.2	degrees	
from	the	midline	each)	and	vertically	centered	on	the	screen.	At	the	beginning	of	each	session	
participants	were	allowed	to	shift	the	on-screen	location	of	the	left	fusion	contours	by	button	
press	(one	pixel	per	press	in	any	of	the	cardinal	directions),	so	as	to	achieve	optimal	fusion	
when	viewing	the	screen	through	the	stereoscope.	Eight	of	20	participants	included	in	the	main	
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analyses	used	this	function	(mean		±	SD	shifts	=		3.58	°		±	1.87°		leftward	and	0.77	°		±		1.31°	
downward).	
	
Each	trial	of	the	main	experiment	contained	two	stimulus	intervals:	one	in	which	the	target	was	
masked	by	FBM,	and	the	other	in	which	the	target	was	masked	by	CFS	(Figure	1b,c).	Each	
stimulus	interval	had	a	total	length	of	533.3	ms.	In	both	FBM	and	CFS	intervals,	a	series	of	5	
different	masks	was	presented	to	one	eye.	In	the	FBM	interval,	all	stimuli	were	presented	to	the	
non-dominant	eye.	Each	mask	was	presented	for	53.3	ms	and	separated	from	the	next	mask	by	
a	53.3	ms	blank	interval,	with	the	exception	of	the	interval	between	the	2	nd		and	3	rd		masks,	in	the	
middle	of	which	the	target	appeared	for	26.7	ms	(Figure	1b).	The	dominant	eye	was	presented	
with	nothing	during	the	FBM	interval.	In	the	CFS	interval,	masks	were	presented	to	the	dominant	
eye	with	the	same	temporal	profile	as	in	the	FBM	interval.	To	the	non-dominant	eye,	the	target	
was	presented	at	a	range	of	contrast	levels,	which	started	at	0,	and	ramped	up	linearly	to	a	peak	
contrast	level	over	the	course	of	173	ms.	The	target	stayed	at	peak	contrast	for	26.7	ms,	and	
then	ramped	back	down	to	zero	linearly	over	the	course	of	173	ms.	The	last	159.6	ms	of	the	
stimulus	interval	for	the	non-dominant	eye	were	blank	(Figure	1b).	Target	offset	occurred	prior	to	
mask	offset	to	prevent	image	aftereffects	that	were	identified	in	pilot	experiments	and	have	also	
been	identified	previously		(Tsuchiya	&	Koch,	2005)	.	The	side	of	target	presentation	was	thus	
fixed	across	all	trials	for	each	participant	to	the	side	of	the	non-dominant	eye.	Eye	dominance	
was	determined	using	the	Miles	test	(Miles,	1930).	Timing	of	all	stimulus	presentations	was	
validated	using	a	Tektronix	TDS	3014B	oscilloscope.	
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	Figure 1. Continuous flash suppression versus forward and backward masking stimuli and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
procedure. a) Examples of target grating and mask stimuli used in all experiments. b) Temporal	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
dynamics of stimuli in Experiment 1.	1. Masks were presented for 53.3 ms each, with intervening	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
blank gaps of the same length. In FBM intervals, masks and target were presented to the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
non-dominant eye, with the target appearing for 26.7 ms evenly between masks 2 and 3. In CFS	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
intervals, masks were presented to the dominant eye, while the target grating was presented to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the non-dominant eye. The contrast of the target ramped up linearly from zero to peak contrast	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
over a period of 173 ms, remained at peak contrast for 26.7 ms, then ramped down linearly to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
zero over another 173 ms. c) procedure. FBM and CFS stimuli were presented in pseudo	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
random order, separated by a 1.0 s interstimulus interval. Following presentation of stimuli,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
participants were instructed to bet on the interval in which they felt more confident in their ability	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
to judge the orientation of the target grating. They were then asked to judge the orientations (left	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
or	right)	of	the	target	gratings	in	intervals	1	and	2,	in	that	order.	
	
Procedure	
The	trial	structure	in	the	main	experiment	extends	the	two-by-two	forced-choice	(2x2FC)	
paradigm	first	introduced	by	Nachmias	and	Weber		(1975)	.	This	method	was	subsequently	used	
to	explore	the	relationship	between	detection	and	identification		(Thomas,	Gille,	&	Barker,	1982;	
A.	B.	Watson	&	Robson,	1981)	,	and	has	more	recently	been	applied	to	research	on	perceptual	
confidence		(Barthelmé	&	Mamassian,	2009,	2010;	de	Gardelle	&	Mamassian,	2014)	.	The	
participant’s	task	was	to	discriminate	the	orientation	of	a	masked	target	grating	(left	or	right)	in	
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each	interval	(Type	1	decision)	and	to	indicate	the	interval	in	which	they	felt	more	confident	
about	their	orientation	judgment	(Type	2	decision;	Figure	1c).	Each	trial	started	with	the	
presentation	of	a	white	fixation	cross	(0.34°	diameter)	for	0.5	s.	This	was	followed	by	the	two	
stimulus	intervals	(described	above	–	0.5	s	each)	separated	by	a	1.0	s	inter-stimulus	interval	
containing	another	white	fixation	cross.	The	second	stimulus	interval	was	followed	by	a	0.5	s	
blue	fixation	cross	to	signal	the	upcoming	response	period.	Participants	were	then	presented	
with	three	response	prompts,	always	in	the	same	order,	all	of	which	were	responded	to	by	
button	press	on	a	regular	computer	keyboard.	First,	participants	were	asked	to	make	the	Type	2	
judgment	by	choosing	the	interval	in	which	they	felt	more	confident	in	their	orientation	judgment.	
Then	participants	were	asked	to	make	the	Type	1	orientation	judgments	for	the	targets	in	the	
first	and	second	intervals,	respectively	(Figure	1c).	The	confidence	judgment	was	placed	before	
the	orientation	judgments	to	prevent	participants	from	factoring	their	reaction	times	on	the	
orientation	task	into	their	confidence	judgments.	There	was	no	time	limit	for	response,	and	
speed	was	never	emphasized	to	participants.	Participants	were	also	informed	that	there	would	
be	several	intervals	in	which	they	may	not	subjectively	feel	they	saw	the	target,	and	that	for	
these	intervals,	they	should	give	their	best	guess	as	to	the	target’s	orientation.		
	
Prior	to	the	main	experiment,	participants	completed	42	practice	trials.	Practice	trial	structure	
was	identical	to	that	in	the	main	experiment,	except	for	the	addition	of	trial-by-trial	feedback	
about	the	accuracy	of	both	orientation	and	confidence	responses.	A	confidence	response	was	
considered	accurate	if	the	participant	bet	on	a	correct	orientation	judgment.	In	the	first	12	trials,	
target	Michelson	contrast	was	100%	under	both	suppression	conditions.	In	the	first	6	trials,	
stimuli	were	displayed	at	half	speed.	For	the	last	30	trials,	target	contrast	was	varied	
independently	under	each	suppression	condition	according	to	an	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	
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[QUEST		(Andrew	B.	Watson	&	Pelli,	1983)	]	set	to	estimate	the	target	stimulus	contrast	at	which	
orientation	discrimination	accuracy	would	be	75%	correct.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	the	
function	of	these	30	trials	was	only	to	familiarize	participants	with	the	task	under	gradually	more	
difficult	conditions.	Threshold	contrast	values	were	not	estimated	from	practice	session	data.		
	
Following	the	practice	trials,	participants	performed	another	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	to	
actually	estimate	the	target	contrast	values	at	which	orientation	discrimination	accuracy	would	
be	matched	at	75%	correct	for	both	suppression	methods.	This	procedure	consisted	of	4	blocks	
of	40	trials	each,	where	the	trial	structure	was	identical	to	that	of	the	main	experiment	(Figure	
1c),	with	the	exception	that	participants	were	not	asked	to	make	a	confidence	judgment.	
Staircases	for	CFS	and	FBM	target	gratings	were	independent,	and	a	threshold	contrast	value	
was	estimated	for	each	suppression	method	in	each	block	(4	estimates	total	per	suppression	
method).	The	median	of	these	threshold	contrast	estimates	for	each	suppression	method	was	
then	multiplied	by	five	different	proportions,	varied	slightly	from	subject	to	subject	by	the	
experimenters,	in	order	to	target	orientation	discrimination	performance	values	across	the	range	
of	60-90%	correct,	or,	roughly	speaking,	d’	=	0.5-2.5.	Proportions	used	to	determine	FBM	and	
CFS	contrast	values	were	as	follows:	Proportions	FBM		=	0.51	±	0.17,	0.75	±	0.10,	0.95	±	0.08,	
1.09	±	0.19,	1.35	±	0.14;	Proportions	CFS		=	0.35	±	0.11,	0.56	±	0.11,	0.79	±	0.09,	1.00	±	0.16,	1.25	
±	0.26.	Notably,	the	proportions	used	for	CFS	stimuli	were	lower	than	those	used	for	FBM	
stimuli	to	account	for	the	fact	that	the	staircasing	procedure	had	a	greater	tendency	to	
overestimate	threshold	contrast	values	for	CFS	stimuli	compared	to	FBM	stimuli.	Furthermore,	
the	QUEST	procedure	tended	to	overestimate	the	75%	correct	threshold	for		both	CFS	and	FBM;	
it	was	because	this	fact	was	only	gradually	revealed	to	the	experimenters	as	more	participants	
were	included	that	the	proportions	of	the	median	threshold	estimate	that	were	used	to	set	
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experimental	contrast	levels	were	ultimately	varied	slightly	between	participants.		Furthermore,	to	
minimize	potential	ceiling	effects	that	could	arise	from	perceptual	learning	during	the	main	
experiment,	staircasing	threshold	estimates	over	75%	contrast	were	excluded	from	the	median	
threshold	contrast	calculation.	
	
Additionally,	if	participants	did	not	have	threshold	contrast	estimates	less	than	or	equal	to	75%	
contrast	in	at	least	two	blocks	for	each	suppression	method,	they	repeated	the	same	staircasing	
procedure	(i.e.,	they	performed	an	additional	four	staircasing	blocks).	If	a	participant	repeated	
the	staircasing	procedure,	threshold	estimates	from	only	the	second	staircasing	procedure	were	
used	to	determine	the	contrast	values	used	in	the	main	experiment,	and	threshold	estimates	up	
to	100%	were	included	in	the	median	threshold	calculation.		As	long	as	a	participant	in	the	
second	staircasing	procedure	had	at	least	one	threshold	contrast	estimate	under	100%	for	each	
suppression	method,	they	were	allowed	to	proceed	to	the	main	experiment.	Otherwise,	they	
were	told	that	the	experiment	was	finished	and	were	excluded	from	participating	in	the	main	
experiment.	Five	participants	were	excluded	in	this	way.	Notably,	all	five	failed	the	QUEST	
procedure	only	for	CFS	stimuli,	suggesting	that	the	CFS	task	was,	on	average,	more	difficult	to	
learn	than	the	FBM	task.	
	
For	the	main	experiment,	a	full	factorial	design	was	used	in	which	all	combinations	of	
suppression	method	order	(2),	target	orientation	(2x2),	and	target	contrast	level	for	each	
suppression	method	(5x5)	were	presented,	leading	to	a	total	of	200	unique	trials.	Each	unique	
trial	was	presented	twice,	making	for	a	total	of	400	trials,	which	were	randomized	over	eight	
50-trial	blocks.	At	the	end	of	each	block,	participants	were	allowed	to	take	a	break	with	no	time	
limit.	At	this	time	they	were	also	given	a	score	corresponding	to	their	performance	on	the	
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previous	block,	which	was	computed	according	to	the	following	rules:	one	point	was	added	or	
subtracted	for	each	correct	or	incorrect	orientation	judgment,	respectively.	An	additional	point	
was	either	added	or	subtracted	for	each	trial	in	which	they	correctly	or	incorrectly,	respectively,	
discriminated	the	target	orientation	in	the	interval	in	which	they	indicated	higher	confidence.	
Participants	were	given	a	bonus	of	$10	USD	if	their	final	score	exceeded	that	of	the	previous	
participant.		
	
After	participants	completed	the	main	experiment	they	were	asked	verbally	by	the	experimenter	
whether,	across	the	main	experiment,	they	noticed	any	differences	between	the	two	stimulus	
intervals	beyond	basic	differences	in	difficulty.	This	question	was	important	in	determining	
whether	there	may	have	been	decisional	or	other	cognitive	response	biases	influencing	
subjects’	confidence	responses.	For	example,	if	a	participant	could	consistently	distinguish	
between	the	FBM	and	CFS	intervals,	they	might	have	consciously	associated	one	of	the	two	
with	higher	confidence	and,	consequently,	bet	on	that	interval	more	frequently.	
	
Data	Analysis	
The	main	question	that	was	investigated	in	each	of	the	current	studies	was	whether	or	not	we	
could	find	a	difference	in	the	relationship	between	subjective	awareness	and	objective	
performance	between	two	visual	suppression	methods.	To	get	at	this	question,	we	used	
orientation	discrimination	d’		(Green	&	Swets,	1966)	as	an	index	of	objective	performance	and	
confidence	judgments	as	an	index	of	subjective	awareness		(Fleming	&	Lau,	2014;	Lau	&	
Rosenthal,	2011)	.		
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For	each	subject,	data	were	collapsed	across	target	orientation	order	(Left-Left,	Left-Right,	
Right-Left,	Right-Right)	and	mask	order	(FBM-CFS,	CFS-FBM)	for	each	combination	of	contrast	
levels	(5	FBM	contrasts	x	5	CFS	contrasts	=	25	combinations)	in	each	trial.	Orientation	
discrimination	d’	was	calculated	for	each	suppression	method	for	each	of	these	contrast	
combinations.	Type	1	hits	were	defined	as	trials	in	which	the	target	had	a	left	tilt	and	the	subject	
chose	left.	Type	1	false	alarms	were	defined	as	trials	in	which	the	target	had	a	right	tilt	and	the	
subject	chose	left.	To	adjust	for	values	of	infinite	d’	in	all	experiments	we	used	a	standard	
correction	that	converts	hit	rates	and	false	alarm	rates	of	1	and	0	to	1	-	1/2N	and	1/2N,	
respectively,	where	N	is	the	number	of	trials	used	in	the	calculation	of	d’		(MacMillan	&	
Creelman,	2004)	.		
	
We	then	plotted,	for	each	of	the	25	contrast	combinations	for	each	subject,	the	proportion	of	
trials	in	which	the	CFS	interval	was	rated	with	higher	confidence	against	the	difference	in	d’	
between	the	CFS	and	FBM	intervals	(see	Figure	2b).	Individual	psychometric	curves	were	then	
generated	by	fitting	the	resulting	25	data	points	with	a	cumulative	normal	distribution	function	
with	free	parameters	α	(threshold)	and	β	(slope),	and	fixed	parameters	γ	(lapse	rate)	=	0	and	δ	
(guess	rate)	=	0,	using	the	Palamedes	Toolbox		(Kingdom	&	Prins,	2010)	.		
	
If	there	is	no	difference	in	the	relationship	between	subjective	awareness	and	objective	
performance	between	two	given	suppression	methods,	then	we	should	expect	the	point	of	
subjective	equality	(PSE),	or	the	difference	in	d’	at	which	participants	are	equally	likely	to	bet	on	
the	two	suppression	methods,	to	be	zero.	Similarly,	the	point	of	objective	equality	(POE),	or	the	
likelihood	of	betting	on	the	CFS	interval	when	d’	CFS		-	d’	FBM		=	0,	should	be	50%.	If,	on	the	other	
hand,	the	relationship	between	subjective	awareness	and	objective	performance	is	significantly	
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different	between	the	two	suppression	methods,	then	the	psychometric	function	should	shift	
such	that	the	PSE	and	POE	should	be	significantly	different	from	zero	and	50%,	respectively.	
Therefore,	in	each	of	the	following	experiments,	the	first	two	major	tests	of	interest	were	
one-sample	t-tests	(α	=	.05,	two-tailed)	conducted	on	the	PSEs	and	POEs	obtained	from	the	
individually-fitted	psychometric	functions,	with	the	null	hypothesis	being	that	the	mean	PSE	and	
POE	across	participants	are	equal	to	zero	and	50%,	respectively.	In	the	case	of	the	POE	
analysis,	since	d’	is	matched	between	suppression	methods,	subjective	awareness	is	
operationally	defined	in	this	case	in	line	with	Giles,	Lau,	&	Odegaard		(2016)	,	as	the	difference	in	
Type	2	responding	when	Type	1	performance	is	matched.	Analyses	for	each	experiment	were	
conducted	in	Matlab	R2013a	(Natuck,	MA),	with	the	exception	of	repeated	measures	ANOVAs,	
which	were	conducted	in	SPSS	v22	(IBM,	Armonk,	NY,	USA),	and	TOST	equivalence	tests,	
which	were	conducted	in	R	using	the	TOSTone.bf	function	provided	in	Lakens	et	al.		(2018)	.	All	
repeated	measures	ANOVAs	were		adjusted	for	violations	of	the	assumption	of	sphericity	with	
the	Greenhouse-Geisser	correction	when	necessary.	
	
Additionally,	we	used	the	'two	one-sided	tests'	(TOST)	approach	as	described	by	Lakens	et	al.	
(2018)	to	more	rigorously	test	whether	or	not	we	can	reject	the	presence	of	an	unconscious	
perception	effect	as	small	as	Cohen’s	d	=	0.8	(see	power	analysis	description	in	‘Participants’	
section	above).	This	approach,	as	it	sounds,	entails	performing	two	one-sided	t-tests	against	
lower	and	upper	bounds	that	are	determined	by	a	given	minimum	effect	size	of	interest.	In	this	
case	the	null	hypothesis	is	now	that	the	true	effect	(here,	a	shift	in	either	the	PSE	or	POE)	is	at	
least	as	large	as	this	smallest	effect	size	of	interest.	If	we	are	able	to	reject	this	null	hypothesis	
at	each	bound	at	alpha	=	0.05,	then	we	can	conclude	that	the	true	effect	in	the	population	is	
smaller	than	the	smallest	effect	size	of	interest	with	a	type	1	error	rate	of	5%		(Lakens	et	al.,	
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2018)	.	We	therefore	present	two	sets	of	t-	and	p-values	for	each	TOST	analysis,	along	with	the	
90%	confidence	intervals	for	POE	and	PSE	shifts.	
	
Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subjects	factors	contrast	(5	levels)	and	suppression	
method	(FBM	or	CFS)	revealed	the	expected	main	effect	of	contrast	on	orientation	
discrimination	d’	[F(1.92,36.56)	=	79.62,	p	<	0.001]	(Figure	2a),	i.e.	that	increased	contrast	led	to	
higher	performance.	The	ANOVA	also	showed	no	main	effect	of	suppression	method	[F(1,19)	=	
1.73,	p	=	0.20],	but	a	significant	interaction	between	contrast	and	suppression	method	
[F(2.40,45.58)	=	4.68,	p	=	0.010].	Figure	2a	suggests	that	this	interaction	is	driven	by	the	
sudden	divergence	in	d’	between	suppression	methods	at	the	highest	contrast	level.	This	was	
confirmed	by	post	hoc	Bonferroni	corrected	two-tailed	paired	t-tests	[at	contrast	level	5:	t(19)	=	
4.39,	p	<	0.001,	whereas	p-values	for	contrast	levels	1-4	were	all	>	0.32].	Because,	by	design,	
contrast	levels	for	the	main	experiment	were	selected	on	a	subject-by-subject	basis	with	the	
goal	of	optimally	matching	d’	between	suppression	methods,	this	result	is	mostly	attributable	to	
experimenter	error.	Nonetheless,	the	lack	of	a	main	effect	of	suppression	method	on	
discrimination	d’	in	the	ANOVA	indicates	that,	across	contrast	levels,	Type	1	performance	was	
matched	between	FBM	and	CFS.	However,	to	check	for	any	potential	biasing	of	the	PSE	and	
POE	analyses	that	could	have	resulted	from	the	difference	in	d’	between	suppression	methods	
at	the	highest	contrast	level,	we	conducted	the	PSE	and	POE	analyses	once	with	all	contrast	
levels	included,	and	once	using	only	contrast	levels	1-4.	
	
As	for	the	main	analyses,	looking	across	all	contrast	levels,	PSE	and	POE	values	were	-0.28		±	
0.21	and	51.5%	±	2.1%,	respectively.	Two-tailed	paired	t-tests	indicated	insufficient	evidence	to	
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reject	the	null	hypotheses	that	the	PSE	is	equal	to	zero	[t(19)	=	-1.35,	p	=	0.19,	95%	CI	=	(-0.72,	
0.15)]	and	the	POE	is	equal	to	50%	[t(19)	=	0.73,	p	=	0.47,	95%	CI	=	(47.2%,	55.8%)]	(Figure	
2b).	When	we	excluded	the	highest	contrast	level,	there	was	still	insufficient	evidence	to	reject	
the	null	hypothesis	in	each	case	[PSE:	t(19)	=	-1.29,	p	=	0.21,	95%	CI	=	(-0.80,	0.1926);	POE:	
t(19)	=	1.04,	p	=0.31,	95%	CI	=	(47.9%,	56.4%)].		
	
TOST	equivalence	tests	for	both	PSE	and	POE	suggested	that	we	can	reject	the	hypothesis	
that	there	is	an	unconscious	perception	effect	in	the	study	sample	as	small	as	Cohen’s	d	=	0.8	
[PSE:	t1(19)	=	2.22,	p1	=	0.019,	t2(19)	=	-4.93,	p2	<	0.001,	90%	CI	for	PSE	shift	=	(-0.64,	0.08);	
POE:		t1(19)	=	4.31,	p1	<	0.001,	t2(19)	=	-2.84,	p2	=	0.005,	90%	CI	for	POE	shift	=	(-2.1%,	
5.1%)].	We	emphasize	again	that	the	minimum	effect	size	selected	for	our	power	and	TOST	
analyses	of	Cohen’s	d	=	0.8,	which	is,	generally	speaking,	a		large	effect	size,	is		relatively	
conservative	here	given	multiple	previously	reported	unconscious	forced-choice	discrimination	
effect	sizes	greater	than	Cohen’s	d	=	1.2	(see	Experiment	1.1	Methods).	However,	given	the	
more	conservative	controls	for	criterion	bias	in	the	present	paradigm,	we	might	naturally	expect	
smaller	effect	sizes	than	those	found	in	earlier	studies.	The	same	pattern	of	results	held	when	
excluding	the	highest	contrast	level	[PSE:	t1(19)	=	2.29,	p1	=	0.017,	t2(19)	=	-4.87,	p2	<	0.001,	
90%	CI	for	PSE	shift	=	(-0.71,	0.10);	POE:		t1(19)	=	4.61,	p1	<	0.001,	t2(19)	=	-2.54,	p2	=	0.010,	
90%	CI	for	POE	shift	=	(-1.41%,	5.61%);].	
	
Overall,	the	PSE	results	suggest	that	when	subjective	awareness	is	matched,	there	is	no	
difference	in	the	level	of	objective	performance	under	FBM	and	CFS.	Similarly,	the	POE	
analysis	suggests	that	when	Type	1	performance	is	matched,	there	is	no	difference	in	
participants’	subjective	awareness	of	the	target	stimulus	between	the	two	suppression	methods.		
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	Importantly,	all	participants	responded	in	the	negative	when	asked,	after	the	main	experiment,	if	
on	any	trials	they	noticed	differences	between	the	two	intervals	beyond	difficulty	level.	This	
suggests	that	participants’	confidence	judgements	were	not	subject	to	decisional	biases	based	
on	explicit	knowledge	about	the	difference	between	FBM	and	CFS	stimuli.		
	
	
Figure 2. Continuous flash suppression versus forward and backward masking results	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(Experiment 1.1) results. a) Orientation discrimination performance (d’) at increasing target	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
contrast under FBM (solid line) and CFS (dashed line). Error bars indicate ± 1 SEM. b) Average	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
psychometric curve. For each participant, the proportion of trials in which they bet on the CFS	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
interval was plotted as a function of the difference in d’ between CFS and FBM intervals for	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
each of the 25 combinations of stimulus contrast levels that could occur in a single trial (shown	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
are group means ± 1 SEM). A cumulative normal function was then fit to each participant’s data,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
with mean and slope as free parameters. Plotted is the mean of the individual participant fits	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(black line) ± 1 SD (gray). The 95% confidence interval for the estimated PSE and POE group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
means are shown by the black bars sitting near the x- and y-axes, respectively. A significant	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
rightward shift of the psychometric curve, such that the confidence interval for the PSE were to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
fall above of zero, would suggest that when subjective awareness is matched between CFS and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
FBM, d’ is significantly higher under CFS than under FBM. Similarly, if a rightward shift of the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
psychometric curve makes it such that the confidence interval for the POE falls below 50%, then	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
it would suggest that subjective awareness of the target stimulus is higher under FBM when d’ is	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
matched. This would indicate relative blindsight. The opposite interpretations would hold if the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
confidence interval for PSE were below zero and the confidence interval for POE were above	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
50%. The fact that zero falls within the observed PSE confidence interval suggests that when	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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subjective awareness of the target was matched between CFS and FBM, there was no	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
significant difference in discrimination d’ between the two suppression methods. Similarly, the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
fact that 50% falls within the observed POE confidence interval suggests no evidence for	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
relative	blindsight.	
	
One	concern	is	that		the	gaps	between	masks	in	the	CFS	condition,	which	lead	to	a	collective	
156.9	ms	in	which	the	target	is	presented	to	one	eye	with	no	mask	presented	to	the	other	eye	
(Figure	1b),	may	minimize	the	degree	to	which	the	CFS	condition	elicits	a	true	binocular	rivalry	
effect.	If	this	is	the	case,	then,	presumably,	it	should	also	minimize	mechanistic	differences	
underlying	the	disruption	of	visual	processing	between	the	two	suppression	methods,	thereby	
reducing	our	chances	of	rejecting	the	null	hypothesis.		
	
One	potential	piece	of	evidence	that	FBM	and	CFS	use	different	mechanisms	to	disrupt	visual	
processing	is	that		target	contrast	values	were	significantly	lower	for	CFS	stimuli	(23.42	±	2.94%	
Michelson	contrast)	than	they	were	for	FBM	stimuli	(35.18	±	1.17%	Michelson	contrast)	
[two-tailed,	paired	t-test:	t(19)	=	4.89,	p	<	0.001].	Importantly,	this	result	holds	when	excluding	
the	highest	contrast	level	[two-tailed,	paired	t-test:	t(19)	=	5.12,	p	<	0.001].		However,	an	
alternative	interpretation	is	that	the	lower	contrast	thresholds	found	in	the	CFS	condition	are	
simply	driven	by	the	longer	presentation	times	for	CFS	target	stimuli	relative	to	FBM	target	
stimuli.	Disambiguating	these	hypotheses	is	critical	for	establishing	that	the	FBM	and	CFS	
conditions	induce	mechanistically	different	visual	suppression	effects.	We	address	this	issue	
directly	in	Experiment		1.	2.	
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Experiment	1.2:	Continuous	Flash	Suppression	Versus	Interocular	Suppression		
Methods	
Participants	
Twenty	participants	(9	female,	ages	18-39,	3	left-handed,	8	left-eye	dominant,	7	experienced),	
including	the	first	author,	gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate.	Six	of	the	20	participants	
in	Experiment	1.2	had	previously	participated	in	Experiment	1.1.	One	participant	had	previously	
participated	in	Experiment	1.3.	One	participant	(inexperienced)	was	excluded	due	to	reporting	
incomplete	fusion	of	binocular	stimuli	on	many	trials	during	the	main	experiment.	Therefore,	19	
total	participants	(8	female,	ages	21-39,	2	left-handed,	8	left-eye	dominant,	7	experienced)	were	
included	in	the	analyses	for	Experiment	1.2.	All	participants	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	
eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$10	USD	or	given	course	credit	for	
their	participation.	
	
Apparatus	and	Stimuli	
Apparatus	and	stimuli	in	Experiment	1.2	were	the	same	as	in	Experiment	1.1,	except	for	the	
following.	Instead	of	CFS,	we	used	a	binocular	rivalry	technique	conventionally	referred	to	as	
interocular	suppression	(IS)	(Breitmeyer,	2015;	Izatt	et	al.,	2014).	The	sole	difference	between	
the	CFS	condition	in	Experiment	1.1	and	the	IS	condition	in	Experiment	1.2	is	that	the	target	
grating	no	longer	had	its	contrast	ramped	up	from	and	down	to	zero.	Instead,	the	IS	target	
grating	had	the	same	duration	as	the	FBM	target	grating	(26.7	ms),	and	its	contrast	was	
constant	(Figure	3a).	Furthermore,	in	each	interval	the	target	had	an	equal	probability	of	
appearing	between	either	masks	2	and	3	or	masks	3	and	4.	The	randomization	was	
independent	in	the	two	intervals	such	that	in	approximately	half	of	all	trials	(48%		±	3%)		the	
target	appeared	between	the	same	mask	numbers	(e.g.,	2	and	3)	in	each	interval,	while	in	the	
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remainder	of	trials	the	target	appeared	between	different	mask	numbers	in	each	interval	(e.g.,	
between	masks	2	and	3	for	FBM	and	masks	3	and	4	for	IS).	This	manipulation	was	introduced	
to	minimize	the	degree	to	which	participants	could	anticipate	the	timing	of	target	onset.	Such	
anticipation,	whether	conscious	or	unconscious,	could	potentially	minimize	visual	processing	
differences	between	the	two	masking	conditions.	Eight	participants	included	in	the	analyses	
shifted	the	left	fusion	contours	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment	by	3.36°	±	1.53°	leftward	and	
2.51	°		±	1.96°	downward.	
	
Therefore,	across	the	entire	experiment,	the	only	difference	between	FBM	and	IS	stimuli	was	
ocularity	(Figure	3a).	It	follows	that	if	we	observe	differences	in	contrast	thresholds	and	stimulus	
contrast	values	at	matched	d’	between	FBM	and	IS	similar	to	those	found	between	FBM	and	
CFS	in	Experiment	1.1,	then	these	differences	should	be	attributed	to	the	difference	in	ocularity	
between	the	two	conditions.	This	result	would	provide	additional	evidence	for	the	presence	of	a	
binocular	rivalry-based	suppression	effect	in	our	original	CFS	condition.	
	
We	also	reasoned,	based	on	previous	evidence	for	a	higher	degree	of	subliminal	priming	under	
FBM	than	IS		(Breitmeyer,	2015;	Izatt,	Dubois,	Faivre,	&	Koch,	2014)	,	that	IS	may	allow	a	greater	
degree	of	unconscious	orientation	discrimination	than	FBM.	If	true,	we	would	expect	a	leftward	
shift	in	the	psychometric	function	such	that	at	the	PSE	there	would	be	significantly	higher	
discrimination	d’	under	FBM	than	under	IS,	and	at	the	POE	there	would	be	a	significantly	higher	
tendency	to	bet	on	the	IS	interval.	
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Procedure	and	Data	Analyses	
The	procedure	in	Experiment	1.2	was	the	same	as	that	in	Experiment	1.1	except	for	the	
following.	Different	proportions	of	the	median	threshold	contrast	estimate	from	staircasing	were	
used		to	determine	target	contrast	values	for	the	main	experiment	(Proportions	FBM		=	0.50	±	0.14,	
0.69	±	0.11,	0.95	±	0.11,	1.09	±	0.13,	1.35	±	0.19;	Proportions	IS		=	0.35	±	0.13,	0.56	±	0.09,	0.79	
±	0.04,	1.02	±	0.08,	1.25	±	0.19).	Again,	the	proportions	used	for	IS	were	lower	than	those	used	
for	FBM	to	account	for	the	tendency	of	the	staircasing	procedure	to	overestimate	threshold	
contrast	values	to	a	greater	extent	for	IS	stimuli	than	for	FBM	stimuli.		
	
Additionally,	40	catch	trials,	in	which	the	contrast	of	the	target	grating	in	one	of	the	two	intervals	
(counterbalanced	between	suppression	methods)	was	at	100%,	were	randomly	interleaved	
among	the	400	main	experiment	trials.	This	made	for	a	total	of	440	trials	in	the	main	experiment,	
which	were	divided	into	eight	55-trial	blocks.	These	catch	trials	were	added	both	to	help	
participants	maintain	perceptual	templates	of	the	left-	and	right-tilted	target	gratings,	and	to	keep	
participants	motivated	throughout	what	is	otherwise	a	very	difficult	and,	according	to	anecdotal	
evidence	from	some	participants	following	Experiment		1.	1,	sometimes	demoralizing	task.		
	
Analysis	procedures	followed	those	conducted	in	Experiment		1.	1.	
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Figure 3. Experiment 1.2 procedure and results. a) Temporal dynamics of stimuli from	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Experiment 1.2. Mask stimuli had the same temporal profile as those in Experiment 1.1. Target	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
stimuli in the IS interval appeared abruptly at peak contrast instead of ramping up and down in	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
contrast as in Experiment 1.1. In each interval target stimuli were presented pseudo randomly	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
between either the second and third or third and fourth masks. b) Orientation discrimination	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
performance (d’) at increasing target contrast under FBM (solid line) and IS (dashed line). c)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Average psychometric curve and 95% confidence intervals for estimated PSE and POE group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
means, calculated and shown the same way as in Experiment 1.1 (see methods, Figure 2).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Because the PSE confidence interval contains the point d’	difference = 0 and the POE confidence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
interval contains the point at which subjects were 50% likely to bet on either suppression	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
method, these results suggest that there was no evidence for a difference in the relationship	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
between objective and subjective thresholds between FBM and IS. Error bars in B & C indicate	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
±	1	SEM.	Gray	region	in	C	indicates	±	1	SD	of	psychometric	fits.	
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Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subjects	factors	contrast	(5	levels),	suppression	
method	(FBM	or	IS),	and	target	timing	(between	masks	2	and	3	or	between	masks	3	and	4)	
again	showed	the	expected	main	effect	of	contrast	on	orientation	discrimination	d’	
[F(2.74,49.38)	=	159.85,	p	<	0.001;	Figure	3a].	As	in	Experiment		1.	1,	there	was	no	main	effect	
of	suppression	method	[F(1,18)	=	0.17,	p	=	0.68],	suggesting	again	that,	overall,	performance	
was	matched	between	the	FBM	and	IS	conditions.	Unlike	Experiment		1.	1,	however,	there	was	
no	interaction	between	contrast	and	suppression	method	[F(2.66,47.85)	=	2.26,	p	=	0.10],	
suggesting	that	discrimination	d’	was	matched	effectively	between	the	two	suppression	methods	
across	contrast	levels.	
	
Interestingly,	there	was	a	main	effect	of	target	timing	[F(1,18)	=	25.41,	p	<	0.001],	such	that	
discrimination	d’	was	significantly	higher	when	the	target	stimulus	was	presented	between	
masks	2	and	3	than	when	it	was	presented	between	masks	3	and	4.	This	effect	of	stimulus	
timing	on	objective	performance	may	be	attributable	to	rhythmic	attentional	sampling		(Landau	&	
Fries,	2012)	set	by	visual	cues	preceding	the	onset	of	the	target	stimulus	(e.g.,	the	initial	fixation	
cross	or	the	onset	of	the	first	mask).There	was	no	interaction	between	either	target	timing	and	
contrast	[F(4,72)	=	2.01,	p	=	0.10],	or	target	timing	and	suppression	method	[F(1,18)	=	0.65,	p	=	
0.432].	There	was	no	significant	3-way	interaction	[F(4,72)	=	1.26,	p	=	0.30].		
	
As	in	Experiment	1.1,	we	did	not	find	evidence	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	that	d’	is	matched	
between	suppression	methods	at	the		PSE		[t(18)	=	-0.07,	p	=	0.95,	95%	CI	=	(-0.22,	0.21);	
Figure	3b].	Similarly,	we	did	not	find	evidence	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	that	subjects	are	
equally	likely	to	bet	on	each	suppression	method	at	the	POE	(i.e.,	there	was	no	evidence	for	
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relative	blindsight)	[t(18)	=	-0.004,	p	>	0.99,	95%	CI	=	(48.2%,	51.8%)].	TOST	equivalence	tests	
similarly	suggested	that	the	effect	size	of	any	POE	or	PSE	shift	in	the	population	is	no	larger	
than	Cohen’s	d	=	0.8	[PSE:	t1(18)	=	3.42,	p1	=	0.002,	t2(18)	=	-3.55,	p2	=	0.001,	90%	CI	for	
PSE	shift	=	(-0.19,	0.17);	POE:		t1(18)	=	3.48,	p1	=	0.001,	t2(18)	=	-3.49,	p2	=	0.001,	90%	CI	for	
POE	shift	=	(-1.46%,	1.46%)].	
	
It	was	also	verified	that	target	contrast	values	(across	all	levels)	were	again	lower	under	IS	
(15.99	±	1.78%)	than	they	were	under	FBM	(30.52	±	2.51%)	[t(18)	=	6.19,	p	<	0.001].	This	
provides	evidence	for	a	difference	in	the	mechanism	of	visual	suppression	between	FBM	and	
the	binocular	conditions	in	both	Experiments		1.	1	and		1.	2,	despite	the	absence	of	the	
hypothesized	difference	in	the	relationship	between	objective	performance	and	subjective	
awareness.	
	
Also	consistent	with	Experiment		1.	1,	no	participants	indicated	noticing	a	difference	between	
FBM	and	IS	intervals	when	questioned	after	the	main	experiment.	Furthermore,	participants	
were	98.8%	±	0.64%	correct	when	discriminating	catch	trial	target	stimuli	with	100%	contrast.	
Betting	accuracy	on	catch	trials	was	similarly	high	(97.5	±	0.94%	correct,	where	a	correct	bet	is	
defined	as	a	bet	on	an	interval	in	which	the	orientation	judgment	was	correct),	suggesting	that	
participants	were	maintaining	attention	throughout	the	experiment.	
	
Given	that	the	main	results	in	Experiments	1.1	and	1.2	both	suggest	that	there	is	no	difference	
in	the	relative	positions	of	subjective	and	objective	perceptual	thresholds	between	the	
respective	monocular	and	binocular	suppression	methods,	we	next	turned	to	backward	masking	
(BM)	as	an	alternative	to	FBM.	Previous	evidence	suggests	that	BM,	but	not	CFS,	allows	for	the	
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subliminal	priming	with	non-manipulable	objects		(Almeida,	Mahon,	Nakayama,	&	Caramazza,	
2008)	.	It	has	also	been	suggested	that,	relative	to	FBM,	the	visual	signal	under	BM	may	benefit	
from	an	increased	signal-to-noise	ratio	when	performance	is	matched		(Breitmeyer,	2015;	Harris,	
Wu,	&	Woldorff,	2011;	Macknik	&	Livingstone,	1998)	.	We	therefore	hypothesized	that	BM	may	
allow	for	a	greater	degree	of	unconscious	processing	than	CFS,	and	that,	in	our	2IFC	paradigm,	
we	may	therefore	see	the	psychometric	function	shift	so	as	to	show	higher	discrimination	d’	
under	BM	at	the	PSE,	and	a	higher	tendency	to	bet	on	the	CFS	interval	at	the	POE.	
	
Experiment	1.3:	Continuous	Flash	Suppression	Versus	Backward	Masking	
Methods	
Participants	
Twenty	participants	(8	female,	ages	21-39,	2	left-handed,	10	left-eye	dominant,	14	experienced),	
including	the	first	author,	gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate.	Three	of	the	20	
participants	in	Experiment	1.3	had	previously	participated	in	only	Experiment	1.1,	seven	had	
previously	participated	in	only	Experiment	1.2,	and	four	had	previously	participated	in	both	
Experiments	1.1	and	1.2.	One	participant	was	removed	due	to	failure	to	pass	the	adaptive	
staircasing	stage.	Therefore,	19	participants	(7	female,	ages	21-39,	2	left-handed,	10	left-eye	
dominant,	14	experienced)	were	included	for	analysis.	All	participants	had	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$10	USD	or	
given	course	credit	for	their	participation.	
	
Apparatus	and	Stimuli	
Apparatus	and	stimuli	in	Experiment	1.3	were	the	same	as	in	Experiment	1.1,	except	for	the	
following.	For	both	BM	and	CFS	conditions,	mask	stimuli	were	shifted	later	in	time	by	26.7	ms.	
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In	the	BM	interval,	the	first	mask	was	preceded	by	the	target,	which	had	a	duration	of	26.7	ms,	
meaning	target	offset	coincided	with	mask	onset.	In	the	CFS	interval,	target	onset	coincided	with	
the	onset	of	the	first	mask	and	returned	to	the	same	ramping	dynamics	used	in	Experiment	1.1	
(Figure	4a).	Nine	of	the	19	participants	included	in	the	analyses	shifted	the	left	fusion	contours	
at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment	by	2.81°		±	1.95	°	leftward	and	2.65°		±	1.89	°	downward		.	
	
Procedure	
The	procedure	in	Experiment	1.3	was	the	same	as	that	in	Experiment	1.2	except	for	the	use	of	
different	proportions	of	the	median	threshold	contrast	estimate		to	determine	target	contrast	
values	for	the	main	experiment	(Proportions	BM		=	0.15	±	0.10,	0.28	±	0.12,	0.48	±	0.09,	0.70	±	
0.08,	0.96	±	0.09;	Proportions	CFS		=	0.19	±	0.18,	0.38	±	0.14,	0.62	±	0.08,	0.87	±	0.05,	1.18	±	
0.13).	Interestingly,	median	threshold	contrast	estimates	were,	on	average,	more	overestimated	
under	BM	than	they	were	under	CFS.	As	a	result,	the	proportions	used	to	determine	target	
contrast	levels	for	the	main	experiment	were	lower	for	BM	stimuli	than	they	were	for	CFS	stimuli.	
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Figure 4. Experiment 1.3 procedure and results. a) Temporal dynamics of stimuli from	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Experiment 1.3. In BM intervals the target was first presented for 26.7 ms and was immediately	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
followed by the first mask. Five masks were presented for 53.3 ms each, with intervening blank	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
gaps of the same length. The offset of the last mask was followed by a blank gap of 26.7 ms.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Masks in the CFS interval had the same temporal profile as those in the BM interval. The onset	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
of the target stimulus in the CFS interval occurred simultaneously with the onset of the first	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
mask and otherwise had the same temporal ramping profile as the target stimulus in Experiment	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1.1 (see methods, Figure 1). b) Orientation discrimination performance (d’) at increasing target	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
contrast under BM (solid line) and CFS (dashed line). c) Average psychometric curve and 95%	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
confidence intervals for estimated PSE and POE group means, calculated and shown the same	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
way as in Experiment 1.1 (see methods, Figure 2). Because the PSE confidence interval	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
contains the point d’	difference = 0 and the POE confidence interval contains the point at which	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
subjects were 50% likely to bet on either suppression method, these results suggest that there	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
was no evidence for a difference in the relationship between objective and subjective thresholds	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
between BM and CFS. Error bars in B & C indicate ± 1 SEM. Gray region in C indicates ± 1 SD	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
of	psychometric	fits.	
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Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
Consistent	with	Experiments		1.	1	and		1.	2,	a	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subject	
factors	contrast	(5	levels)	and	suppression	method	(BM	or	CFS)	showed	the	expected	main	
effect	of	contrast	[F(2.54,45.7)	=	154.8,	p	<	0.001;	Figure	4b]	and	no	main	effect	of	suppression	
method	[F(1,18)	=	0.30,	p	=	0.59].	Consistent	with	Experiment		1.	2,	there	was	no	significant	
interaction	between	contrast	and	suppression	method	[F(2.31,	41.6)	=	0.78,	p	=	0.48],	
suggesting	that	d’	was	effectively	matched	between	suppression	methods	across	contrast	levels	
(Figure	4b).		
	
Regarding	the	main	analysis,	once	again	there	was	not	sufficient	evidence	to	reject	the	null	
hypothesis	that	d’	is	matched	between	BM	and	CFS	at	the	PSE	[t(18)	=	-0.52,	p	=	0.61,		95%	CI	
=	(-0.45,	0.27)	;	Figure	4c].	Nor	was	their	sufficient	evidence	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis		that	
subjects	are	equally	likely	to	bet	on	each	suppression	method	at	the	POE	[t(18)	=	0.53,	p	=	0.60,	
95%	CI	=	(47.4%,	54.4%)],	again	providing	no	evidence	for	relative	blindsight.	TOST	
equivalence	tests	again	suggested	that	any	POE	or	PSE	shifts	in	the	population	have	effect	
sizes	no	larger	than	Cohen’s	d	=	0.8	[PSE:	t1(18)	=	2.97,	p1	=	0.004,	t2(18)	=	-4.01,	p2	<	0.001,	
90%	CI	for	PSE	shift	=	(-0.38,	0.21);	POE:	t1(18)	=	4.02,	p1	<	0.001	,	t2(18)	=	-2.96,	p2	=	0.004,	
90%	CI	for	POE	shift	=	(-2.0%,	3.8%)].		Experiment		1.	3	was	therefore	in	line	with	Experiments	
1.	1	and		1.	2	in	providing	no	evidence	for	a	difference	in	the	relationship	between	objective	
performance	and	subjective	awareness	between	suppression	methods.		
	
Interestingly,	mean	stimulus	contrast	per	subject	in	the	main	experiment	was	significantly	lower	
under	BM	(9.30	±	1.45%)	than	under	CFS	(17.737	±	2.60%)	[t(18)	=	-3.28,	p	=	0.004].	This	
decrease	in	threshold	target	contrast	from	FBM	to	BM	is	presumably	due	to	the	relative	lack	of	
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interference	with	feedforward	processing	under	BM		(Breitmeyer,	2015;	Harris	et	al.,	2011;	
Macknik	&	Livingstone,	1998)	.	
	
No	participants	reported	noticing	a	difference	between	BM	and	CFS	intervals	when	questioned	
after	the	main	experiment.	Performance	on	catch	trials	was	again	high	(orientation	judgment	
accuracy:	97.5	±	1.10%	correct,	betting	accuracy:	97.2	±	0.93%	correct),	suggesting	that	
participants	maintained	attention	throughout	the	task.	
	
Considering	the	results	from	Experiments	1.1	-	1.3	together	with	those	from	Peters	&	Lau	
(2015)	,	we	might	predict,	by	transitive	logic,	a	lack	of	absolute	blindsight	under	CFS.	However,	
as	stimuli	were	not	matched	between	the	current	experiments	and	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	,	it	is	still	
possible	that	some	absolute	unconscious	perception	is	permitted	under	the	current	FBM	and	
CFS	paradigms.	We	tested	this	question	in	Experiment		1.	4.	
	
Experiment	1.4:	Testing	Absolute	Blindsight	Under	Continuous	Flash	Suppression	
Methods	
Participants	
Twenty-two	participants	(14	female,	ages	18-42,	2	left-handed,	11	left-eye	dominant,	5	
experienced),	gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate.All	participants	had	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$10	USD	or	
given	course	credit	for	their	participation.	
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Apparatus	and	Stimuli	
The	same	apparatus,	stimuli,	and	procedure	as	in	the	CFS	condition	in	Experiment	1.3	were	
used	in	Experiment	1.4	with	the	following	exceptions.	CFS	was	used	to	mask	target	stimuli	in	all	
stimulus	intervals	throughout	Experiment	1.4.	Critically,	as	previously	described		(Peters	&	Lau,	
2015)	,	on	each	trial,	unbeknownst	to	participants,	one	interval	contained	a	left-	or	right-tilted	
target	grating	[target	present	(TP)	interval]	while	the	other	contained	no	target	grating	[target	
absent	(TA)	interval;	Figure	5a,b].	The	target	absent	interval	contained	either	a	vertically	
oriented	grating	or	no	grating	at	all	(Figure	5b).	Further,	the	spatial	frequency	of	all	gratings	
increased	from	0.025	to	0.043	cycles	per	pixel	or	1	cycle	per	degree	visual	angle	(dva),	and	the	
gaussian	hull	was	reduced	from	100	to	25.5	(Figure	5c).	Masks	were	also	temporally	contiguous	
throughout	each	stimulus	interval	(Figure	5b),	and	the	size	of	mask	stimuli	was	increased	to	fill	
the	entire	area	within	the	fusion	contour	presented	to	the	dominant	eye	(Figure	5c).	
	
Procedure	
The	experiment	consisted	of	two	~1	hour	sessions	across	two	days.	On	each	day	participants	
completed	a	variable	number	of	practice	trials	based	on	their	performance	(mean		±	s.d.	Number	
of	trials	on	Day	1	=	69.0	±	30.5,	and	Day	2	=	41.8	±	23.7)	.	During	the	practice	trials	there	were	
valid	targets	in	both	stimulus	intervals.	This	was	to	both	to	give	subjects	additional	practice	in	
discriminating	valid	targets	and	to	strengthen	participants’	belief	that	there	were	also	valid	
targets	in	both	intervals	during	the	main	task.	All	practice	trials	included	trial-by-trial	feedback	
about	the	accuracy	of	the	orientation	discrimination	judgment	in	each	interval	and	the	accuracy	
of	the	confidence	judgment	as	in	the	previous	experiments.		
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After	the	practice	trials	participants	performed	80	trials	of	an	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	to	
estimate	the	grating	contrast	level	that	would	lead	to	75%	correct	orientation	discrimination	
performance.	As	in	the	practice	trials,	there	were	valid	targets	in	both	intervals	throughout	the	
staircasing	procedure,	and	confidence	judgments	were	removed	to	save	time.	The	staircasing	
procedure	used	two	interleaved	40-trial	staircases,	and	the	average	of	the	two	resulting	
threshold	contrast	estimates	was	used	to	estimate	each	participant’s	75%	correct	contrast	
threshold.	This	threshold	was	then	multiplied	by	five	proportions,	as	in	Experiment	1.1-1.3	to	
target	a	set	of	five	contrast	levels	that	would	lead	to	orientation	discrimination	performance	
scores	across	the	range	of	55%	to	90%	correct.	
	
Following	the	staircasing	procedure	on	Day	1	participants	performed	270	trials	of	the	main	task	
(Figure	5a).	Thirty	of	these	were	catch	trials	in	which	both	intervals	contained	valid	targets,	and	
one	or	more	of	these	had	a	full	contrast	of	1	[15	trials	where	both	intervals	contained	full	
contrast,	and	15	trials	where	one	interval	contained	one	of	the	five	near-threshold	contrast	
values	estimated	from	the	staircasing	procedure	(3	trials	per	contrast	level)].	These	catch	trials	
served	three	functions:	1)	to	help	participants	maintain	perceptual	templates	of	the	target	stimuli	
throughout	the	main	task,	2)	to	help	maintain	participants’	belief	that	all	trials	in	the	main	task	
contained	two	valid	targets,	and	3)	to	ensure	that	participants	were	maintaining	attention	
throughout	the	task	(full	contrast	stimuli	were	easy	to	discriminate	and	should	therefore	elicit	
ceiling	performance	if	participants	are	paying	attention).	For	non-catch	trials	on	Day	1	we	used	a	
randomized	full	factorial	combination	of	5	target	contrast	levels,	2	target	absent	interval	types,	2	
interval	orders,	and	2	target	orientations	with	5	trials	per	unique	combination.	The	contrast	of	
vertical	gratings	was	randomly	selected	to	be	one	of	the	5	near-threshold	contrast	values	used	
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for	target	stimuli,	except	for	in	catch	trials,	when	it	could	be	either	one	of	the	5	near-threshold	
contrast	values	or	1.		
	
Following	Day	1,	orientation	discrimination	scores	were	computed	across	trials	for	each	of	the	
five	near-threshold	grating	contrast	levels.	The	first	author	then	made	eyeball	estimates	of	five	
new	contrast	levels	to	be	used	on	Day	2	that	were	intended	to	lead	to	orientation	discrimination	
scores	that	would	fill	in	any	gaps	within	the	targeted	55%	to	90%	correct	range	in	the	Day	1	
orientation	discrimination	performance	data.	These	five	new	contrast	levels	were	used	
exclusively	on	Day	2.		
	
On	Day	2,	after	the	initial	practice	trials,	participants	performed	440	trials	of	the	main	task,	40	of	
which	were	catch	trials	[20	with	full	contrast	targets	in	both	intervals,	and	20	with	near-threshold	
contrast	values	(4	trials	per	near-threshold	contrast	level)].	For	non-catch	trials	we	used	the	
same	randomized	full	factorial	approach	as	on	Day	1,	but	with	10	trials	per	unique	combination	
of	conditions.	At	the	end	of	Day	2,	participants	were	asked	if	they	noticed	anything	consistent	
difference	between	the	two	stimulus	intervals	throughout	the	main	task.	This	was	intended	to	
gauge	whether	or	not	participants	noticed	that	one	interval	always	contained	an	invalid	target.	
	
Data	Analyses	
As	previously	described		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	,	we	plotted	the	proportion	of	trials	in	which	
participants	indicated	higher	confidence,	or	bet,	on	the	target	present	interval	as	a	function	of	
orientation	discrimination	percent	correct	scores	in	the	target	present	interval	(Figure	5c,d).	If	
participants	can	perform	the	orientation	discrimination	tasks	unconsciously,	then	this	“absolute	
blindsight	curve”	should	show	a	range	of	orientation	discrimination	proportion	correct	scores	
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above	0.5	correct	(chance)	for	which	the	proportion	of	trials	in	which	the	target	present	interval	
was	bet	on	is	roughly	0.5.	The	interpretation	would	be	that	over	this	range,	despite	being	able	to	
reliable	perform	the	discrimination	task	above	chance	level,	participants	are	unable	to	
subjectively	distinguish	the	target	interval	from	one	in	which	there	is	either	no	gating	information	
period	(target	absent	blank)	or	one	in	which	the	grating	information	should	be	uninformative	to	
the	orientation	discrimination	decision	(target	absent	vertical;	Figure	5b).	This	would	provide	
evidence	for	absolute	blindsight	on	the	orientation	discrimination	task	that	is	free	of	potential	
contamination	from	criterion	bias		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	
	
The	inclusion	of	the	two	target	absent	conditions	(blank	vs	vertical;	Figure	5b)	was	designed	to	
test	whether	or	not	participants	use	a	detection	heuristic	to	make	confidence	judgments	when	
performing	this	task		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	This	would	entail	betting	on	the	interval	that	had	
greater	grating	visibility	regardless	of	the	introspective	sense	of	the		correctness	of	the	
associated	orientation	discrimination	judgment.	If	this	were	the	case,	then	we	should	predict	a	
higher	proportion	of	bets	on	the	target	interval	in	the	target	absent	blank	condition	versus	the	
target	absent	vertical	condition.	To	test	this	question	we	ran	a	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	
percent	correct	scores	with	within-subjects	factors	stimulus	contrast	(10	levels),	target	absent	
type	(blank	or	vertical),	and	response	type	(Type	1	or	Type	2).		
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	Figure 5. Experiment 1.4 procedure, stimuli, and results. a) Procedure. The two stimulus	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
intervals were preceded, separated, and followed by fixation crosses with durations of 0.5, 1,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
and 0.5 s, respectively. Unbeknownst to participants, in the main task one interval always	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
contained a valid left- or right-tilted target grating [target present (TP) interval] while the other	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
contained either a vertical grating or no grating at all [target absent (TA) interval]. The order of	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the target present and target absent intervals was randomized across trials. Following the last	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
fixation cross participants indicated in which interval (first or second) they felt more confident in	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
their ability to discriminate the orientation of a grating. b) Stimulus intervals. All stimulus interval	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
types (target present, target absent blank, and target absent vertical) included six contiguous	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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mondrian mask textures presented to the dominant eye for ~100 ms each. In target present and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
target absent vertical intervals a tilted or vertical grating, respectively, was presented to the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
non-dominant eye with the same temporal contrast ramping parameters as in the CFS intervals	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
in Experiments 1.1 and 1.3. In target absent blank intervals no grating was presented to the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
non-dominant eye. c) Examples of target and mask stimuli. Note the difference from target and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
mask stimuli used in Experiments 1.1 - 1.3 (Figure 1a). d) “Absolute blindsight” curve. The	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
proportion of trials in which participants indicated higher confidence in, or bet on, the target	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
present interval are plotted as a function of orientation discrimination proportion correct scores	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
in the target present interval. If participants can perform the orientation discrimination task	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
unconsciously then we should see a flat portion of the absolute blindsight curve at y = 0.5 that	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
extends up to an x-value indicating orientation discrimination performance that is significantly	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
above chance (not observed). Mean ± s.e.m. proportion of target interval bets in each of ten	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
evenly spaced bins from 0.5 to 1 target present interval orientation discrimination proportion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
correct scores are shown. Bin mean x-values correspond to the mean orientation discrimination	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
proportion correct in each bin. Orientation proportion correct scores below 0.5 were lumped into	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the lowest bin (0.50-0.55) as they are assumed to reflect chance performance. e) Absolute	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
blindsight curves separated by target absent interval type (black: blank, red: vertical). Data is	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
plotted	the	same	as	in	panel	d.	
	
Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
Absolute	blindsight	curves	show	that	when	orientation	discrimination	accuracy	was	greater	than	
chance,	the	proportion	of	trials	in	which	participants	bet	on	the	target	present	interval	was	also	
above	chance.	This	was	the	case	across	all	trials	(Figure	5d)	and	across	the	individual	target	
absent	blank	and	target	absent	vertical	conditions	(Figure	5e).	This	indicates,	in	line	with	both	
Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	and	Experiments	1.1-1.3,	that	there	was	no	absolute	blindsight	for	
orientation	discrimination	under	CFS.	
	
The	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within	subjects	factors	stimulus	contrast	(10	levels),	target	
absent	interval	type	(blank	or	vertical),	and	response	type	(Type	1	or	Type	2)	showed	a	lack	of	a	
significant	interaction	between	response	type	and	target-absent	interval	type	F(1,21)	=	3.06,	p	=	
0.10.	Importantly,	this	suggests	that	participants	were	not	using	a	detection	heuristic	when	
making	confidence	judgments.	At	the	debriefing	stage	at	the	end	of	Day	2,	while	some	
participants	reported	noticing	that	on	some	trials	target	gratings	appeared	to	be	oriented	
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vertically,	no	participants	reported	noticing	that	one	of	the	two	stimulus	intervals		always	
contained	an	invalid	target.	
	
General	Discussion	
In	three	experiments	we	looked	for	a	difference	in	the	relationship	between	objective	
performance	and	subjective	awareness,	in	line	with	reports	of	relative	blindsight		(Lau	&	
Passingham,	2006)	,	between	pairs	of	visual	suppression	methods.	In	each	case	we	found	no	
evidence	for	any	such	difference,	suggesting	that	the	relationship	between	objective	and	
subjective	thresholds	for	forced-choice	orientation	discrimination	is	equivalent	under	FBM,	CFS,	
IS,	and	BM.	Taking	a	specific	definition	of	subjective	awareness		(Giles	et	al.,	2016)	,	which	is	
operationally	defined	as	what	is	tracked	by	subjective	reports	while	sensitivity	is	controlled	for,	
we	interpret	the	results	(i.e.,	the	POE	analyses)	to	mean	that	the	different	suppression	methods	
impact	subjective	awareness	similarly.	
	
In	Experiments	1.1-1.3	we	used	a	modified	version	of	the	2IFC	paradigm	from	Peters	&	Lau	
(2015)	in	which	each	of	two	suppression	methods,	one	per	2IFC	interval,	was	used	to	mask	a	
left-	or	right-tilted	target	grating.	Subjective	awareness	was	indexed	by	forcing	participants	to	bet	
on	the	interval	in	which	they	had	higher	confidence	in	their	ability	to	discriminate	the	orientation	
of	the	target	grating.	This	paradigm	has	several	advantages	that	build	on	previous	studies	
comparing	different	visual	suppression	techniques.	For	instance,	some	studies	have	compared	
suppression	techniques		between	experiments		(Almeida,	Mahon,	&	Caramazza,	2010;	Almeida	
et	al.,	2008;	Almeida,	Pajtas,	Mahon,	Nakayama,	&	Caramazza,	2013;	Faivre,	Berthet,	&	
Kouider,	2012)	,	making	them	vulnerable	to	potentially	confounding	idiosyncratic	differences	
between	experimental	conditions.	Further,	the	forced-choice	nature	of	the	subjective	judgment	
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reduces	concern	about	subjective	criterion	biases	that	may	have	been	present	in	previous	
comparative	suppression	studies		(Izatt	et	al.,	2014;	Peremen	&	Lamy,	2014)	.	To	further	reduce	
subjective	biases,	we	took	inspiration	from	earlier	studies	that	compared	monocular	and	
binocular	suppression	conditions	within	single	experiments		(Izatt	et	al.,	2014;	Jiang,	Costello,	&	
He,	2007;	Stein	et	al.,	2011)	and	designed	stimuli	such	that,	beyond	simple	differences	in	
difficulty,	the	two	intervals	on	a	given	trial	appeared	subjectively	similar.	This	has	the	benefit	of	
minimizing	conscious	decisional	biases	(e.g.,	participants	having	a	conscious	preference	for	
backward	masked	stimuli	over	CFS-masked	stimuli)	that	would	otherwise	reduce	the	chances	of	
finding	the	hypothesized	difference	in	the	relative	positioning	of	objective	and	subjective	
discrimination	thresholds	between	suppression	methods.		
	
While	Experiments	1.1-1.3	showed	a	lack	of	evidence	for	relative	blindsight	for	orientation	
discrimination	judgments	under	CFS	versus	monocular	pattern	masking	conditions,	in	
Experiment	1.4	we	further	found	no	evidence	for		absolute	blindsight	under	CFS.	We	therefore	
interpret	these	findings	together	to	suggest,	in	line	with	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	,	that	objective	and	
subjective	thresholds	do	not	dissociate	under	any	of	the	currently	examined	suppression	
techniques.	That	is	to	say,	we	consider	the	current	results	to	be	further	evidence	against	the	
idea	that	normal	observers	have	any	capacity	for	unconscious	orientation	discrimination.	This	
idea	is	in	line	with		others	who	have	argued	that	objective	thresholds	should,	a	priori,	be	
considered	equivalent	to	subjective	thresholds	in	forced-choice	perceptual	tasks		(Ian	Phillips,	
2017;	Snodgrass	&	Shevrin,	2006)	.	These	findings	also	suggest	that	controlling	for	criterion	bias	
may	be		a	critical	experimental	difference	between	studies	that	report	evidence	for	unconscious	
forced-choice	discrimination	sensitivity	in	normal	observers		(2011;	Lamy,	Salti,	&	Bar-haim,	
2008;	2015)	and	those	that	report	evidence	against	it		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	
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	The	results	of	Experiment	1.4	also	provide	evidence	against	the	idea	that	participants		ignored	
instructions	to	rate	confidence	specifically	in	their	performance	on	the	orientation	discrimination	
task,	and	instead	rated	confidence	based	on	the		detectability	of	target	stimuli.		Previous	studies	
using	orientation	discrimination	tasks	have	shown	that	in	slightly	different	psychophysical	
contexts	participants		do	in	fact	rate	confidence	based	on	stimulus	detectability		(Koizumi	et	al.,	
2015;	Maniscalco	et	al.,	2016)	.	Therefore,	the	demonstration	that	participants	are		not	using	such	
a	heuristic		here	is	an	important	demonstration	of	the	efficacy	of	the	present	2IFC	confidence	
paradigm	in	the	investigation	of	visual	awareness.	
	
An	important	limitation	is	that	it	remains		an	open	question	whether	a	different	visual	suppression	
technique	can	selectively	impair	subjective	awareness	while	leaving	objective	discrimination	
performance	relatively	intact	.	Future	studies	should	compare	visual	suppression	techniques	that	
are	more	distant	from	each	other	in	terms	of	how	much	unconscious	priming	they	allow,	e.g.,	
FBM	and	visual	crowding		(Breitmeyer,	2015)	,	or	that	have	been	functionally	characterized	to	act	
at	different	points	in	the	visual	processing	stream,	e.g.,	visual	crowding	and	object	substitution	
(Chakravarthi	&	Cavanagh,	2009)	or	metacontrast	masking	and	interocular	suppression	
(Breitmeyer,	Koç,	Öǧmen,	&	Ziegler,	2008)	.	They	can	also	focus	on	suppression	methods	that	
rely	on	attentional	manipulations	(e.g.,	attentional	blink,	inattentional	blindness),	which	may	
allow	for	higher	levels	of	unconscious	processing		(Kouider	&	Dehaene,	2007)	that	include	
unconscious	forced-choice	discrimination.	The	current	paradigm	provides	a	useful	means	for	
comparing	such	suppression	techniques,	while	maintaining	a	rigorous	control	for	criterion	bias.	
However,	a	challenge	in	designing	these	studies	will	be	in	creating	stimuli	that	make	the	
techniques	under	comparison	appear	superficially	indistinguishable.	
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	It	should	also	be	emphasized	that	we	extend	the	current	interpretation	of	a	lack	of	unconscious	
perception	only	to		direct	perceptual	tasks	such	as	forced-choice	detection	and	discrimination	
tasks		(Green	&	Swets,	1966;	MacMillan	&	Creelman,	2004)	,	and	not	to	other	established	indirect	
perceptual	effects	like	subliminal	priming		(Hannula,	Simons,	&	Cohen,	2005;	Kouider	&	
Dehaene,	2007;	though	see	Phillips	(2017)	for	a	discussion	on	whether	priming	effects	should	
constitute	genuine	cases	of	perception	per	se).	Even	if	we	assume	that	normal	observers	do	
have	some	capacity	for	direct	unconscious	perception,	our	results	suggest	that	we	should	not	
expect	hierarchical	relationships	for	subliminal	priming	among	suppression	methods	(e.g.,	
Kouider	&	Dehaene,	2007;	Faivre,	Berthet,	&	Kouider,	2014;	Breitmeyer,	2015)	to	apply	to	direct	
unconscious	perception.	For	example,	Almeida	et	al.	found	greater	subliminal	priming	effects	for	
tool	stimuli	(2008,	2010)	and	emotional	faces	(2011)	under	BM	than	under	CFS,	while	Izatt	et	al.	
(2014)	found	greater	subliminal	face	priming	effects	under	FBM	than	under	IS.	These	
hierarchical	relationships	among	suppression	methods	for	subliminal	priming	clearly	conflict	with	
the	null	results	for	differences	in	direct	unconscious	processing	between	suppression	methods	
observed	here.	However,	even	some	previously	suggested	hierarchical	relationships	between	
suppression	methods	should	be	approached	with	caution,	as	judgments	of	prime	visibility	in	
these	studies	were	vulnerable	to	criterion	bias		(Izatt	et	al.,	2014;	Peremen	&	Lamy,	2014)	The	
2IFC	paradigm	described	in	Peters	&	Lau		(2015)	provides	a	means	for	future	priming	studies	to	
ensure	invisibility	of	primes	without	this	potential	confound.	
	
In	conclusion,	we	have	shown	a	lack	of	a	difference	in	the	relationship	between	objective	and	
subjective	thresholds	for	forced-choice	orientation	discrimination	between	four	commonly	used	
visual	suppression	techniques.	Taken	together	with	previous	evidence		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	and	
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the	lack	of	an	absolute	blindsight	effect	found	in	our	Experiment	1.4,	the	current	results	suggest	
that	when	criterion	bias	is	sufficiently	controlled	for,	normal	observers	do	not	demonstrate	direct	
unconscious	perception.	Whether	this	capacity	can	be	demonstrated	under	a	different	set	of	
visual	suppression	conditions	is	a	matter	for	future	studies	to	investigate.	The	present	results	
should,	however,	place	helpful	constraints	on	future	hypotheses	and	methodological	choices	for	
studying	conscious	and	unconsciousness	visual	perception.	
	
	
VIII.	The	Role	of	Prefrontal	Cortex	in	Visual	Consciousness	
Background:	The	Key	to	Consciousness	May	Not	Be	Under	the	Streetlight	
According	to	a	famous	fable		(Kaplan,	1964)	,	one	night,	a	drunk	man	was	looking	for	his	lost	
keys	under	a	streetlight.	As	it	turned	out,	he	had	lost	them	somewhere	far	away.	When	asked	
why	he	didn’t	go	back	to	where	he	had	lost	the	keys	to	look,	he	replied,	“but	the	light	is	here!”	
Of	course,	seeing	things	clearly	is	easier	in	some	places	than	it	is	in	others,	and	in	looking	for	
the	neural	mechanisms	for	consciousness	in	the	brain,	there	may	be	similar	temptations.	
Specifically,	neural	coding	is	relatively	straightforward	and	extremely	sparse		(Olshausen	&	Field,	
2004)	in	sensory	areas.	Such	coding	can	be	roughly	understood	as	having	a	‘labeled	lines’	
architecture		(Gross,	2002)	,	where	the	representational	content	of	individual	neurons	is	
described	in	terms	of	receptive	field	locations	and	specific	features.	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	
prefrontal	cortex	(PFC),	where	neurons	show	a	high	degree	of	mixed	selectivity		(Mante	et	al.,	
2013)	,	such	that	identifying	perceptual	content	has	proved	to	be	more	challenging.	As	such,	
despite	ample	evidence	that	PFC	activity	underlies	subjective	judgments	in	perceptual	tasks		(S.	
Dehaene	&	Naccache,	2001;	Lau	&	Rosenthal,	2011)	,	the	causal	status	of	PFC	activity	for	
consciousness	is	debated		(Boly	et	al.,	2017;	Odegaard	et	al.,	2017)	.	
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	One	point	of	debate	concerns	the	observation	that	the	link	between	PFC	activity	and	
consciousness	is	weakened	when	subjects	do	not	have	to	attend	to	and	report	about	the	
relevant	stimuli.	Specifically,	under	these	conditions,	PFC	signals	reflecting	the	difference	
between	conscious	and	unconscious	perception	are	typically	reduced,	especially	for	
conventional	neuroimaging	measurements		(Lau	&	Rosenthal,	2011)	.	As	such,	it	may	look	as	if	
these	signals	were	primarily	driven	by	report	and	attention.	However,	PFC	activity	isn’t	entirely	
abolished	when	attention	and	explicit	reports	are	omitted;	using	more	sensitive	invasive	multiunit	
neuronal	recordings,	it	has	been	shown	that	unreported	and	unattended	stimulus	features	can	
be	read	out	from	PFC,	nearly	as	well	as	for	reported	and	attended	features		(Mante	et	al.,	2013)	.	
Similar	decoding	approaches	can	be	applied	to	neuroimaging	data		(Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	.	Yet,	if	
one	focuses	on	traditional	univariate	analyses	for	neuroimaging	data,	indeed	it	might	seem	like	
the	bright	streetlights	are	not	there	in	PFC.	
	
A	second	point	of	contention	is	that,	if	PFC	is	truly	critical	for	conscious	experiences,	one	may	
expect	lesion	to	this	region	to	affect	some	specific	aspects	of	subjective	perception.	Indeed,	a	
group	study	of	patients	with	mostly	unilateral	PFC	lesions	showed	a	50%	decrease	in	their	
ability	to	correctly	introspect	perceptual	(but	not	memory)	content		(Fleming,	Ryu,	Golfinos,	&	
Blackmon,	2014)	.	As	in	careful	psychophysics	studies,	such	effects	were	observed	using	
near-threshold,	i.e.,	degraded,	visual	stimuli.	However,	some	have	argued	that	these	
near-threshold	situations	are	“virtually	irrelevant”	from	the	perspective	of	everyday	conscious	
perception		(Haun,	Tononi,	Koch,	&	Tsuchiya,	2018)	.	It	is	not	clear	to	what	extent	such	
arguments	are	meant	to	write	off	the	meaningfulness	of	psychophysics	for	conscious	perception	
in	general.	But	the	point	may	be	that	again,	to	some,	the	streetlights	are	not	there	in	PFC.	
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	The	sensitivity	of	near-threshold	methods	may	be	needed,	however,	because	unilateral	PFC	
lesions	in	humans	often	do	not	always	lead	to	the	complete	abolishment	of	functions,	including	
‘textbook’	PFC	functions	such	as	working	memory		(Curtis	&	D’Esposito,	2004)	.	On	the	other	
hand,	complete	bilateral	lesions	are	rare	and	often	misidentified		(Odegaard	et	al.,	2017)	.	For	
complex	systems	like	the	brain	(and	maybe	PFC	in	particular),	the	traditional	logic	of	using	
unilateral	lesion	methods	to	demonstrate	absolute	necessity	for	functions	may	therefore	not	be	
as	straightforward	as	was	once	thought		(Jonas	&	Kording,	2017)	;	relatively	clear	cases	like	
Broca’s	area	seem	to	be	exceptions	rather	than	the	norm.	
	
An	analogy	may	help	to	illustrate	this	point.	Suppose	one	builds	a	computational	neural	network	
using	current	artificial	intelligence	methods,	with	the	goal	of	generating	sentences	to	describe	
some	pictures	(Figure	6).	Lesioning	different	parts	of	this	network	may	lead	to	different	levels	of	
impairment;	some	lesions	may	afford	higher	degrees	of	‘graceful	degradation’	or	fault	tolerance	
(Achard	&	Bullmore,	2007)	than	others.	It	should	be	clear	that	using	such	information	to	identify	
the	functions	of	different	subparts	of	the	network	may	therefore	be	misleading.	
	
46	
Figure 6. ‘Graceful degradation’ in a recurrently connected layer of a neural network. Two	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
neural networks are designed to describe images in words. In each network, the first three	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
layers constitute a feedforward architecture that crudely reflects the structure of a mammalian	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
visual system. The fourth layer is a recurrent neural network, which somewhat mimics the highly	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
recurrently connected nature of frontal and parietal cortices. Network 1 (left) contains a ‘lesion’	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
to the upper left quadrant of the input layer (red; extent of lesion as it corresponds to the input	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
image is shown by the dotted lines). Because the lesion occurs at the input level, a quarter of	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the information in the image is irrevocably lost. The network thus makes the error of identifying	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the tree on the left side of the image as a stump. Network 2 (right) contains a lesion to the upper	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
left quadrant of the recurrent layer. Image information in the feedforward network is preserved,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
and because the non-lesioned nodes in the recurrent layer are so highly interconnected,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
processing at this level may show limited impairment, which may be overcome with additional	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
training. This well-known phenomenon of ‘graceful degradation’ may thus give the false	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
impression	that	higher	layers	are	not	causally	relevant.	
	
This	is	of	course	not	to	say	that	the	network	in	Figure	6	would	be	a	precise	model	of	the	brain,	
but	we	can	gain	important	intuitions	by	thinking	of	PFC	as	playing	similar	roles	as	the	nodes	at	
the	higher	levels.	Even	neglecting	feedback	from	high	to	lower	layers,	which	is	known	to	be	
important	in	conscious	mammalian	brains,	one	can	see	that	nodes	at	all	levels	contribute	
causally	to	overall	function	despite	the	varying	effects	of	lesions.	Ignoring	the	network	structure	
and	focusing	on	the	lesion	alone	may	therefore	misleadingly	suggest	that	the	recurrent	layer	is	
causally	irrelevant.	
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	Likewise,	this	can	help	us	understand	why	traditional	methods	of	PFC	electrical	stimulation	may	
not	drastically	modify	conscious	experiences	[though	such	rare	cases	have	been	reported,	e.g.,	
(Blanke,	Landis,	&	Seeck,	2000;	Quraishi,	Benjamin,	Spencer,	Blumenfeld,	&	Alkawadri,	2017)	].	
Stimulating	nodes	from	some	deeper	or	late	stage	layer	may	have	a	relatively	small	and	
non-specific	impact	on	the	output	content	due	to	the	relatively	complex	connections,	but	this	
does	not	mean	these	nodes	are	‘content	free’.	Continuing	the	same	analogy	that	PFC	coding	
may	be	more	like	what	happens	in	higher	layers,	this	may	also	explain	why	PFC	may	
misleadingly	look	like	relatively	unlit	territory	as	we	search	for	the	keys	to	consciousness.	
	
Admittedly,	an	analogy	is	not	proof.	Thankfully,	a	recent	study		(Pal	&	Mashour,	2018)	shed	some	
much	needed	empirical	light	on	the	role	of	this	brain	region	in	consciousness	by	using	
pharmacological	stimulation	that	likely	impacts	PFC	activity	more	broadly	than	focal	lesions	or	
electrical	stimulations.	They	exposed	rats	to	continuous	sevoflurane	anesthesia	and	tested	
whether	perfusion	of	a	cholinergic	or	noradrenergic	agonist	to	either	PFC	or	one	of	two	parietal	
targets	(posterior	parietal	cortex	or	medial	parietal	association	cortex)	could	reverse	anesthesia.	
While	in	all	cases	drug	perfusion	produced	electroencephalographic	signs	of	arousal	and	
increased	respiration	rate,	only	cholinergic	stimulation	of	PFC	produced	clear	behavioral	signs	
of	wakefulness.	Their	results	provide	strong	evidence	for	the	causal	involvement	of	PFC	in	
consciousness.	Hopefully,	even	to	those	who	are	skeptical	of	near-threshold	perceptual	effects,	
the	importance	of	restoring	consciousness	from	anesthesia	cannot	be	denied	lightly.	
	
Of	course,	one	caveat	of	this	interpretation	is	that	it	elides	the	important	difference	between	
states	of	consciousness,	i.e.,	wakefulness	versus	being	‘knocked	out’,	and	the	specific		content	
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of	subjective	experiences,	e.g.,	the	redness	of	a	tomato	versus	the	greenness	of	its	vine.	But	
perhaps,	because	of	some	partially	shared	mechanisms,	the	two	notions	of	consciousness	are	
intimately	linked;	after	all,	supposedly	one	rarely	experiences	vivid	perceptual	contents	when	
adequately	anesthetized.	
	
One	network-based	view	for	such	potentially	shared	mechanisms	is	the	mesocircuit	model	of	
consciousness		(Schiff,	2010)	,	which	accounts	for	the	results	of	several	studies	in	which	patients	
with	disorders	of	consciousness	showed	signs	of	recovery	following	various	types	of	mechanical	
or	pharmacological	stimulation	(Figure	7).	
	
	
Figure 7. A modified schematic of the ‘mesocircuit’ that is proposed to underlie recovery of	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
consciousness in several stimulation studies [see (Schiff, 2010)	]. Frontal cortex is a critical	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
node, receiving excitatory inputs from the thalamus and parietal cortex while sending excitatory	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
projections to the medium spiny neurons (MSN) of the striatum, consequently disinhibiting the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
thalamus via inhibitory projections from the globus pallidus interna. The classic mesocircuit is	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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modified here to show excitatory projections from frontal cortex to the basal forebrain	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
[	(Gaykema, Van Weeghel, Hersh, & Luiten, 1991)	, though see also (Zaborszky, Gaykema,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Swanson, & Cullinan, 1997)	, which highlights potentially complex inhibitory pathways too], a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
global cholinergic output system. Importantly, cholinergic efferents from the basal forebrain	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(pink) target each of the major excitatory nodes of the classic mesocircuit (thalamus, frontal	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
cortex, and parietal cortex). Thus, through its direct connections to the basal forebrain, frontal	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
cortex	may	be	uniquely	positioned	to	initiate	large	scale	excitation	of	the	mesocircuit.	
	
In	the	context	of	this	model,	the	details	regarding	the	local	acetylcholine	(Ach)	levels	measured	
in	each	condition	by	Pal		et	al.		(2018)	become	intriguing.	Specifically,	cholinergic	stimulation	of	
PFC	via	the	agonist	carbachol	was	unique	in	causing	roughly	a	500%	increase	in	local	Ach	
levels.	By	comparison,	in	all	other	conditions,	group	level	increases	in	local	acetylcholine	ranged	
from	about	20%	to	75%.	A	possible	explanation	for	this	large	difference	is	based	on	the	idea	
that	the	basal	forebrain,	which	contains	the	brain’s	major	cholinergic	output	system,	receives	
afferent	inputs	from	PFC,	but	not	parietal	cortex		(Gaykema	et	al.,	1991)	(Figure	7).	Given	this	
known	connectivity	profile,	perhaps	within	their	experimental	setup,	only	stimulation	of	PFC	
could	generate	large-scale	cholinergic	activation	(via	the	pink	cholinergic	efferents	shown	in	
Figure	7)	of	the	three	major	excitatory	nodes	of	the	classic	mesocircuit	(frontal	cortex,	parietal	
cortex,	and	thalamus).	This	could	consequently	lead	to	strong	positive	excitatory	feedback	
within	the	mesocircuit,	which	would	explain	the	wakefulness	behavior	that	was	observed	in	
response	to	stimulation	of	PFC,	but	not	parietal	cortex.	
	
If	this	interpretation	is	right,	it	may	further	imply	that	PFC	signals	to	the	basal	forebrain	are	more	
strongly	activated	by	cholinergic	as	opposed	to	noradrenergic	stimulation.	Speculatively,	this	
model	would	also	suggest	that	cholinergic	stimulation	of	PFC,	implemented	via	reverse	dialysis	
of	carbachol	as	in	Pal	et	al.		(2018)	,	might	have	also	resulted	in	larger	increases	in	parietal	Ach	
levels	than	direct	cholinergic	stimulation	of	parietal	cortex	itself.	If	this	were	true,	parietal	
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cholinergic	activity	may	not	be	causally	irrelevant;	it	may	just	be	easier	to	trigger	such	activity	via	
PFC	than	via	direct	parietal	stimulation.	
	
Of	course,	as	keys	are	not	always	found	automatically	as	we	shine	light	on	the	ground,	the	
experiments	of	Pal	et	al.		(2018)	understandably	do	not	on	their	own	tell	us	the	full	answer	to	the	
age	old	problem	of	consciousness.	But	if	the	above	analysis	is	correct,	then	we	should	not	write	
off	the	causal	contribution	of	parietal	cortex	just	yet,	just	as	other	researchers	should	not	write	
off	the	role	of	PFC	in	consciousness	based	on	the	sheer	lack	of	ease	of	observation.	While	Pal	
et	al.’s	results	and	experimental	setup	do	not	allow	us	to	fully	address	all	of	the	above	
hypotheses	and	questions,	they	certainly	serve	to	motivate	further	studies.	In	sobriety,	let	us	
recognize	the	need	for	more	resources	and	effort,	to	take	us	into	these	new	and	exciting	areas	
that	were	once	considered	to	be	‘in	the	dark’.	
	
	
Experiment	2:	Multivoxel	patterns	for	perceptual	confidence	are	associated	with	false	
color	detection	
Abstract	
While	it	has	been	proposed	that	metacognition	and	conscious	perception	are	related,	the	exact	
mechanistic	relationship	between	the	two	is	unclear.	To	address	this	question,	we	combined	
decoded	neurofeedback	(DecNef)	in	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	with	
concurrent	psychophysics.	Participants	were	rewarded	for	activating	multivoxel	patterns	for	
color	discrimination	confidence	while	they	detected	color	in	mostly	achromatic	stimuli.	We	found	
that	occurences	of	voxel	patterns	for	high	color	discrimination	confidence	were	associated	with	
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false	alarms	in	the	concurrent	color	detection	task,	suggesting	a	link	between	discrimination	
confidence	and	consciousness.		
	
Introduction	
Some	current	theories	of	consciousness	posit	a	link	between	consciousness	and	metacognition	
(Stanislas	Dehaene,	Lau,	&	Kouider,	2017;	Lau	&	Rosenthal,	2011)	.	Intuitively,	one	cannot	
consciously	see	something	without	having	some	sense	of	certainty	or	uncertainty	regarding	
what	is	being	seen		(Dienes,	2007;	Fleming	&	Lau,	2014;	Rosenthal,	2018)	;	but	see		(Block,	
2007)	.	While	behavioral	evidence	supports	the	idea	that	metacognitive	judgments	are	a	
meaningful	proxy	for	conscious	experiences		(Dienes	&	Seth,	2010;	Norman	&	Price,	2015;	
Persaud,	McLeod,	&	Cowey,	2007;	Rausch	&	Zehetleitner,	2016;	Szczepanowski,	Traczyk,	
Wierzchoń,	&	Cleeremans,	2013)	,	the	extent	of	this	support	has	been	questioned		(Norman	&	
Price,	2015;	Overgaard,	Timmermans,	Sandberg,	&	Cleeremans,	2010;	Rosenthal,	2018;	
Sandberg,	Timmermans,	Overgaard,	&	Cleeremans,	2010)	.	It	has	also	been	suggested	that	a	
common	mechanism	may	underlie	biases	in	conscious	perception	(e.g.	conservative	detection)	
and	metacognitive	misjudgments	(e.g.	under-confidence	in	discrimination);	in	disorders	like	
blindsight,	both	seem	to	be	problematic		(Ko	&	Lau,	2012)	.	And	yet,	these	claims	have	so	far	not	
been	directly	tested.	
	
We	capitalized	on	the	findings	of	a	previous	study	in	which	we	showed	that	perceptual	
confidence	could	be	decoded	from	multivoxel	fMRI	patterns	in	lateral	prefrontal	and	parietal	
cortex		(Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	.		Pairing	these	patterns	with	reward	modulated	participants'	
reported	confidence	in	a	subsequent	dot	motion	discrimination	task	.	Our	question	here	concerns	
whether	these	changes	in	reported	confidence	reflect	changes	in	conscious	experience	too.		
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	To	answer	this	question,	we	rewarded	participants	for	simultaneously	activating	decoded	voxel	
patterns	for	both	perceptual	confidence	in	frontoparietal	areas	(high	vs	low	confidence)	and	
color	perception	in	early	visual	areas	(red	vs	green	stimulus	color),	while	they	viewed	a	stimulus	
that	was	achromatic	on	the	majority	(>	97%)	of	trials.	During	this	closed-loop	fMRI	procedure,	
we	asked	participants	at	regular	intervals	to	report	whether	they	saw	any	color	in	the	stimulus.	
We	found	that	when	they	falsely	detected	non-existent	color,	there	was	an	association	with	
occurrences	of	multivoxel	patterns	for	high	color	discrimination	confidence,	supporting	the	link	
between	a	metacognitive	process	and	conscious	perception.	
	
Methods	
Experiment	Overview	
The	experiment	had	four	main	stages	across	a	total	of	seven	days	(Figure	8a):	the	multivoxel	
pattern	analysis	(MVPA)	sessions	(Days	1-2),	pre-DecNef	psychophysics	(Day	3),	DecNef	
(Days	4-6),	and	post-DecNef	psychophysics	(Day	7)	(see	Figure	A1	for	further	details).	During	
the	MVPA	sessions	on	Days	1	and	2	participants	(N=17)	performed	a	color	lightness	task	with	
both	red	and	green	stimuli	(Figure	8b)	and	a	red/green	color	discrimination	task	with	confidence	
judgments	(Figure	8c)	inside	an	fMRI	scanner,	and	the	resulting	blood	oxygen-level	dependent	
(BOLD)	signal	patterns	were	used	to	train	binary	decoders	for	red	versus	green	color	and	high	
versus	low	confidence,	respectively.	During	the	DecNef	stage	participants	performed	a	real-time	
neurofeedback	task	in	which	they	were	rewarded	for	activating	decoded	multivariate	BOLD	
signal	patterns	corresponding	to	redness	in	visual	cortex	and	high	confidence	in	frontoparietal	
cortex.	To	examine	whether	activation	of	decoded	color	and	confidence	patterns	had	any	
correspondence	with	real-time	color	perception,	participants	performed	a	concurrent	color	
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detection	task	during	DecNef.	Finally,	to	examine	whether	this	neurofeedback	manipulation	had	
any	effect	on	red/green	color	discrimination		(Amano,	Shibata,	Kawato,	Sasaki,	&	Watanabe,	
2016)	,	participants	performed	the	same	red/green	color	discrimination	task	as	in	the	MVPA	
sessions	outside	of	the	scanner	during	the	pre-	and	post-DecNef	psychophysics	stages.		Days	2	
and	3	always	occurred	on	separate	calendar	weeks,	and	were	thus	always	separated	by	at	least	
two	days.	Days	3-7	were	always	consecutive.	
	
Participants	
Seventeen	subjects	(2	female,	mean	±	SD	age:		26.0		±	7.5	years,	2	left-handed)	with	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	vision	participated	in	the	decoder	construction	stage	on	Days	1	and	2.	Two	
participants	were	excluded	from	analyses	following	the	decoder	construction	stage	for	not	
having	accuracies	greater	than	55%	for	both	the	color	decoder	and	at	least	2	of	the	4	
confidence	decoders		(Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	.	Thus,	15	subjects	(1	female,	mean	±	SD	age:		25.4		±	
7.1	years,	2	left-handed)	are	included	in	the	analyses	for	the	behavioral	and	DecNef	tasks	on	
Days	3-7.	The	study	was	conducted	at	the	Advanced	Telecommunications	Research	Institute	
International	(ATR)	and	was	approved	by	the	Institutional	Review	Board	of	ATR.	All	subjects	
gave	written	informed	consent.	
	
Red/Green	Color	Discrimination	Task	
The	red/green	color	discrimination	task	(Figure	8c)	was	performed	both	outside	and	inside	of	the	
scanner	on	Days	1	and	2,	and	outside	of	the	scanner	only	on	Days	3	and	7	(Figure	A1).	At	the	
start	of	each	trial	a	white		fixation	circle	(diameter	~0.43°)	was	presented	for	1	s	on	a	gray	
background	(rgb[64	64	64]).	A	circular	vertical	grating		(diameter	~13.5	°)	and	a	black	annulus	
(diameter	~0.85°),	both	centered	around	the	white	fixation	circle,	then	appeared	for	0.5	s	(Figure	
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8c).	The	black	vertical	bars	within	the	grating	had	a	width	of	~0.64°,	with	the	area	between	them	
subtending	the	same	visual	angle.		
	
The	majority	of	pixels	in	the	areas	between	the	black	bars	had	grayscale	RGB	triplet	values	(i.e.,	
all	RGB	channel	values	were	equal)	that	varied	randomly	on	each	frame	(frame	duration	=	
16.67	ms)	with	a	mean	channel	value	of	120	and	a	standard	deviation	of	51.2.	The	area	
between	black	bars	in	the	grating	was	thus	dynamic.	Color	strength	was	adjusted	by	setting	the	
color	of	a	variable	proportion	of	pixels	in	the	areas	between	the	black	bars	to	either	a	red	or	
green	RGB	triplet.	Subject-specific	RGB	triplets	were	computed	from	a	flicker	fusion	task	
(Simonson	&	Brozek,	1952)		performed	at	the	beginning	of	the	Day	1	to	ensure	psychophysical	
equiluminance	(Supplementary	Material).	These	triplets	were	fixed	for	all	red/green	color	
discrimination	and	color	detection	tasks	used	throughout	the	rest	of	the	experiment.	The	
locations	of	colored	pixels	varied	randomly	between	frames,	but	the	proportion	of	colored	pixels	
was	constant	throughout	a	given	trial.	
	
Offset	of	the	grating	was	followed	by	a	1.5-s	decision	period	in	which	only	the	fixation	circle	
remained	on	the	screen.	Participants	were	then	asked	to	report	the	color	of	the	grating	(red	or	
green)	and	to	indicate	their	confidence	in	their	decision	on	a	scale	from	1	to	4	per	the	following	
instructions:	1	corresponded	to	a	guess,	2	corresponded	to	having	low	but	non-zero	confidence,	
3	corresponded	to	having	moderately	high	confidence	without	being	certain,	and	4	
corresponded	to	feeling	certain	in	their	decision.	Participants	had	two	seconds	to	make	each	
response.	The	on-screen	locations	of	each	response	option	(‘Red’	and	‘Green’	for	the	color	
judgment	and	‘1’,’2’,’3’,	and	‘4’	for	the	confidence	judgment)	were	randomized	on	each	trial.	For	
all	iterations	of	this	task	that	occurred	outside	of	the	fMRI	scanner	on	Days	1	and	2	trial-by-trial	
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feedback	(1	s)	was	given	in	the	form	of	a	green	(rgb[0	255	0])	“+1”	for	correct	discrimination	
responses	or	a	red	(rgb[255	0	0])	“-1”	for	incorrect	discrimination	responses.	The	ITIs	for	this	
task	where	1	s	and	5	s	when	performed	outside	and	inside	of	the	fMRI	scanner,	respectively.	
	
On	both	Day	1	and	Day	2,	prior	to	the	decoder	construction	session	participants	performed	80	
trials	of	an	adaptive	version	(QUEST,		(Andrew	B.	Watson	&	Pelli,	1983)	)	of	the	red/green	color	
discrimination	task.	The	adaptive	procedure	used	two	interleaved	40-trial	staircases	to	estimate	
the	stimulus	strength	(in	proportion	of	colored	pixels)	that	would	lead	to	75%	correct	accuracy	
on	the	task.	These	procedures	were	broken	down	into	two	40	trial	blocks.	The	mean	of	the	two	
75%	correct	threshold	estimates	on	Day	1	was	used	as	starting	stimulus	strength	for	the	
red/green	discrimination	task	in	the	subsequent	Day	1	decoder	construction	session	in	the	
scanner.	The	mean	of	the	two	75%	correct	threshold	estimates	on	Day	2	was	used	to	determine	
the	stimulus	strengths	that	would	be	used	for	the	pre-	and	post-DecNef	psychophysics	tasks	on	
Days	3	and	7	(see	below).	
	
Color	Lightness	Task	
The	color	lightness	task	(Figure	8b)	was	performed	both	inside	and	outside	of	the	scanner	on	
Day	1,	and	inside	the	scanner	on	Day	2	(Figure	A1).	On	each	trial,	a	fixation	circle	with	the	
same	parameters	as	that	in	the	red/green	color	discrimination	task	appeared	for	1	s.	A	colored	
grating	stimulus	(either	red	or	green)	then	flashed	for	0.5	s	durations	at	1	Hz	and	its	color	
lightness	either	increased	or	decreased	linearly	over	a	period	of	6	s	(6	presentations	in	total).		
	
The	grating	stimulus	had	the	same	parameters	as	that	in	the	red/green	color	discrimination	task	
except	for	the	following.	In	the	area	between	the	black	vertical	bars,	all	pixels	were	colored	
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(either	all	red	or	all	green).	On	each	trial,	a	set	of	6	different	equally	spaced	values	for	the	
dominant	RGB	channel	was	determined.	This	set	had	a	variable	range	across	trials	but	a	
constant	mean	equal	to	the	dominant	channel	value	in	the	corresponding	RGB	triplet	
determined	by	the	flicker	fusion	task.	On	each	frame	of	a	given	0.5-s	grating	presentation,	the	
dominant	RGB	channel	value	of	a	given	colored	pixel	was	drawn	from	a	normal	distribution	with	
a	mean	of	the	corresponding	set	value	and	a	SD	of	51.2.	The	value	of	the	non-dominant	RGB	
channels	for	a	given	colored	pixel	was	determined	by	taking	the	difference	between	the	
dominant	and	non-dominant	rgb	channel	values	from	the	relevant	RGB	triplet	determined	by	the	
flicker	fusion	task,	and	subtracting	it	from	the	dominant	RGB	channel	value	for	that	pixel.	Thus,	
for	each	subject	the	difference	between	dominant	and	non-dominant	RGB	channel	values	per	
color	was	constant	across	all	colored	pixels	for	all	grating	presentations	in	this	task.	
	
After	grating	presentation	there	was	a	2-s	decision	period	in	which	only	the	fixation	circle	
remained	on	the	screen.	Participants	then	had	2	s	to	indicate	whether	the	flashing	grating	
stimulus	increased	or	decreased	in	lightness	over	time.	Because	the	color	tended	to	look	more	
saturated	when	lightness	decreased,	the	response	options	for	decreases	and	increases	in	
lightness	were	“more	color”	and	“less	color”,	respectively	(Figure	8b).		
	
Participants	performed	16	trials	of	this	task	outside	of	the	scanner	on	Day	1.	On	these	lightness	
trials,	but	not	those	performed	inside	the	scanner,	they	received	the	same	trial-by-trial	feedback	
for	correct	and	incorrect	judgments	as	they	did	in	the	color	discrimination	task.	The	first	four	
trials	were	designed	to	familiarize	subjects	with	the	task,	and	thus	each	stimulus	in	these	trials	
used	a	large	range	of	lightness	values	(	154	RGB	units).	Trials	5	to	16	employed	a	1-up	1-down	
staircasing	procedure	with	variably	weighted	step	sizes		(Kingdom	&	Prins,	2010)	of	7.68	and	
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2.56	RGB	units,	respectively.	The	starting	range	of	lightness	values	on	trial	5	was	15	RGB	units.	
The	mean	of	all	of	the	lightness	range	values	from	all	staircased	trials	in	which	a	reversal	(i.e.,	a	
correct	response	following	an	incorrect	response	or	vice	versa)	occurred	was	set	as	the	
midpoint	of	the	uniform	distribution	of	potential	range	values	used	in	the	first	color	decoder	run	
of	the	subsequent	Day	1	decoder	construction	session	(see	Supplementary	Material).	
	
	
	
Figure 8. Experiment 2 overview and decoding tasks. a) Experiment flowchart. On Days 1 and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2, participants performed color lightness and color discrimination tasks in the fMRI scanner to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
decode multivoxel patterns for color and confidence, respectively. On Days 3 and 7 participants	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
performed a red/green color discrimination task outside of the fMRI scanner. On Days 4-6	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
participants performed a DecNef task in which they were rewarded for the simultaneous	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
activation of multivoxel patterns for red color in visual cortex and high confidence in frontal and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
parietal cortex. b) Color decoder task. Participants viewed 6 circular colored (either all red or all	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
green on a given trial; see Methods) vertical gratings presented for 500ms each and flashed at a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
frequency of 1 Hz (6 s total). Grating color lightness either increased or decreased (shown) with	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
successive presentations. After a 2 s decision period, subjects indicated whether color lightness	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
increased or decreased by selecting the “less color” or “more color” options, respectively. c)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Confidence decoder task. After a 1 s fixation period, a colored grating (red or green) was	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
presented for 500 ms. After a 1.5 s post-stimulus interval, participants indicated whether they	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
perceived the grating to be red or green and rated confidence on the color discrimination task	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
from 1 (guessed) to 4 (certain). The same task was used in the psychophysics sessions outside	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
of the fMRI scanner on Days 3 and 7. Text in panels b and c is enlarged compared to its actual	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
size	during	the	experiment	for	clarity.		
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	Color	and	confidence	MVPA	
Color	and	confidence	decoders	were	trained	on	multivoxel	BOLD	signal	patterns	acquired	while	
participants	performed	the	color	lightness	and	red/green	color	discrimination	tasks,	respectively.	
The	color	decoder	was	trained	on	voxel	activities	in	a	region	of	interest	(ROI)	spanning	visual	
areas	V1,	V2,	V3,	and	V4	(denoted	hereafter	as	V1-4).	Separate	confidence	decoders	were	
trained	on	voxel	activities	in	each	of	four	frontoparietal	ROIs:		inferior	parietal	lobule	(IPL),	
inferior	frontal	sulcus	(IFS),	middle	frontal	gyrus		MFG,	and	middle	frontal	sulcus	(MFS)	(Figure	
9).		Each	task	was	performed	in	separate	16-trial	runs.	Color	(lightness	task)	and	confidence	
(red/green	color	discrimination	task)	runs	alternated	consecutively	for	each	participant,	with	the	
order	pseudorandomized	across	participants.	Participants	performed	as	many	of	each	run	as	
possible	across	two	90	minute	scanning	sessions	on	Days	1	and	2	(mean	±	SD	across	subjects:	
9.5	±	0.9	color	runs	and	9.9	±	0.8	confidence	runs).		
	
Iterative	sparse	logistic	regression		(Yamashita,	Sato,	Yoshioka,	Tong,	&	Kamitani,	2008)	was	
used	to	select	and	weight	the	most	informative	voxels	for	distinguishing	red	vs	green	color	in	the	
visual	ROI	and	high	vs	low	confidence	in	the	four	frontoparietal	ROIs	as	previously	described	
(Amano	et	al.,	2016;	Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	.	Decoding	accuracy	was	validated	using	an	iterative	
leave-one-run-out	procedure.	For	each	cross	validation	run,	the	SLR	algorithm	selected	and	
weighted	a	subset	of	voxels	in	the	relevant	ROI.	These	voxels	were	then	removed,	and	the	
algorithm	was	applied	again,	selecting	and	weighting	a	new,	unique	subset	of	voxels.	This	
process	was	repeated	iteratively,	10	times	for	each	cross	validation	run.	Decoding	accuracies	
were	then	averaged	across	cross	validation	runs	for	each	iSLR	iteration,	and	the	number	of	
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iterations	that	led	to	the	highest	decoding	accuracy	was	selected	as	the	optimal	number	to	be	
subsequently	used	during	DecNef.		
	
Following	the	cross	validation	procedure	a	separate	training	run	was	performed	on	the	entire	
dataset	using	the	optimal	number	of	iterations.	The	resulting	decoder	was	used	for	the	
subsequent	DecNef	sessions	on	Days	4-6.	The	output	of	the	color	decoder	reflected	the	
probability	of	the	participant	viewing	a	red	stimulus,	while	the	output	of	the	confidence	decoder	
reflected	the	probability	of	the	participant	being	in	a	state	of	high	perceptual	confidence.	See	
Supplementary	Material	for	further	details	on	color	and	confidence	decoder	optimization.	
	
DecNef	sessions	
All	participants	in	the	MVPA	session	who	had	accuracies	of	55%	or	higher	for	color	decoding	
and	for	at	least	two	of	the	frontoparietal	ROIs	for	confidence	decoding	(N=15)	were	included	in	
the	DecNef	sessions	on	Days	4-6.	Each	DecNef	run	(	mean	±	s.e.m.	=	9.6	±	0.4	runs	per	day)	
started	with	an	initial	29	second	fixation	period,	during	which	a	white	fixation	cross	(diameter	
~0.84°)	was	presented	at	the	center	of	the	screen.	This	was	followed	by	16	trials	in	which	
participants	were	rewarded	for	activating	the	patterns	identified	in	the	MVPA	session	as	
corresponding	to	red	in	V1-V4	and	high	confidence	in	the	four	frontoparietal	ROIs	(Figure	10a).	
On	each	trial,	after	a	1	s	cue,	participants	viewed	a	vertical	grating	with	the	same	dimensions	as	
the	gratings	shown	during	the	MVPA	session	for	6	s,	during	which	time	they	were	instructed	to	
try	to	use	their	minds	to	activate	a	pattern	of	brain	activity	in	order	to	make	the	size	of	a	
subsequent	feedback	stimulus	(a	black	disc)	as	large	as	possible.	The	feedback	disc	appeared	
for	2	s	after	a	6	s	rest	period	(Figure	10a).	
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For	online	decoding,	the	BOLD	signal	was	head	motion	corrected	in	real	time	using	Turbo-Brian	
Voyager	software	(Brain	Innovation,	Netherlands).	The	BOLD	signal	corresponding	to	the	
interval	from	the	start	of	the	run	until	the	last	measured	TR	in	the	prevailing	trial	was	then	
extracted	from	the	voxels	that	were	selected	in	each	ROI	during	the	MVPA	session.	Linear	
detrending	and	z-score	normalization	was	then	performed	on	these	extracted	voxel	activities.	
The	resulting	detrended,	z-score	normalized	signal	in	each	ROI	was	then	averaged	across	the	6	
second	rest	period	of	the	prevailing	trial,	which	should	correspond	to	neural	activity	during	the	6	
second	induction	period	when	adjusting	for	an	estimated	6-s	hemodynamic	delay,	and		
was	inputted	into	the	corresponding	color	or	confidence	decoder.	The	resulting	decoding	
likelihoods	(LLs)	determined	the	size	of	the	feedback	disc	according	to	the	following	formula:		
	
0.667	*	[(LL	red		/	2)	+	(LL	high	confidence		/	2)]	+	0.333	*	(LL	red	*		LL	high	confidence	).		
	
The	size	of	the	feedback	disc	also	corresponded	to	a	monetary	reward	earned	on	each	trial	
(max	=	18.75	yen	or	approximately	$0.15	US	dollars	per	trial).		Successive	trials	were	separated	
by	a	5	s	ITI.		
	
At	the	end	of	each	DecNef	run	participants	separately	reported	whether	they	perceived	any	red	
or	any	green	in	the	induction	grating	stimulus	on	any	of	the	16	trials	in	that	run,	and	indicated	
how	confident	they	were	in	this	judgment	on	the	same	1	to	4	scale	that	was	used	during	
decoder	construction	trials	(Figure	10b).	The	order	in	which	the	red	and	green	perception	
questions	were	asked	at	the	end	of	each	DecNef	run	was	randomized	across	runs.	Importantly,	
on		97.4	±	0.2%	of	trials,	the	induction	stimulus	was	achromatic,	while	on	the	remaining	trials	(4	
per	day,	the	induction	stimulus	was	either	slightly	red	(2	trials)	or	slightly	green	(2	trials).	
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Specifically,	on	each	day	of	neurofeedback	one	run	contained	one	red	trial,	a	different	run	
contained	one	green	trial,	and	a	third	run	contained	both	one	red	and	one	green	trial.	Run	order	
was	randomized	between	subjects,	but	the	three	runs	containing	color	trials	were	constrained	to	
always	occur	within	the	first	8	runs	on	a	given	day	to	avoid	a	given	subject	missing	a	run	with	a	
color	trial	due	to	time	constraints.		
	
Given	this	setup,	each	run	can	be	categorized	as	one	of	four	classic	types	according	to	signal	
detection	theory:	hits	(reported	seeing	color	during	a	run	in	which	at	least	one	trial	contained	a	
colored	induction	stimulus),	misses	(reported	seeing	no	color	during	a	run	in	which	at	least	one	
trial	contained	a	colored	induction	stimulus),	false	alarms	(reported	seeing	color	during	a	run	in	
which	no	trials	contained	a	colored	induction	stimulus),	and	correct	rejections	(reported	seeing	
no	color	during	a	run	in	which	no	trials	contained	a	colored	induction	stimulus).		The	color	
manipulation	was	designed	to	induce	a	nonzero	baseline	false	alarm	rate	for	perceiving	color,	
e.g.,	reporting	the	perception	of	red	in	a	given	DecNef	run	when	no	red	was	present	in	any	
induction	stimuli	during	that	run.	
	
At	the	end	of	Day	7,	participants	were	asked	two	debriefing	questions.	First,	they	were	asked	
whether	they	thought	they	received	real	or	sham	neurofeedback.	Second,	they	were	asked	to	
guess,	assuming	they	had	been	receiving	real	neurofeedback,	whether	they	were	rewarded	for	
activating	a	pattern	of	brain	activity	corresponding	to	red	perception	or	green	perception.	For	
additional	details	on	the	decoded	neurofeedback	procedure,	see	Supplementary	Material.	
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Pre-/post-DecNef	psychophysics	
On	Days	3	and	7	participants	(N=15)	performed	the	same	red/green	color	discrimination	task	
from	Days	1	and	2,	with	the	following	differences	in	stimulus	parameters.	Three	stimulus	levels	
(proportion	of	colored	pixels),	fixed	across	color	to	preserve	equiluminance,	were	used	to	target	
percent	correct	scores	of	65%,	75%,	and	85%.	As	in	the	red/green	color	discrimination	tasks	
performed	outside	of	the	scanner	on	Days	1	and	2,	the	ITI	was	1	s.	
	
Participants	first	performed	10	practice	trials	with	trial-by-trial	feedback	(as	described	in	the	
Red/Green	Color	Discrimination	Task	section	above).	They	then	performed	6	blocks	of	51	trials	
each	with	self-paced	breaks	between	blocks	and	no	trial-by-trial	feedback.	Of	the	306	total	trials,	
276	had	stimulus	strengths	near	perceptual	threshold,	with	46	trials	at	each	of	the	three	
near-threshold	stimulus	strengths	for	each	color.	Of	the	remaining	30	trials,	15	had	a	high	
percentage	of	colored	pixels	(45%),	which	was	intended	to	help	maintain	perceptual	templates	
for	color,	and	15	had	zero	colored	pixels.	All	trial	types	were	randomly	interleaved	across	blocks.		
	
The	three	stimulus	strengths	were	determined	for	each	participant	by	multiplying	their	mean	
Quest-estimated	threshold	stimulus	strength	(in	proportion	of	colored	pixels)	from	Day	2	by	
three	proportions	(mean	±	SD	proportions	across	subjects	=		0.57		±	0.17,	1.06	±	0.10,	1.56	±	
0.16	for	low,	medium,	and	high	stimulus	strengths,	respectively).	These	proportions	were	
adjusted	on	a	subject-by-subject	basis	according	to	the	Quest	procedure’s	tendency	to	over-	or	
underestimate	threshold	stimulus	strength	when	considering	all	of	the	across-subject	data	that	
had	been	collected	at	the	time.	The	resulting	mean	±	s.e.m.	performance	scores	across	Days	3	
and	7	for	low,	medium,	and	high	stimulus	strengths	were	65.0	±	2.2%,	77.0%	±	2.7%,	and	
84.0%	±	2.4%	correct	(d’	=	1.00		±	0.16,	1.83		±	0.23,	and	2.37		±	0.22,	respectively).		
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	Individual	participant	data	from	each	day	were	fit	with		cumulative	normal	psychometric	functions	
with	free	parameters	α	(threshold)	and	β	(slope),	and	fixed	parameters	γ	(lapse	rate)	=	0	and	δ	
(guess	rate)	=	0	also	using	the	Palamedes	toolbox		(Kingdom	&	Prins,	2010;	Prins	&	Kingdom,	
2018)	.	Values	on	the	abscissa	were	equated	across	subjects	to	equal		±1,	±2,	and	±3	to	reflect	
the	low,	medium,	and	high	stimulus	strength	conditions	for	each	color,	respectively,	with	positive	
and	negative	values	corresponding	to	red	and	green	stimuli,	respectively.	The	mean	and	s.e.m.	
of	the	individual	psychometric	fits	are	shown	by	the	dark	lines	and	lighter	bounded	regions,	
respectively	(Figure	11c).	The	point	of	subjective	equality,	which	corresponds	to	the	stimulus	
strength	at	which	participants	are	equally	likely	to	choose	red	or	green	on	the	color	
discrimination	task	(i.e.,	50%	on	the	ordinate),	was	estimated	as	the	threshold	parameter,	α,	
from	the	fitting	procedure.	Given	that	stimulus	strength	values	were	equated	across	subjects	for	
psychometric	curve	fitting,	the	resulting	mean		±	SD	point	of	subjective	equality	(PSE)	values	
(PSE	pre-DecNef		=	1.66		±	2.00,		PSE	post-DecNef		=	0.34		±	0.72	)	can	be	thought	of	as	the	proportion	of	the	
lowest	stimulus	strength	necessary	for	the	stimulus	to	be	equally	likely	to	have	a	subjective	
appearance	of	redness	or	greenness,	with	positive	values	reflecting	red	stimulus	strength	and	
negative	values	reflecting	green	stimulus	strength.	
	
Apparatus	
Stimuli	for	tasks	performed	outside	of	the	fMRI	scanner	were	presented	on	an	IBM	P275	CRT	
monitor	with	a	1280	x	960	resolution	and	a	60	Hz	refresh	rate.	All	visual	stimuli	were	generated	
with	custom	Matlab		R2014a	(Natuck,	MA)	scripts	using	PsychToolbox	3.0.12.	Stimuli	for	tasks	
performed	inside	of	the	fMRI	scanner	were	presented	on	an	LCD	projector	that	also	had	a		1280	
x	960	resolution	and	a	60	Hz	refresh	rate.	Repeated	measures		ANOVAs	were	performed	using	
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SPSS	v22	and	were		adjusted	for	violations	of	the	assumption	of	sphericity	with	the	
Greenhouse-Geisser	correction	when	necessary.	
	
MRI	Parameters		
MRI	images	were	acquired	using	3T	MRI	scanners	(Siemens,	Verio	[N=15]	or	Siemens,	Trio	
[N=2])	at	the	ATR	Brain	Activation	Imaging	Center.	Both	scanners	used	head	coils.	Functional	
images	for	MVPA	and	DecNef	sessions	were	acquired	using	gradient	EPI	sequences	with	33	
contiguous	slices	(repetition	time	(TR)	=	2	s,	echo	time	(TE)	=	26	ms,	flip	angle	=	80	deg,	voxel	
size	=	3	x	3	x	3.5	mm	3	,	0	mm	slice	gap)	oriented	parallel	to	the	AC-PC	plane,	covering	the	entire	
brain.	T1-weighted	MR	images	(MP-RAGE;	256	slices,	TR	=	2s,	TE	=	26	ms,	flip	angle	=	80	
deg,	voxel	size	=	1	x	1	x	1	mm	3	,	0	mm	slice	gap)	were	also	acquired	during	the	first	MVPA	
session.	These	images	were	used	for	automatic	brain	parcellation	in	Freesurfer		(Fischl	et	al.,	
2002)	.		
	
fMRI	preprocessing	
fMRI	images	from	decoder	construction	sessions	were	preprocessed	as	previously	described	
(Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	.	T1-weighted	structural	images	were	processed	with	an	automatic	
parcellation	procedure	based	on	volumetric	segmentation	and	cortical	reconstruction	using	the	
FreeSurfer	image	analysis	suite	(	http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/	).	The	IPL,	IFS,	MFG,	MFS	
ROIs	(Figure	9)	used	in	subsequent	analyses	were	defined	using	this	procedure.	Visual	ROIs	
were	defined	using	a	probabilistic	atlas		(L.	Wang,	Mruczek,	Arcaro,	&	Kastner,	2015)	.	Average	
inflated	cortical	surfaces	shown	in	Figure	9	were	generated	using	Freesurfer	and	displayed	
using	PySurfer	(	https://	pysurfer.github.io/	).	Average	ROIs	in	Figure	9	were	generated	in	
Freesurfer	for	display	purposes;	voxels	were	included	in	each	average	ROI	if	they	were	present	
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in	the	individual	ROIs	of	at	least	half	of	the	17	decoder	construction	participants	(Figure	9a).	
Gray	matter	masks	were	generated	using	the	mrVista	software	package	for	Matlab	
(	http://vistalab.stanford.edu/software/	),	which	uses	functions	from	the	SPM	suite	
(	http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm	),	to	ensure	that	only	gray	matter	voxels	were	used	for	
subsequent	analyses.	Three-dimensional	rigid-body	motion	correction	was	applied	in	mrVista	to	
align	functional	scans	to	the	T1-weighted	structural	image	for	each	participant.	Day	2	Localizer	
scans	were	slice-time	corrected	and	averaged	across	stimulus	groups,	and	a	coherence	
analysis	was	applied	to	identify	voxels	in	visual	cortex	that	responded	maximally	to	the	localizer	
stimulus		(Wandell	&	Winawer,	2011)	.	No	temporal	or	spatial	smoothing	was	applied.	For	all	color	
and	confidence	decoder	construction	scans,	we	removed	voxels	with	exceptional	values,	
extracted	BOLD	signal	time	courses	from	each	remaining	voxel	in	each	ROI,	applied	linear	
detrending,	and	z-score	normalized	the	BOLD	signal	per	run	to	account	for	potential	baseline	
differences	between	runs.		
	
Results	
Decoding	color	and	confidence	
Based	on	10-fold	cross	validation,	color	decoding	accuracy	(mean		±	s.e.m.)	in	visual	cortex	was	
71.5		±	1.7%,	while	the	mean	confidence	decoding	accuracy	across	frontoparietal	ROIs	was	64.9	
±	1.4%	(	IPL:	65.9		±	1.5%	,	IFS:	66.2		±	1.6%	,	MFG:	64.9		±	1.4%	,	MFS:	62.6		±	1.2%;	Figure	9).	
D	ecoding	accuracy	in	each	ROI	was	significantly	greater	than	chance	(50%	correct)	[V1-4:	t(16)	
=	12.5,	p	<	0.001,	95%	CI	=	(0.68,0.75);	IPL:	t(16)	=	10.3,	p	<	0.001,	95%	CI	=	(0.63,0.69);	IFS:	
t(16)	=	10.2,	p	<	0.001,	95%	CI	=	(0.63,0.70);	MFG:	t(16)	=	10.6,	p	<	0.001,	95%	CI	=	
(0.62,0.68);	MFS:	t(16)	=	10.3,	p	<	0.001,	95%	CI	=	(0.60,0.65);	Bonferroni	corrected	(	α	
corrected	
	=	
0.01),	two-tailed	one-sample	t-test	s	].		The	mean	±		s.e.m.	numbers	of	selected	voxels	in	each	
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ROI	were	the	following:	V1-V4	=	140.4	±	23.0,		IPL	=		107.4	±	13.1	,	IFS	=		71.5	±	12.1	,	MFG	=	
80.4	±	14.6	,	MFS	=		79.1	±	12.6	).		Two	participants	were	excluded	from	subsequent	DecNef	
analyses	for	failing	to	have	accuracies	greater	than	55%	for	color	decoding	and	for	at	least	two	
of	the	four	frontoparietal	confidence	decoders.	
	
	
Figure 9. Decoding ROIs and accuracies. a) Average regions of interest (ROIs) used for	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
decoder construction. Voxels were included in each of the displayed average ROIs if they were	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
present for at least half of the 17 decoder construction participants. ROIs are displayed on an	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
average (N=17) inflated cortical surface using the Freesurfer and PySurfer software packages.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
b) Decoding accuracies (reported as mean ± s.e.m., N=17)	. All decoders were trained using	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
sparse logistic regression	(Yamashita et al., 2008) and tested with 10-fold cross-validation. Color	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
decoding (red vs green) accuracy in V1-V4: 71.5 ± 1.7%	. Confidence decoding (high vs low)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
accuracy in IPL: 65.9 ± 1.5%	, IFS: 66.2 ± 1.6%	, MFG: 64.9 ± 1.4%	, MFS: 62.6 ± 1.2%	. All	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
decoding accuracies were significantly higher than chance (50% correct) as measured by	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Bonferroni corrected (	α	
corrected
= 0.01), two-tailed one-sample t-tests. V1-4: combined visual	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
areas V1, V2, V3, & V4; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFS, inferior frontal sulcus; MFG, middle	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
frontal	gyrus;	MFS,	middle	frontal	sulcus.	
	
The	color	manipulation	in	the	induction	stimulus	succeeded	in	establishing	a	non	zero	baseline	
false	alarm	rate	(FAR)	for	red	perception	in	9	of	15	DecNef	participants	(FAR	red		=	14.2%	±	2.2%)	
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and	for	green	perception	in	14	of	15	DecNef	participants	(FAR	green		=	23.0%	±	5.9%).	One	
participant	was	excluded	from	analyses	of	false	alarm	and	correct	rejection	runs	because	they	
did	not	make	any	false	alarms.	One	additional	participant	was	excluded	from	these	analyses	
due	to	a	failure	to	make	correct	rejections	for		both	red	and	green	responses	on	any	single	run.	
Thus,	in	13	DecNef	participants,	we	could	analyze	whether	there	was	any	connection	between	
activation	of	multivoxel	patterns	for	color	or	confidence	and	false	color	perception	by	comparing	
color	and	confidence	induction	likelihoods	between	false	alarm	and	correct	rejection	runs.		
	
In	subjects	who	made	red	false	alarms,	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	color	induction	
likelihoods	between	red	false	alarm	runs	and	correct	rejection	runs	[	t(8)	=	-0.34,	p	=	0.75,	95%	
CI	=	(-0.24,	0.18),	two-tailed	paired-samples	t-test;	Figure	11a].	In	subjects	who	made	green	
false	alarms	there	was	no	significant	difference	in	color	induction	likelihoods	between	green	
false	alarm	runs	and	correct	rejection	runs	[	t(12)	=	-0.34,	p	=	0.74,	95%	CI	=	(-0.08,	0.06),	
two-tailed	paired-samples	t-test;	Figure	11a].	However,	collapsing	across	color,	high	confidence	
induction	likelihoods	were	significantly	higher	during	false	alarm	runs	than	they	were	during	
correct	rejection	runs	[t(12)	=	2.75,	p	=	0.02,	95%		CI	=	(0.01,0.06),	two-tailed	paired-samples	
t-test;	Figure	11b].	
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Figure 10. DecNef task. a) Trial structure. Participants were told that, after a 1 s cue, while an	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
induction stimulus (vertical grating) was present, they should try to activate a pattern of brain	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
activity so as to maximize the size of a subsequently presented black feedback disc. A 6 s rest	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
period separated the induction and feedback stimuli to account for hemodynamic delay and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
real-time processing of fMRI images. BOLD signal in the visual (V1-4) and frontoparietal (IPL,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IFS, MFG, MFS) ROIs from the induction period was processed by the previously-trained color	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
and confidence decoders, respectively. The magnitude of the resulting red and high confidence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
likelihoods determined the size of the feedback disc such that participants were maximally	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
rewarded for simultaneously activating a red pattern in visual cortex and a high confidence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
pattern in frontoparietal cortex (see Methods). b) End of run questions. At the end of each run	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
participants were asked whether they perceived red or green in the induction grating during any	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
of the 16 trials in that run. They were also asked to rate confidence in each of these judgments	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
on a scale from 1 (low) to 4 (high). Text in panel b is enlarged compared to its actual size during	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the experiment for clarity. V1-4: combined visual areas V1, V2, V3, & V4; IPL, inferior parietal	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
lobule;	IFS,	inferior	frontal	sulcus;	MFG,	middle	frontal	gyrus;	MFS,	middle	frontal	sulcus.	
	
If	the	learned	co-activation	of	the	decoded	red	and	high	confidence	patterns	can	influence	
conscious	visual	perception	in	real	time,	then	we	might	predict	the	false	alarm	rate	(FAR)	for	red	
perception	during	neurofeedback	to	increase	across	the	three	days	of	neurofeedback.	However,	
a	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subjects	factor	time	(3	days)	showed	that		the	red	FAR	
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did	not	increase	over	time	[F(1.23,17.21)	=	0.55,	p	=	0.50].	Correspondingly,		a	repeated	
measures	ANOVA	with	a	within-subjects	factor	of	time	suggested	that		neither	red	nor	high	
confidence	induction	likelihoods	increased	over	the	three	days	of	DecNef	(	red	induction:	F	2,28		=	
0.63,	p	=	0.54	;	high	confidence	induction:		F(2,28)	=	0.79,	p	=	0.46	).	Mean	induction	likelihoods	
across	days	were	0.47		±	0.04	and	0.52	±	0.01	for	red	and	high	confidence	induction,	
respectively.	Because	participants	did	not	successfully	learn	to	perform	the	neurofeedback	task	
we	are	precluded	from	addressing	whether	DecNef	learning	in	this	context	can	affect	real-time	
color	perception.	
	
All	DecNef	participants	(N=15)	also	performed	a	red/green	color	discrimination	task	outside	of	
the	fMRI	scanner	on	the	day	before	the	first	DecNef	session	and	on	the	day	after	the	last	
DecNef	session.	The	color	discrimination	task	was	the	same	as	that	used	for	confidence	
decoding	in	the	MVPA	sessions	(Figure	8c)	except	that	three	constant	stimulus	strengths	were	
used	for	each	color	(whereas	stimulus	strength	was	modified	on	a	per	run	basis	during	the	
MVPA	sessions;	see	Methods).	The	resulting	individual	participant	data	from	each	day	were	fit	
with		cumulative	normal	psychometric	functions	(Figure	11c).	In	line	with	a	previous	DecNef	
study	of	color	perception		(Amano	et	al.,	2016)	,	participants	were	significantly	more	biased	
towards	choosing	red	after	DecNef,	as	indicated	by	a	significant	leftward	shift	in	the	point	of	
subjective	equality	(PSE)	[	t(14)	=	2.43,	p	=	0.03,	95%	CI	=	(0.16,	2.48),	two-tailed	
paired-samples	t-test;	Figure	11c].	
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	Figure 11. Induction likelihoods during false alarm versuss correct rejection runs and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
pre-/post-DecNef psychometric functions for color discrimination. a) Red induction likelihoods	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
during red false alarm, green false alarm, and correct rejection runs. Induction likelihoods were	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
not significantly different between false alarms and correct rejections for either color [red false	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
alarm versus correct rejection runs: t(8) = -0.34, p = 0.75, 95% CI = (-0.24, 0.18); green false	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
alarm versus correct rejection runs: t(12) = -0.34, p = 0.74, 95% CI = (-0.08, 0.06), two-tailed	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
paired-samples t-tests]. b) High confidence induction likelihoods during false alarm runs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(collapsed across color) and correct rejection runs. High confidence induction was higher under	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
false alarm runs than it was under correct rejection runs [t(12) = 2.75, p = 0.02, CI =	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.01,0.06)	]. c) Pre- vs post-DecNef psychometric curves. Participants performed a red/green	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
color task (see Figure 8c) with the method of constant stimuli on the day before the first DecNef	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
session (Day 3, gray) and on the day after the last DecNef session (Day 7, purple).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Psychometric curves were fit to individual participant data using cumulative normal distribution	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
functions	. Shown is the mean (black/magenta line) ± s.e.m. (gray/light magenta shaded area) of	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the individual fits. A significant negative shift in group mean point of subjective equality (PSE)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
was observed from Day 3 to Day 7 [t(14) = 2.43, *p = 0.03, two-tailed paired-sample t-test],	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
showing	a	post-DecNef	reduction	in	an	initial	bias	toward	choosing	green.	
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	The	signal	detection	theoretic	measures	d’	and	criterion		(Green	DM,	1966;	MacMillan	&	
Creelman,	2004)	,	c,	were	computed	for	the	color	discrimination	task	with	Hits	corresponding	to	
trials	in	which	participants	correctly	discriminated	red	stimuli	as	red	and	False	Alarms	
corresponding	to	trials	in	which	participants	incorrectly	discriminated	green	stimuli	as	red.	There	
was	a	trend,	though	non-significant,	toward	an	overall	improvement	in	discrimination	d’	from	Day	
3	to	Day	7	[d’	pre		=	1.48	±	0.18	,	d’	post		=	1.79	±	0.22,	t(14)	=	-1.91,	p	=	0.08,	95%	CI	=	(-0.66,	
0.04),	two-tailed	paired-samples	t-test]	which	may	be	attributable	to	perceptual	learning		(Dosher	
&	Lu,	2017)	.	There	was	also	a	non-significant	trend	towards	a	decrease	in	criterion	[c	pre		=	0.50	±	
0.12,	c	post		=	0.20	±	0.08,	t(14)	=	1.99,	p	=	0.07,	95%	CI	=	(-0.02,	0.61),	two-tailed	paired-samples	
t-test],	which	is	consistent	with	the	observed	negative	shift	in	PSE	from	the	psychometric	
function	analyses.	There	was	no	significant	change	in	red/green	color	discrimination	confidence	
from	Day	3	to	Day	7	[mean	confidence	pre		=	2.13	±	0.14,	mean	confidence	post		=	2.18	±	0.13,	t(14)	
=	-0.54,	p	=	0.60,	95%	CI	=	(-0.28,0.17),	two-tailed	paired-samples	t-test].	
	
During	the	debriefing	session	following	the	red/green	color	discrimination	task	on	Day	7,	eight	
out	of	15	DecNef	participants	(53.3%)	indicated	on	the	forced-choice	question	that	they	thought	
they	had	been	receiving	sham	neurofeedback.	Further,	only	five	out	15	DecNef	participants	
(33.3%)	responded	that,	assuming	they	had	been	receiving	real	neurofeedback,	they	were	
rewarded	for	activating	a	pattern	of	brain	activity	corresponding	to	red	perception.	These	results	
suggest	that	participants	were	unaware	of	the	true	targets	of	neurofeedback.	
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Discussion	
Using	a	DecNef	paradigm	that	targeted	activation	of	multivariate	decoded	patterns	for	color	in	
visual	cortex	and	perceptual	confidence	in	frontoparietal	cortex,	we	found	that	participants	were	
more	likely	to	activate	patterns	for	high	confidence	during	fMRI	runs	in	which	they	also	falsely	
perceived	color.	Activation	of	decoded	patterns	for	color	in	visual	areas,	on	the	other	hand,	was	
not	associated	with	false	color	perception.	These	results	suggest	that	the	decoded	pattern	for	
color	discrimination	confidence	is	critically	related	to	conscious	visual	perception.	
	
This	result	also	provides	support	for	confidence	judgments	in	the	extant	debate	about	which	
subjective	measure	is	ideal	for	measuring	conscious	awareness		(Overgaard	et	al.,	2010;	
Rosenthal,	2018)	.	Optimization	of	subjective	measures	is	critical	for	the	study	of	consciousness;	
the	measure	one	selects	can	make	the	difference	in	whether	or	not	a	priming	effect	is	
considered	to	be	truly	subliminal		(Wierzchoń,	Asanowicz,	Paulewicz,	&	Cleeremans,	2012)	or	
whether	above-chance	orientation	discrimination	sensitivity	is	considered	a	case	of	Type	1	or	
Type	2	blindsight		(Rausch	&	Zehetleitner,	2016)	.	In	each	of	these	cases,	confidence	judgments	
were	found	to	be	the	most	exhaustive	and	conservative	measure	of	conscious	awareness.	
While	the	current	results	do	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	decoded	patterns	for	other	subjective	
measures	like	visibility	judgments	might	show	a	similar	association	with	conscious	perception	in	
the	same	DecNef	paradigm,	they	are	informative	nonetheless	in	providing	at	least	a	partial	
neural	basis	for	the	well-supported	behavioral	link	between	confidence	judgments	and	
consciousness.	
	
These	results	also	shed	light	on	the	current	debate	about	whether	or	not	prefrontal	cortex	is	part	
of	the	core	neural	basis	of	consciousness		(Boly	et	al.,	2017;	Odegaard	et	al.,	2017)	.	Given	that	
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three	out	of	the	four	confidence	ROIs	were	in	prefrontal	cortex,	the	observed	association	
between	confidence	induction	and	conscious	perception	suggests	that	prefrontal	cortex	is	
critically	involved	in	consciousness.	Indeed,	comparing	high	confidence	induction	under	false	
alarm	vs	correct	rejection	runs	in	each	of	the	individual	frontoparietal	ROIs	as	well	as	in	a	
collective	prefrontal	ROI	(spanning	IFS,	MFS,	and	MFG)	suggests	that	the	main	effect	of	high	
confidence	induction	under	false	alarms	is	driven	by	activity	in	prefrontal	cortex	(Figure	A3).	
Also	supporting	the	idea	that	PFC	is	uniquely	involved	in	the	generation	of	conscious	percepts	is	
the	result	that	the	decoded	patterns	for	color	in	visual	cortex	were	not	associated	with	false	color	
perception.	
	
To	further	investigate	whether	the	information	in	the	ROI-specific	decoders	was	shared	with	
other	ROIs	during	neurofeedback,	we	performed	an	information	leak	analysis	as	previously	
described		(Cortese	et	al.,	2016;	Shibata,	Watanabe,	Sasaki,	&	Kawato,	2011)	;	Figure	A4)	using	
data	from	the	13	DecNef	subjects	whose	induction	data	were	considered	in	the	false	alarm	
versus	correct	rejection	analyses	shown	in	Figure	11a	and	11b.	Briefly,	this	analysis	quantifies	
the	extent	to	which	multivariate	BOLD	patterns	in	one	ROI	can	predict	the	output	of	a	decoder	
trained	in	another	ROI.	The	pattern	of	results	shown	in	S4	suggests	minimal	information	leak	
between	frontal	and	visual	ROIs,	with	more	intermediate	information	leak	between	parietal	and	
frontal	and	parietal	and	visual	ROIs.	Given	that	the	main	result	of	high	confidence	induction	
likelihoods	being	higher	during	false	alarm	runs	was	found	to	be	driven	largely	by	frontal	activity	
(Figure	A3),	the	leak	analysis	further	supports	the	idea	that	this	effect	was	independent	of	
activity	in	visual	cortex.	Furthermore,	supporting	the	notion	that	the	output	of	the	confidence	
decoder	was	meaningfully	related	to	perception	is	the	fact	that	average	high	confidence	
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induction	likelihoods	in	confidence	ROIs	across	all	three	days	of	neurofeedback	were	positively	
correlated	with	average	confidence	judgments	(Figure	A5).	
	
The	finding	that	participants’	red/green	discrimination	psychometric	functions	shifted	in	the	
direction	of	a	higher	overall	proportion	of	red	responses	is	consistent	with	a	previous	DecNef	
study	targeting	color	representations	in	visual	cortex		(Amano	et	al.,	2016)	.	A	potentially	
important	difference,	however,	is	that	in	the	previous	study	it	was	reported	that	participants	
successfully	learned	to	activate	the	targeted	decoded	color	patterns	more	frequently	over	time	
through	DecNef	training,	whereas	in	the	current	study	such	learning	did	not	occur.	One	possible	
explanation	for	this	difference	is	that	despite	the	lack	of	such	learning	in	the	current	experiment,	
an	association	still	formed	between	the	induction	stimulus,	which	was	matched	in	its	achromatic	
parameters	to	the	target	stimuli	in	the	Day	3	and	Day	7	psychophysics	tasks,	and	spontaneous	
induction	of	decoded	patterns	for	redness.		
	
An	alternative	explanation	is	that	the	observed	shift	in	psychometric	functions	in	the	current	
study	was	due	to	an	initial	Day	3	bias	towards	choosing	green	being	minimized	over	time	via	
non-DecNef-related	perceptual	learning.	Future	studies	should	investigate	this	question	by	
reducing	such	initial	biases	through	longer	training	periods	and	more	extensive	stimulus	titration	
based	not	only	on	task	performance	(as	was	the	case	here)	but	also	on	response	bias	
measures	like	the	signal	detection	theoretic	criterion		(Green	DM,	1966;	MacMillan	&	Creelman,	
2004)	.		
	
A	limitation	of	the	current	study	is	the	intermittent	nature	(i.e.,	run-by-run)	of	the	psychophysical	
data	collected	during	DecNef.	Trial-by-trial	measures	of	color	perception	would	provide	
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considerably	greater	power	for	evaluating	the	relationship	between	confidence	and	conscious	
awareness.	Run-by-run	psychophysical	measures	are	not	without	precedent		(Cheesman	&	
Merikle,	1984)	,	and	they	were	selected	here	as	a	means	of	reducing	trial	times.	This	was	in	turn	
intended	to	facilitate	participants	learning	to	induce	the	targeted	multivoxel	color	and	confidence	
patterns.	However,	given	the	lack	of	such	a	learning	effect	here,	it	may	be	optimal	for	future	
studies	to	prioritize	the	greater	power	and	signal-to-noise	ratio	afforded	by	trial-by-trial	
perceptual	judgments.		
	
It	remains	an	open	question,	however,	what	prevented	participants	from	learning	to	activate	the	
targeted	color	and	confidence	patterns	in	the	DecNef	task.	As	such	an	effect	would	allow	for	the	
investigation	of	a	causal	relationship	between	perceptual	confidence	and	consciousness,	this	is	
an	important	issue	for	future	DecNef	studies	to	investigate.	The	present	DecNef	study	was	the	
first	to	target	two	categorically	different	perceptual	targets	(color	and	confidence);	one	
possibility,	therefore,	is	that	the	combination	of	these	patterns	becomes	too	complex	for	
participants	to	learn	to	generate	endogenously	in	a	consistent	manner.	Another	related	
possibility	is	that	the	neurofeedback	procedure	was	simply	spread	across	too	many	decoders	
(one	for	color	and	four	for	confidence).	The	complexity	of	the	neurofeedback	procedure,	both	in	
terms	of	categorical	targets	and	number	of	decoders,	may	similarly	have	been	responsible	for	
the	failure	of	confidence	neurofeedback	to	modulate	confidence	judgements	as	previously	
reported		(Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	.		
	
Future	studies	should	investigate	the	limits	of	what	human	participants	can	learn	to	regulate	via	
DecNef	both	in	terms	of	the	number	and	distribution	of	decoders	throughout	the	brain,	and	in	
terms	of	the	complexity	of	the	perceptual	content	being	targeted.	For	example,	it	is	an	open	
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question	whether	confidence	DecNef	would	benefit	from	using	a	single	decoder	spanning	the	
four	frontoparietal	ROIs	used	here,	as	might	be	suggested	by	successful	approaches	using	
whole	brain	decoders		(deBettencourt,	Cohen,	Lee,	Norman,	&	Turk-Browne,	2015)	.	It	would	
also	be	informative	to	repeat	the	current	study	with	confidence	DecNef	alone,	and	to	limit	the	
neurofeedback	to	only	prefrontal	ROIs	(Figure	A3).	If	learning	occurred	in	either	of	these	
modified	contexts,	or	some	combination	of	them,	then	it	would	suggest	that	the	difference	in	
learning	indeed	stems	from	the	difference	in	either	the	number	of	decoders	or	the	categorical	
complexity	of	the	targets	of	neurofeedback.	
	
Another	limitation	and	potential	roadblock	to	induction	learning	is	the	suboptimality	of	the	
decoding	procedure	itself.	It	is	possible	that	simply	increasing	decoding	accuracy	in	the	first	two	
days	of	the	study	would	have	lead	to	induction	learning.	One	recent	study	showed	that	decoding	
accuracies	could	be	significantly	improved	by	integrating	fMRI	hyperalignment		(Haxby	et	al.,	
2011)	into	the	DecNef	procedure		(Taschereau-Dumouchel	et	al.,	2018)	.	Hyperalignment	
improves	decoding	accuracies	by	taking	advantage	of	shared	high-dimensional	patterns	in	
representational	content	between	subjects.	Another	recent	study	showed	that	offline	simulations	
can	be	used	to	estimate	optimal	parameters	for	experiment	timing	and	real-time	fMRI	
preprocessing,	which	can	lead	to	greater	decoding	accuracy	and	neurofeedback	performance	
(Oblak,	Sulzer,	&	Lewis-Peacock,	2018)	.	Similar	approaches	should	be	applied	going	forward	in	
order	to	optimize	the	efficacy	of	DecNef	tasks,	which	should	in	turn	allow	us	to	ask	questions	
about	a	potential	causal	relationship	between	confidence	and	consciousness.	
	
In	conclusion,	the	present	study	found	an	association	between	the	occurrence	of	decoded	
patterns	for	high	perceptual	confidence	in	frontoparietal	cortex	and	subjective	color	perception.	
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Furthermore,	pre-	and	post-DecNef	psychophysics	revealed	a	shift	in	participants’	psychometric	
functions	for	red/green	color	discrimination	that	was	consistent	with	a	previous	color-DecNef	
study		(Amano	et	al.,	2016)	.	The	results	discussed	above	support	both	the	efficacy	of	confidence	
judgments	as	a	subjective	measure	for	consciousness	and	the	notion	that	conscious	perception	
may	rely	critically	on	activity	in	prefrontal	cortex.		
	
	
IX.	Phenomenological	Richness,	Subjective	Inflation,	and	the	Continued	Search	for	
Blindsight	in	Normal	Observers	
Background:	Subjective	Inflation,	Phenomenology’s	Get-Rich-Quick	Scheme	
Introduction	
There	is	a	longstanding	and	currently	lively	debate	about	whether	or	not	visual	phenomenology	
overflows	cognitive	access	(see	recent	themed	issue	of	Philosophical	Transactions	of	the	Royal	
Society	B		(Fazekas	&	Overgaard,	2018;	Matthews,	Schröder,	Kaunitz,	van	Boxtel,	&	Tsuchiya,	
2018;	Naccache,	2018;	Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018;	Overgaard,	2018;	Ian	Phillips,	2018;	
Sergent,	2018;	Stazicker,	2018;	Usher,	Bronfman,	Talmor,	Jacobson,	&	Eitam,	2018;	Ward,	
2018)	).	The	question	of	phenomenological	overflow	is	often	rephrased	as	asking	whether	
phenomenology	is	rich	or	sparse.	On	the	Rich	view,	a	snapshot	of	visual	phenomenology	is	
highly	detailed	across	the	visual	field,	while	cognitive	access	is	constrained	to	a	subset	of	that	
detail	given	the	limited	capacities	of	attention,	memory,	and	reporting	mechanisms		(Block,	1995,	
2007,	2014;	Bronfman,	Brezis,	Jacobson,	&	Usher,	2014;	Koch	&	Tsuchiya,	2007;	Lamme,	
2003,	2010;	Sligte,	Vandenbroucke,	Scholte,	&	Lamme,	2010;	Sperling,	1960;	Tsuchiya	et	al.,	
2015;	Usher	et	al.,	2018)	.	This	view	is	supported	by	anecdotal	reports	from	subjects	in	
partial-report	studies		(Landman,	Spekreijse,	&	Lamme,	2003;	Sligte	et	al.,	2010;	Sperling,	1960)	
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in	which	they	indicate	having	seen	more	of	a	given	stimulus	array	than	their	objective	task	
performance	would	suggest.	The	Rich	view	further	posits,	based	on	both	partial-report	and	
dual-task	studies		(Braun	&	Julesz,	1998;	Matthews	et	al.,	2018;	Sperling	&	Dosher,	1986)	,	that	
attention	is	not	necessary	for	phenomenology.	
	
Proponents	of	the	Sparse	view	argue,	often	relying	on	the	results	of	inattentional	blindness	
(Mack	&	Rock,	1998;	Neisser	&	Becklen,	1975;	Simons,	2000)	and	change	blindness		(Simons	&	
Rensink,	2005)	studies,	that	phenomenology	itself	is	constrained	by,	and	thus	scales	with,	
cognitive	access.	For	example,	when	subjects	fail	to	notice	a	difference	between	two	
consecutively	presented	images	at	a	minimally	attended	location,	a	Sparse	interpretation	is	that	
there	was	insufficient	phenomenological	detail	at	that	location	for	the	change	to	be	noticed.	On	
this	view,	a	snapshot	of	visual	phenomenology	is	highly	detailed	around	the	focal	point	of	
attention	where	there	is	strong	cognitive	access,	but	loses	detail	as	attention	drops	off	in	the	
periphery,	where	there	is	minimal	cognitive	access		(Cohen	&	Dennett,	2011;	Stanislas	Dehaene,	
Changeux,	Naccache,	&	Sergent,	2006;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010;	Naccache,	2018;	Sergent,	
2018;	Sergent	et	al.,	2013;	Ward,	2018;	Ward,	Bear,	&	Scholl,	2016)	.	Furthermore,	on	this	view,	
phenomenology	and	cognitive	access	tend	to	scale	with	attention,	though	this	relationship	is	not	
necessarily	monotonic.	Importantly,	proponents	of	this	view	argue	that,	without	consensus	on	an	
operational	definition	of	attention,	we	cannot	definitively	claim	that	attention	is	not	necessary	for	
phenomenology		(Cohen,	Cavanagh,	Chun,	&	Nakayama,	2012;	Cohen	&	Dennett,	2011;	
Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010)	.		
	
It	has	been	suggested	that	the	debate	about	phenomenological	overflow,	and	by	extension,	the	
Rich	vs	Sparse	debate,	may	be	empirically	intractable		(Cohen	&	Dennett,	2011;	Stanislas	
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Dehaene	et	al.,	2006;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010;	Overgaard	&	Fazekas,	2016;	I.	Phillips,	2011;	
Ian	Phillips,	2018;	Sergent	et	al.,	2013;	Stazicker,	2018;	Ward	et	al.,	2016)	.	The	major	issue	
usually	raised	is	that	while	empirical	studies	of	phenomenology	fundamentally	rely	on	subjective	
reports,	unaccessed	phenomenology	is,	by	definition,	unreportable.	And	if	unaccessed	
phenomenology	cannot	be	detected,	its	presence	neither	confirmed	nor	denied,	then	the	results	
of	any	given	study	can	be	interpreted	as	being	consistent	with	either	the	Rich	or	the	Sparse	view	
(Cohen	&	Dennett,	2011;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010;	Overgaard,	2018;	I.	Phillips,	2011;	Ian	
Phillips,	2018;	Stazicker,	2018;	Ward,	2018)	.	
	
A	classic	experiment	that	combines	the	retrocuing	paradigm	made	famous	by	George	Sperling	
(Sperling,	1960)	with	a	change	blindness	paradigm		(Landman	et	al.,	2003)	provides	an	example	
where	such	alternative	interpretations	are	available.	Participants	were	shown	two	consecutive	
arrays	of	eight	rectangles,	where	each	rectangle	could	be	oriented	either	vertically	or	
horizontally.	The	subjects’	task	was	to	detect	whether	one	of	the	rectangles	switched	
orientations	between	the	first	and	second	arrays.	Because	subjects	were	instructed	to	initially	
fixate	at	a	central	point	that	is	roughly	equidistant	from	the	locations	of	each	of	the	rectangles	in	
the	to-be-flashed	arrays,	attention	was	thought	to	be	diffuse	and	minimal	with	respect	to	each	
individual	object	in	the	first	array.	The	authors	found	that	when	a	retrocue	indicating	the	location	
of	the	object	whose	orientation	could	potentially	change	was	presented	after	offset	of	the	first	
array,	but	prior	to	onset	of	the	second	array,	performance	on	the	change	detection	task	was	
better	than	it	was	when	no	retrocue	was	presented.	
	
On	a	Rich	interpretation	of	this	result,	the	orientations	of	the	minimally-attended	rectangles	in	
the	first	array	are	present	in	phenomenology,	and	the	postcue	allows	participants	to	access	and	
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remember	the	orientation	of	the	cued	rectangle	before	that	information	can	be	overwritten	by	the	
second	array.	In	this	case,	a	failure	in	change	detection	amounts	to	a	failure	of	memory.	On	a	
Sparse	interpretation,	orientation	information	for	each	of	the	minimally-attended	rectangles	is	
represented	unconsciously,	with	the	resulting	phenomenology	being	filled-in	and/or	summarized.	
Retrocued	attention	then	makes	the	initially	unconscious	orientation	information	for	the	cued	
object	available	for	report.	On	this	interpretation,	a	failure	in	change	detection	amounts	to	both	a	
failure	of	phenomenological	representation	and	a	failure	to	access	the	relevant	unconscious	
orientation	information	before	onset	of	the	second	array.	Because	subjects’	behavior	could	be	
identical	under	both	views,	neither	interpretation	is	obviously	more	tenable	than	the	other.	
	
A	similar	problem	arises	when	trying	to	address	more	directly	whether	attention	is	necessary	for	
consciousness.	A	common	way	to	test	this	is	to	try	to	demonstrate	that	some	task	can	be	
performed	in	the	absence	or	near	absence	of	attention,	for	example	using	a	dual-task	paradigm	
(Braun	&	Julesz,	1998;	F.	F.	Li,	VanRullen,	Koch,	&	Perona,	2002;	Matthews	et	al.,	2018;	
Sperling	&	Dosher,	1986;	Van	Boxtel,	Tsuchiya,	&	Koch,	2010)	.	But	again,	without	a	working	
operational	definition	of	attention,	it	is	unclear	how	the	complete	elimination	of	attention	could	be	
unequivocally	demonstrated	in	an	experimental	setting.	Some	have	argued	that	this	similarly	
makes	the	debate	about	the	necessity	of	attention	empirically	intractable		(Cohen	et	al.,	2012;	
Cohen	&	Dennett,	2011;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010)	.	
	
In	light	of	these	concerns,	Ned	Block	has	suggested	that	currently	the	best	approach	to	the	Rich	
vs	Sparse	debate	is	to	consider	the	extant	empirical	evidence	and	use	inference	to	the	best	
explanation		(Block,	2007;	Harman,	1965)	.	Here,	we	agree	with	Block’s	methodological	appeal.	
We	highlight	an	approach	that,	instead	of	attempting	to	investigate	visual	phenomenology	in	the	
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complete	or	near-complete	absence	of	attention,	exploits	the	fact	that	attention	is	graded,	and	
investigates	the		interaction		between	attention	and	phenomenology.	Such	an	approach	
consistently	reveals	a	phenomenon	known	as		subjective		inflation	,	wherein	study	participants	
exhibit	liberal	detection	criteria	or	are	overly	confident	when	evaluating	minimally	attended	or	
peripheral	stimuli		(Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018)	.	We	argue,	in	line	with		(Odegaard,	Chang,	et	
al.,	2018)	,	that	this	can	explain	the	subjective	impression	of	richness	across	the	visual	field	
appealed	to	by	Block		(Block,	2007)	,	while	accounting	for	both	behavioral		(Mack	&	Rock,	1998;	
Neisser	&	Becklen,	1975;	Simons,	2000;	Simons	&	Rensink,	2005)	and	physiological		(Azzopardi	
&	Cowey,	1993;	Strasburger,	Rentschler,	&	Jüttner,	2011)	limitations	in	minimally	attended	
perception,	all	without	invoking	phenomenological	overflow.	
	
Evidence	for	Subjective	Inflation	
It	is	well	established	that	attention	boosts	objective	perceptual	performance		(Carrasco,	2011)	.	It	
has	also	been	shown	that	subjective	and	objective	measures	of	perception	can	be	dissociated	in	
clinical	cases	of	blindsight		(Weiskrantz,	1986,	1999)	,	as	well	as	in	normal	observers		(Lau	&	
Passingham,	2006)	.	It	follows	that	if	we	want	to	isolate	a	subjective	measure	of	phenomenology	
for	comparison	between	conditions	of	low	and	high	attention	(or	low	and	high	retinotopic	
eccentricity),	then	objective	task	performance	should	be	treated	as	a	potential	confound	and	
matched	between	those	conditions		(Lau,	2008)	.		
	
Rahnev	et	al.		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011)	employed	the	strategy	described	above	by	matching	
objective	performance,	as	indexed	by	the	signal	detection	theory	(SDT)	sensitivity	measure,	d’	
(Green	DM,	1966)	,	between	attended	and	minimally	attended	conditions	in	a	visual	detection	
task	(Figure	12).	They	found	that	the	SDT	criterion	measure,	c,	was	systematically	more	liberal	
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in	the	minimally	attended	condition	(Figure	12b).	On	a	detection	task,	a	lower	value	of	c	equates	
to	a	higher	proportion	of	trials	in	which	the	observer	incorrectly	reports	the	presence	of	the	
target	stimulus,	i.e.,	a	higher	false	alarm	rate		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011)	,	Supplementary	Figure	3].	
This	difference	in	false	alarm	rate	between	attended	and	minimally	attended	conditions	is	of	
particular	note	given	that	stimulus	strength	is	matched	(at	zero)	across	all	false	alarm	trials.	
	
One	could	argue	that	the	observed	shift	in	criterion	reflects	a	change	in	non-perceptual	
decisional	bias		(Witt,	Taylor,	Sugovic,	&	Wixted,	2015)	.	However,	we	interpret	this	shift	to	reflect	
a	genuine	change	in	subjective	perception,	as	it	was	robust	to	trial-by-trial	feedback	and	
increases	in	monetary	rewards,	manipulations	that	are	thought	to	minimize	non-perceptual	
response	biases		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011;	Solovey	et	al.,	2015;	Witt	et	al.,	2015)	.	On	this	
interpretation,	the	observed	criterion	shifts	in		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011)	suggest	that	subjective	
awareness	is	systematically		inflated	relative	to	objective	processing	capacity	in	conditions	of	
minimal	attention.	It	is	worth	emphasizing	that	this	effect	may	seem,	at	least	initially,	to	be	
counterintuitive:	despite	performance	matching,	one	might	reasonably	expect	that	when	
attention	is	reduced	observers	might	be	more	conservative	in	their	detection	judgments.	This	
could	be	due	to	prior	knowledge	that,	under	normal	conditions,	unattended	vision	is	relatively	
poor.	However,	we	observe	the	opposite:	given	matched	objective	capacity,	when	attention	is	
reduced,	participants	are	more	likely	to	say	something	is	there	when	it	is	not.	
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	Figure 12. An empirical demonstration of subjective inflation from (Rahnev et al., 2011)	. a)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Stimuli and task. Each trial was initiated by a pre-cue that indicated to which diagonal (top-right	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
and bottom-left or top-left and bottom-right) the subject should attend. This was followed by a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
stimulus array, in which each diagonal (independently) contained either a set of tilted gratings	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
embedded in noise or noise alone. This was followed by a response cue, which prompted the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
subject to indicate, in a forced-choice manner, whether or not the diagonal in the stimulus array	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
indicated by the response cue had contained a set of gratings. The pre-cue and response cues	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
were congruent on 70% of trials. b) Behavioral results show matched detection sensitivity, d’,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
between cued and uncued conditions, but a more liberal criterion measure, c, in the uncued	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
condition relative to the cued condition. Reprinted with modifications and permission from	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011)	.	
	
This	inflation	effect	has	been	replicated	and	extended	in	several	independent	studies.	One	study	
found	a	consistent	decrease	in	detection	criterion	in	peripheral	vision	compared	to	central	vision	
despite	matched	detection	d’		(Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	.	This	effect	was	again	robust	to	trial-by-trial	
feedback.	Similarly,	in	a	study	that	was	not	designed	to	test	inflation,	more	liberal	change	
detection	criteria	were	observed	for	fragile	visual	short	term	memory	compared	to	working	
memory,	despite	matched	change	detection	d’	between	the	two	conditions		(Vandenbroucke	et	
al.,	2014)	.	The	authors	interpreted	this	as	being	analogous	to	the	inflation	effect	in		(Rahnev	et	
al.,	2011)	,	as	there	was	presumably	higher	attention	in	the	working	memory	condition.		Another	
study,	which	used	a	relatively	naturalistic	setting	of	simulated	driving,	found	more	liberal	criteria	
for	detecting	the	color	of	a	simulated	pedestrian’s	shirt	when	attention	was	minimized		(M.	K.	Li,	
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Lau,	&	Odegaard,	2018)	.	In	a	control	experiment	in	which	the	identity	of	the	detection	target	(the	
color	to	be	detected	out	of	a	set	of	11	colors)	was	not	revealed	until		after	presentation	of	the	
target	stimulus,	the	inflation	effect	was	no	longer	present.	This	suggests	that	the	observed	
criterion	shift	in		(M.	K.	Li	et	al.,	2018)	was	not	due	to	simple	confirmation	bias,	which,	much	like	
the	trial-by-trial	feedback	results	in		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011)	and		(Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	,	indicates	
that	the	observed	inflation	effect	was	perceptual	as	opposed	to	decisional.		
	
Inflation	was	also	recently	observed	in	both	peripheral	summary	statistics	and	crowding	tasks	
(Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018)	.	In	the	latter	task,	inflation	was	indexed	by	an	increase	in	
confidence	ratings	on	incorrect	trials	for	crowded	compared	to	uncrowded	stimuli.	Surprisingly,	
this	effect	was	observed	despite	discrimination	d’	being		lower	in	the	crowded	condition.	Also	
recently,	an	inflation-like	effect,	similar	to	the	flashed	face	distortion	effect		(Tangen,	Murphy,	&	
Thompson,	2011)	,	was	found	in	which	repeatedly	flashed	peripheral	color	stimuli	were	rated	as	
more	saturated	than	physically-saturation-matched,	non-flashing	central	color	stimuli	
(Sivananda,	Peters,	Lau,	&	Odegaard,	2017)	.	Further,	an	inflation-like	effect	has	been	found	in	
which	subjects	failed	to	notice	drastic	changes	in	peripheral	text	during	reading		(McConkie	&	
Rayner,	1975)	.	
	
Inflation	and	the	Richness	Debate	
To	see	how	inflation	fits	into	the	Rich	vs	Sparse	debate,	it	is	helpful	to	consider	that	
phenomenology	tends	to		feel	rich.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	the	famous	Sperling	retrocueing	
experiments		(Sperling,	1960)	,	participants	indicated,	anecdotally		(Ward,	2018)	,	that	they	felt	as	
though	they	saw	all	of	the	characters	in	a	briefly	flashed	3x4	array	in	detail,	despite	not	being	
able	to	report	all	of	that	detail	after	the	fact.	Proponents	of	the	Rich	view	traditionally	take	these	
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reports	at	face	value	and	assume	that	this	detail	was	indeed	phenomenologically	represented	
outside	of	focal	attention,	albeit	in	a	fragile	and	fleeting	manner.	It	is	worth	emphasizing,	
however,	that	in	many	partial-report	studies	these	reports	of	global	richness	are	not	
systematically	collected	per	experimental	procedure,	and	instead	come	from	retrospective	
subjective	impressions		(Landman	et	al.,	2003;	Sligte	et	al.,	2010;	Sperling,	1960;	Ward,	2018)	.	
And	it	is	possible	that	such	retrospective	reports	result	from	a	demand	effect		(Orne,	1969)	.	
However,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	we	take	these	reports	at	face	value	here.	
	
The	Sparse	view,	on	the	other	hand,	suggests	that	what	is	phenomenologically	represented	
outside	of	focal	attention	is	gist-like,	a	summary	representation	of	low	level	features		(Cohen,	
Dennett,	&	Kanwisher,	2016;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010;	Ward,	2018)	.	There	is	evidence	for	this	
view	from	studies	in	which	nonsensical	or	dramatically	homogenized	alphanumeric	characters	in	
peripheral	vision	go	unnoticed		(de	Gardelle,	Sackur,	&	Kouider,	2009;	McConkie	&	Rayner,	
1975)	,	and	studies	in	which	participants	cannot	subjectively	distinguish	between	physically	
distinct	images	that	are	matched	for	low-level	image	statistics		(Freeman	&	Simoncelli,	2011;	
Wallis,	Funke,	Alexander,	Gatys,	&	Wichmann,	2018)	.	Yet,	a	proponent	of	the	Rich	view	might	
argue	that,	despite	these	studies,	non-focally	attended	phenomenology	does	not		feel	
summarized	or	homogeneous,	so	there	is	still	something	left	to	be	explained.	In	other	words,	if	
the	Sparse	view	is	correct,	why	is	introspection	so	mistaken?	
	
We	suggest,	in	line	with		(Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018)	,	that	this	mistaken	feeling	of	richness	is	
the	result	of	subjective	inflation.	If	partially-summarized,	minimally-attended	representations	are	
subjectively	inflated	above	what	would	be	expected	based	on	objective	processing	capacity,	as	
in	the	examples	above,	then	inflation	can	explain	the	apparent	richness	of	the	resulting	
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phenomenology	despite	well-established	physiological	limitations	in	minimally-attended	and	
peripheral	visual	processing		(Azzopardi	&	Cowey,	1993;	Carrasco,	2011;	Strasburger	et	al.,	
2011)	.		
	
The	exact	mechanism	of	inflation	here	may	be	unclear	(but	see		(Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018;	
Rahnev	et	al.,	2011;	Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	).	Still,	the	very	occurrence	of	inflation	provides	an	
explanation	based	on	an	operationally	defined	comparison	between	attended	and	minimally	
attended	phenomenology.	And	that	explanation	is	neutral	as	regards	the	more	difficult	and	
possibly	empirically	intractable	issues	surrounding	the	overflow	argument.	Therefore,	a	
combination	of	summary	statistics	and	subjective	inflation	arguably	provides	the	best	
explanation	of	the	subjective	phenomena	that	advocates	of	the	Rich	view	appeal	to.	Since	this	
view	incorporates	both	the	relevant	behavioral	data	and	anecdotal	reports	of	richness,	which	
may	well	be	illusory		(Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010)	,	we	suggest	that	it	constitutes	a	position	
intermediate	between	the	Sparse	and	Rich	views.	
	
This	inflation	account	is	consistent	with	behavioral	results	observed	in	several	additional	studies	
of	peripheral	or	minimally	attended	vision.	For	example,	inflation	appears	to	be	similar	to	
perceptual	filling-in		(Komatsu,	2006;	Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018)	.	A	recent	study	found	that	
filled-in	percepts	at	the	blindspot	are	rated	as	more	reliable	than	perceptually	equivalent,	but	
externally	veridical	percepts		(Ehinger,	Häusser,	Ossandon,	&	König,	2017)	.	This	shows	a	similar	
pattern	to	inflation	in	which	a	percept	that	is	based	on	a	less	veridical	representation	of	the	
external	world	is	actually	granted	a	subjective	boost.	This	leads	to	the	question	of	whether	
filling-in	at	the	blind-spot	and	inflation	share	a	common	mechanism.	If	so,	then	we	might	also	
expect	the	mechanism	that	underlies	known	cases	of	peripheral	inflation		(M.	K.	Li	et	al.,	2018;	
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Sivananda	et	al.,	2017;	Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	to	underlie	instances	of	peripheral	filling-in	like	in	
the	“uniformity	illusion”		(Otten,	Pinto,	Paffen,	Seth,	&	Kanai,	2016)	or	in	the	case	of	peripheral	
color	in	natural	scenes		(Balas	&	Sinha,	2007)	.	Presumably,	such	questions	are	empirically	
tractable.	For	example,	future	studies	could	combine	an	approach	similar	to		(Ehinger	et	al.,	
2017)	with	the	performance-matching	strategies	described	above,	e.g.,		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011;	
Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	,	to	see	if	subjective	judgements	about	filled-in	percepts	are,	operationally	
speaking,	inflated	relative	to	judgments	about	veridical	percepts.		
	
Additionally,	as	the	peripheral	filling-in	examples	above	are	presumably	driven	by	an		expectation	
based	on	foveal	perception,	inflation	similarly	appears	to	be	influenced	by	expectations	based	
on	prior	knowledge.	For	example,	the	control	experiment	in		(F.	F.	Li	et	al.,	2002)	,	described	
above,	suggests	that	the	content	of	inflation	depended,	at	least	in	part,	on	an	expectation	about	
a	specific	color.	This	is	consistent	with	the	studies	mentioned	above	in	which	participants	failed	
to	notice	manipulations	to	alphanumeric	characters	during	partial-report		(de	Gardelle	et	al.,	
2009)	and	reading		(McConkie	&	Rayner,	1975)	tasks.	It	is	also	consistent	with	the	result	that	
stronger	filling-in	effects	were	observed	when	the	to-be-filled-in	content	of	a	natural	scene	
percept	was	colored	compared	to	when	it	was	grayscale,	presumably	based	on	the	prior	
knowledge	that	natural	scenes	contain	color		(Balas	&	Sinha,	2007)	.	Similar	prior	expectation	
effects	based	on	central	visual	information	have	been	shown	for	peripheral	motion	perception	
(Zhang,	Kwon,	&	Tadin,	2013)	and	peripheral	object	recognition		(Wijntjes	&	Rosenholtz,	2018)	.	
	
This	reliance	on	expectation	supports	the	important	partial	awareness	hypothesis	put	forth	by	
Kouider	et	al.		(Kouider	&	Dupoux,	2004;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010)	,	and	suggests	that	inflation	
may	underlie	cases	in	which	expectation	influences	minimally	attended	phenomenology		(Balas	
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&	Sinha,	2007;	de	Gardelle	et	al.,	2009;	M.	K.	Li	et	al.,	2018;	McConkie	&	Rayner,	1975)	.	One	
benefit	is	that	expectation	is	an	easily	manipulated	experimental	variable;	thus,	the	influence	of	
expectation	on	minimally	attended	phenomenology	should	also	be	amenable	to	empirical	
investigation	going	forward.	For	example,		one	prediction	is	that	inflation	should	be	stronger	
when	expectations	are	higher.	Here,	we	take	expectations	to	be	functionally	different	from	
attention	in	that	they	depend	on	the	predictability	of	the	stimulus.	Experimentally,	attention	and	
expectation	could	be	manipulated	separately,	e.g.,	by	telling	a	subject	to	attend	to	location	A,	
where	the	statistical	likelihood	of	a	detection	stimulus	appearing	is	known	to	be	low	relative	to	
location	B		(Kok,	Rahnev,	Jehee,	Lau,	&	De	Lange,	2012)	.	If	inflation	depends	critically	on	
expectation,	then	we	should	expect	inflation	effects	to	be	stronger	when	the	subject	attends	to	
location	A	compared	to	when	they	attend	to	location	B.	
	
We	therefore	propose	that	the	content	of	inflated	phenomenology	can	be	affected	by	at	least	3	
factors:	1)	summary	computations	of	minimally-attended	and/or	peripheral	low-level	visual	
features		(Cohen	et	al.,	2016;	Freeman	&	Simoncelli,	2011;	Wallis	et	al.,	2018;	Ward	et	al.,	
2016)	,	2)	expectations	based	on	attended	and/or	foveal	representations		(Balas	&	Sinha,	2007;	
Otten	et	al.,	2016;	Suárez-Pinilla,	Seth,	&	Roseboom,	2018;	Toscani,	Gegenfurtner,	&	Valsecchi,	
2017;	Wijntjes	&	Rosenholtz,	2018;	Zhang	et	al.,	2013)	,	and	3)	expectations	based	on	prior	
knowledge		(Balas	&	Sinha,	2007;	de	Gardelle	et	al.,	2009;	McConkie	&	Rayner,	1975;	Wijntjes	&	
Rosenholtz,	2018)	.	In	the	case	of	prior	knowledge,	it	is	a	topic	for	future	investigation	whether	
this	knowledge	needs	to	be	explicit,	or	if	it	can	be	implicit	(e.g.,	as	in	implicit	statistical	
knowledge	found	in	visual	search		(Zinchenko,	Conci,	Müller,	&	Geyer,	2018)	).		
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Summary	
We	have	argued	that	subjective	inflation	may	explain	the	apparent	introspective	content	that	the	
Rich	view	assigns	to	minimally	attended	and	peripheral	phenomenology.	It	can	explain	why	
phenomenology	may	appear	to	overflow	cognitive	access,	without	countenancing	actual	
overflow.	By	denying	overflow	but	explaining	why	it	seems	to	occur,	inflation	provides	an	
intermediate	position	between	the	Rich	and	Sparse	views	that	borrows	and	extends	ideas		from	
the	partial	awareness		(Kouider	&	Dupoux,	2004;	Kouider	&	Gardelle,	2010)	and	summary	
statistics	hypotheses		(Cohen	et	al.,	2016)	.	
	
On	this	position,	minimally	attended	phenomenology	is	built	on	summary	representations	
(Cohen	et	al.,	2016)	,	the	subjective	reliability	of	which	is	inflated	above	what	would	be	predicted	
based	on	objective	performance.	This	operationally	definable	effect	is	likely	based	on	prior	
expectations		(Balas	&	Sinha,	2007;	de	Gardelle	et	al.,	2009;	Kouider	&	Dupoux,	2004;	Kouider	
&	Gardelle,	2010;	M.	K.	Li	et	al.,	2018;	McConkie	&	Rayner,	1975)	.	So	phenomenological	
richness	need	not	be	seen	as	mapping	onto	high	representational	capacity,	as	the	traditional	
Rich	view	claims	to	be	the	case	in	early	visual	cortex		(Block,	1995,	2007;	Lamme,	2003,	2010)	.	
Rather,	inflation	supports	strong	physiological	evidence	that	peripheral	representational	capacity	
in	early	vision	is	limited		(Azzopardi	&	Cowey,	1993;	Strasburger	et	al.,	2011)	,	and	suggests	that	
our	exaggerated	sense	of	rich	peripheral	phenomenology	is	mediated	by	some	later	stage	
prediction-based	mechanism		(Suárez-Pinilla	et	al.,	2018)	.	The	neural	basis	of	this	mechanism	is	
a	topic	for	future	investigation,	but	at	this	point,	it	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	the	multi-level	
overflow	account	offered	by	proponents	of	the	Rich	view		(Block,	1995)	.	One	prediction	along	
these	lines	is	that	when	comparing	false	alarm	trials	to	correct	rejection	trials	for	minimally	
attended	stimuli	in	a	visual	detection	task,	the	decodability	of	illusory,	inflated	perception	should	
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be	high	in	later	stages	of	the	visual	processing	hierarchy,	but	not	in	primary	visual	cortex	
(Suárez-Pinilla	et	al.,	2018)	.	Furthermore,	if	expectation-based	inflation	effects	are	mediated	by	
top-down	feedback	to	visual	areas		(Miconi	&	VanRullen,	2016)	,	then	this	should	be	reflected	in	
the	relative	timecourses	of	decodability	between	frontoparietal	areas	and	visual	areas.	This	
prediction	could	be	tested	with	a	time-sensitive	imaging	method	like	magnetoencephalography	
(MEG).	
	
Finally,	one	interesting	consideration	is	that	whether	the	inflation	hypothesis	really	favors	one	
side	of	the	richness	debate	over	the	other	may	ultimately	depend	on	the	extent	to	which	
proponents	of	the	Rich	view	categorize	illusory	percepts	as	instances	of	“rich”	phenomenology.	
Indeed,	Block		(Block,	2011)	and	others		(Bronfman	et	al.,	2014)	,	p.	1395]	have	conceded	this	
point,	e.g.,	acknowledging	that	“a	minor	illusion	effect,”		(Block,	2011)	,	p.5],	as	in		(de	Gardelle	et	
al.,	2009)	,	can	still	be	consistent	with	the	Rich	view.	Whether	the	majority	of	the	results	
discussed	here	would	constitute	such	minor	illusions	is	a	topic	for	future	discussion;	though	it	is	
worth	pointing	out	that	the	more	the	Rich	view	sees	such	illusion	effects	as	constituting	“rich”	
phenomenology,	the	more	the	dividing	lines	between	the	Sparse	and	Rich	views	will	blur.	Most	
importantly,	we	hope	that	the	issues	raised	here	in	connection	with	inflation	will	stimulate	new	
ideas	about	how	to	approach	the	puzzle	of	phenomenology,	ultimately	giving	the	field	more	
useful	data	for	resolving,	or	perhaps		dis	solving,	the	richness	debate.	
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Impaired	Introspective	Access	in	Dot	Motion	Discrimination	
Abstract	
Previous	studies	have	shown	that	subjective	judgments	about	peripheral	or	minimally	attended	
visual	perception	can	be	inflated	above	what	would	be	expected	based	on	objective	
performance		(Knotts,	Odegaard,	Lau,	&	Rosenthal,	2018)	.	This	effect	has	been	observed	for	
grating	detection	and	discrimination,	color	detection,	orientation	summary	perception,	and	
crowding,	but	it	is	not	known	if	it	generalizes	to	dot	motion	discrimination.	Surprisingly,	when	we	
compared	central	and	peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination	directly	in	a	two-interval	forced	
choice	task	with	relative	confidence	judgments,	we	observed	the	opposite	of	the	predicted	
inflation	effect:	subjective	confidence	ratings	were	higher	for	central	stimuli	when	objective	
performance	was	matched	between	center	and	periphery.	We	followed	this	with	a	series	of	
behavioral	experiments	that	revealed	another	surprising	effect:	metacognition	is	impaired	for	dot	
motion	descrimination	in		both	central	and	peripheral	vision,	more	so	than	when	an	analogous	
task	is	used	with	orientation	discrimination.	Whether	these	results	can	be	interpreted	as	
evidence	for	blindsight	in	normal	observers	versus	an	inflation-like	effect	that	may	be	inherent	to	
the	motion	system	is	discussed.	
	
Introduction	
In	Experiments1.1-1.4	we	found	no	evidence	for	either	relative	or	absolute	blindsight	in	normal	
observers	performing	an	orientation	discrimination	task	under	a	variety	of	monocular	and	
binocular	suppression	techniques.	This	supports	a	previous	finding	for	a	lack	of	absolute	
blindsight	in	normal	observers	for	orientation	discrimination	under	forward	and	backward	
masking		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	Importantly,	all	of	these	experiments	used	centrally	presented	
stimuli.	Based	on	the	subjective	inflation	effects	described	in	the	previous	section,	we	
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hypothesized	that	relative	blindsight	could	be	found	by	using	the	comparative	2IFC	approach	
from	Experiments	1.1-1.3	to	compare	central	and	peripheral	stimuli.	Specifically,	per	inflation,	
we	hypothesized	that	when	objective	performance	on	a	given	perceptual	task	is	matched	
between	central	and	peripheral	conditions,	participants	will	indicate	higher	confidence	in	
peripheral	stimuli.	
	
In	addition	to	introducing	an	eccentricity	manipulation	in	our	continued	search	for	relative	
blindsight,	we	switched	to	using	a	dot	motion	discrimination	task.	There	are	a	few	reasons	why	
dot	motion	may	be	more	conducive	to	inflation-based	relative	blindsight.	First,	in	the	
two-streams	hypothesis	of	vision,	motion	perception	has	been	associated	with	the	“less	
conscious”	dorsal	stream		(Goodale,	2011;	Milner	&	Goodale,	2008;	Tapia	&	Breitmeyer,	2011)	.	
Second,	motion	discrimination	for	random	dot	motion	kinematograms	inherently	involves	a	
summary	computation.	This	can	be	intuited	from	imagining	a	natural	analog	to	a	random	dot	
motion	kinetogram,	like	the	movement	of	a	school	of	fish.	One	does	not	need	to	possess	
simultaneous	awareness	of	the	movement	of	every	individual	component	to	perceive	the	global	
trajectory	of	the	group	(but	see	Bronfman	et	al.,	2014;	Block,	2014;	Haun	et	al.,	2018	for	a	
different	perspective).	As	we	listed	summary	computations	as	one	of	the	putative	major	
contributors	to	subjective	inflation	effects	in	the	previous	section,	random	dot	motion	perception	
appears	to	be	an	ideal	candidate	task	for	generating	an	inflation-like	effect.	
	
In	the	current	series	of	experiments	we	compared	subjective	awareness	in	central	and	
peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination	first	using	a	simultaneous	central/peripheral	dot	motion	
task.	To	anticipate,	in	the	simultaneous	central/peripheral	task	we	found	the	opposite	of	the	
hypothesized	inflation	effect:	participants	were	more	confident	in	central	motion	judgments.	This	
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led	to	three	additional	experiments,	testing	both	relative	and	absolute	blindsight	for	central	and	
peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination,	in	which	it	was	found	that	metacognition	for	dot	motion	
discrimination	appears	to	be	impaired	across	the	visual	field.	
	
Experiment	3.1:	Simultaneous	center	and	peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination	
Methods		
Participants	
Four	participants	(3	female,	ages	18-33,	all	right	handed),	including	the	first	author,	gave	written	
informed	consent	to	participate.	One	subject	was	removed	from	analyses	due	to	failure	to	
perform	the	left/right	motion	discrimination	task	above	chance.	All	participants	had	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$13.25	USD	per	
hour	plus	performance-contingent	bonus	money	(see	Procedure	section	below)	for	their	
participation.	This	and	all	subsequent	experiments	in	this	chapter	were	conducted	in	accordance	
with	the	Declaration	of	Helsinki	and	were	approved	by	the	UCLA	Institutional	Review	Board.	
	
Apparatus	&	Stimuli	
All	stimuli	were	generated	with	custom	Matlab	R2014a	(Natuck,	MA)	scripts	using	PsychToolbox	
3.0.12	on	a	gamma-corrected	Dell	E773c	CRT	monitor	with	a	resolution	of	1024	x	768	pixels	
and	a	refresh	rate	of	75	Hz.	Participants	used	a	chin	rest	and	viewed	stimuli	at	a	fixed	distance	
of	42	cm	in	a	dimly	lit	room.	Eye	movements	were	tracked	continuously	with	an	SMI	REDn	
Scientific	remote	eye	tracker	(SensoMotoric	Instruments	GmbH,	Teltow,	Germany)	at	a	sample	
rate	of	60	Hz.		
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All	dot	motion	kinematograms	contained	196	dots	and	subtended	a	circular	region	with	a	
diameter	of	3.5	°	for	an	average	density	of	16	dots	per	degree	squared.	Individual	dots	were	
square	with	a	width	of	2	pixels	or	~0.08	°	and	had	a	speed	of	1	°	/s.	The	background	was	a	
uniform	gray	with	an	rgb	triplet	value	of	[109,	109,	109]	and	a	luminance	of	~16.1	cd/m	2	.	Dots	
were	white	with	a	luminance	of	~97.6	cd/m	2	,	resulting	in	a	Michelson	contrast	of	~0.72.	
Peripheral	dot	motion	stimuli	were	centered	at	points	19.5°	northeast,	northwest,	southeast,	or	
southwest	from	central	fixation	(dashed	circles	in	Figure	13a).	Central	and	peripheral	stimuli	
were	presented	simultaneously	for	1200	ms,	and	all	dots	had	a	full	lifetime	over	this	interval.	
	
The	starting	locations	of	all	dots	were	selected	randomly	for	each	motion	stimulus.	Each	
stimulus	contained	a	subset	of	coherently	moving	dots	whose	directions	of	motion	were	either	
leftward	or	rightward	with	no	vertical	component.	The	motion	directions	of	the	remaining	
“incoherent”	dots	were	determined	as	follows.	Assuming	an	even	number	of	incoherent	dots,	the	
motion	directions	(in	degrees)	of	half	of	these	dots	(D	1	...D	N/2	)	were	selected	randomly	from	the	
360	whole	numbers	from	1	to	360.	The	directions	of	the	remaining	incoherent	dots	(D	N/2+1	...D	N	)	
were	determined	by	adding	180°	to	the	randomly	selected	directions	from	the	first	half.	If	there	
was	an	odd	number	of	incoherent	dots	for	a	given	stimulus,	then	the	value	of	N/2	in	the	
computations	just	described	was	rounded	down,	and	the	final	remaining	incoherent	dot	was	
randomly	selected	to	move	either	upward	(90°)	or	downward	(270°)	with	no	horizontal	motion	
component.		Dots	were	plotted	within	a	square	region	with	a	width	equivalent	to	the	diameter	of	
the	circular	motion	stimulus	(3.5	°),	but	only	dots	falling	within	the	largest	circle	within	the	square	
were	displayed.	Dots	exiting	the	square	plotting	boundary	were	replotted	at	a	random	location	
on	the	opposite	side.	
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Eye	tracking	
At	the	start	of	each	session	participants	performed	a	10-point	eye	tracking	calibration	procedure	
using	a	default	SMI	REDn	Scientific	Matlab	script	(SensoMotoric	Instruments	GmbH,	Teltow,	
Germany).	Participants	then	performed	an	additional	1-back	calibration	task	during	which	they	
fixated	on	a	centrally	presented	alphanumeric	character	surrounded	by	4	concentric	rings	of	
additional	characters	with	2	n+1		characters	in	every	nth	concentric	ring.	All	characters	were	
presented	in	size	11	arial	font	and	changed	at	a	rate	of	1.4	Hz.	Each	nth	concentric	ring	had	a	
diameter	of	n	x	1.3°.	Participants	were	instructed	to	fixate	the	centrally	presented	character	and	
press	a	button	every	time	the	same	character	was	presented	twice	consecutively,	referred	to	
hereafter	as	a	target	pair.	
	
Participants	first	performed	a	practice	run	of	the	1-back	task	with	11	character	changes	and	two	
target	pairs.	If	they	did	not	detect	both	target	pairs	they	had	to	repeat	the	practice.	They	then	
performed	a	main	run	with	39	letter	changes	and	eight	target	pairs.	If	they	did	not	detect	at	least	
seven	of	the	eight	target	pairs	they	had	to	perform	another	run.	Participants	were	instructed	to	
keep	their	gaze	fixed	firmly	on	the	central	character	throughout	the	task	for	the	purpose	of	
calibrating	the	eye	tracker.	Gaze	position	was	recorded	continuously	throughout	the	main	
1-back	task,	and	the	mean	position	across	all	eyetracking	samples	was	set	as	the	functional	
central	fixation	point	for	all	subsequent	real-time	eye	tracking	analyses.	Additionally,	a	functional	
“gaze	contingency	radius”	was	set	by	doubling	the	standard	deviation	of	gaze	positions	and	
adding	1.75	°.	If	gaze	position	deviated	from	the	functional	central	fixation	point	by	a	value	
greater	than	this	gaze	contingency	radius	during	specific	gaze-contingent	portions	of	
subsequent	tasks,	the	prevailing	trial	was	aborted	and	a	warning	message	was	displayed.		If	the	
standard	deviation	of	eye	movements	on	the	main	1-back	task	exceeded	9.75	°	,	participants	
96	
were	informed	that	the	variance	of	their	gaze	position	was	too	high,	and	the	8-target	version	of	
the	task	was	repeated.	These	calibration	and	gaze-enforcement	procedures	were	implemented	
in	the	same	manner	in	all	of	Experiments	3.1-3.4.		
	
Procedure	
After	completing	the	eye	tracking	calibration	procedure	participants	performed	10	practice	trials	
of	the	main	task	(Figure	1a).	Participants	first	had	to	focus	on	a	centrally	presented	fixation	
cross	for	a	full	1000	ms	to	initiate	the	rest	of	the	trial	sequence.	If,	on	any	trial	throughout	the	
experiment,	it	took	longer	than	10	s	to	initiate	the	trial	sequence	via	fixation,	the	1-back	task	was	
repeated	and	a	new	functional	central	fixation	point	and	gaze	contingency	radius	were	
determined.	Upon	successful	initiation	of	a	trial	the	display	cross	remained	on	the	screen	for	a	
variable	interval	between	100	and	250	ms,	after	which	the	central	and	peripheral	dot	motion	
kinematograms	were	displayed	for	1200	ms.	If	gaze	deviated	beyond	the	gaze	contingency	
radius	described	above	during	the	variable	fixation	or	stimulus	display	period	the	trial	was	
aborted	and	a	warning	message	was	displayed.	The	location	of	the	peripheral	dot	motion	
stimulus	varied	randomly	across	trials.	After	offset	of	the	dot	motion	stimuli	participants	first	
made	a	Type	2	judgment,	indicating	via	button	press	whether	they	were	more	confident	in	their	
ability	to	discriminate	the	direction	of	motion	in	the	central	or	peripheral	stimulus.	They	then	
made	Type	1	left	versus	right	motion	discrimination	judgments	for	each	dot	motion	stimulus.	The	
Type	2	judgment	preceded	the	Type	1	judgments	to	prevent	participants	from	using	their	Type	1	
reaction	times	to	inform	their	Type	2	judgments.	
	
For	all	parts	of	the	experiment	the	order	of	the	Type	1	questions	(central	first	versus	peripheral	
first)	was	varied	between	blocks,	with	block	order	pseudorandomized	across	subjects.	During	
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the	practice	session,	five	trials	were	performed	per	Type	1	question	order	to	familiarize	subjects	
with	the	blocking	procedure.	Trial-by-trial	feedback	on	performance	of	both	Type	1	(correct	vs	
incorrect)	and	Type	2	(indicated	higher	confidence	in	a	correct	vs	incorrect	Type	1	decision)	was	
also	provided	during	the	practice	session.	
	
	
Figure 13. Procedure and results for simultaneous central and peripheral dot motion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
discrimination task (Experiment 3.1). a. On each trial, after a brief gaze-contingent fixation	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
period, participants viewed one central and one peripheral random dot motion kinematogram	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
each with a nonzero net motion coherence either to the left or to the right. The peripheral	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
stimulus could appear at one of four locations, indicated by the dashed circles. Participants then	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
reported the location, central or peripheral, at which they were more confident in their ability to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
accurately discriminate the net direction of dot motion. They then judged the net direction of	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
motion at each location, with the order of question (central first or peripheral first) varied	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
between blocks. This was followed by a 1000 ms intertrial interval. Font sizes are enlarged here	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
relative to their actual size during the experiment for clarity. b. Individual psychometric curves.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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For each participant the percentage of trials in which higher confidence was indicated for the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
central motion judgment is plotted as a function of the difference in motion discrimination d’	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
between central and peripheral locations. Cumulative normal functions with mean and slope as	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
free parameters were fit to the individual participant data. Also shown are the point of subjective	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
equality (PSE; magenta) and point of objective equality (POE, red). c. Group level (N=4) data.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Black circles represent group mean d’ difference scores ± 1 s.e.m., while the black line shows	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the mean of the individual cumulative normal fits ± 1 SD (gray). The 95% confidence intervals	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
for estimated PSE and POE group means are shown by the black bars near the x- and y-axes,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
respectively.	
	
Following	the	practice	participants	performed	160	trials	of	an	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	
(QUEST,	Watson	&	Pelli,	1983)	to	estimate	the	percentage	of	dot	motion	coherence	that	would	
lead	to	75%	correct	Type	1	performance	both	at	center	and	in	the	periphery.	The	trial	structure	
was	identical	to	the	practice	trials	and	main	task	except	that	confidence	judgments	were	not	
collected.	Four	randomly	interleaved	40-trial	staircases	were	used	per	eccentricity	condition,	
and	75%	coherence	thresholds	were	estimated	by	taking	the	mean	of	the	four	coherence	
threshold	estimates	for	each	eccentricity	condition.	We	then	multiplied	these	estimated	
coherence	thresholds	by	a	set	of	six	proportions	to	generate	six	coherence	values	for	each	
eccentricity	condition	that	would	provide	a	range	of	Type	1	percent	correct	scores	from	roughly	
60%	to	90%	(or	approximately	d’	=	0.51	to	d’	=	2.56)	correct	on	the	subsequent	main	task.	Mean	
±	s.e.m.	proportions	used	across	subjects	were	as	follows:	Proportions	center		=	0.17	±	0.05,	0.34	±	
0.10,	0.51	±	0.16,	0.71	±	0.20,	0.95	±	0.23,	1.27	±	0.21	;	Proportions	periphery		=	0.18	±	0.04,	0.30	±	
0.05,	0.42	±	0.07,	0.59	±	0.11,	0.77	±	0.17,	1.03	±	0.22.	If	a	trial	was	aborted	during	the	
staircasing	procedure	due	to	improper	gaze	position,	the	trial	was	repeated	with	motion	
directions	and	the	location	of	the	peripheral	stimulus	newly	randomized	to	avoid	stimulus	
predictability.	
	
Following	the	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	participants	performed	2,304	trials	of	the	main	task	
(Figure	13a)	using	a	full	factorial	combination	of	6	coherence	levels	per	eccentricity	condition,	4	
99	
peripheral	stimulus	locations,	2	motion	directions	per	eccentricity	condition,	and	2	Type	1	
question	orders,	with	2	trials	per	unique	combination	of	conditions.	Trials	were	divided	into	48	
48-trial	blocks.	If	5	gaze	errors	were	made	within	a	single	block,	subjects	immediately	repeated	
the	1-back	eyetracking	calibration	task	to	generate	a	new	functional	central	fixation	point	and	
gaze	contingency	radius.	If	10	gaze	errors	were	made	within	a	single	block,	participants	
immediately	repeated	both	the	initial	SMI	REDn	Scientific	10-point	calibration	task	and	the	
1-back	calibration	task.	After	any	recalibration	procedures	participants	returned	the	trial	of	the	
main	task	on	which	they	had	left	off.	
	
Given	the	large	trial	number,	the	main	task	was	completed	over	several	sessions	on	different	
days	(mean	±	s.d.	days	per	subject:	7	±	1).	At	the	end	of	each	session	a	total	performance	score	
was	computed	by	adding	the	total	proportion	of	correct	Type	1	judgment	to	the	proportion	of	
Type	2	judgments	in	which	participants	indicated	higher	confidence	in	a		correct	Type	1	
judgment.	Starting	from	the	second	session	of	the	main	task,	if	a	participant’s	total	performance	
score	was	higher	than	that	in	the	previous	session,	they	earned	a	$10	bonus.		
	
Data	Analyses	
For	our	main	analysis	we	adopt	the	approach	of	fitting	Type	2	psychometric	curves	as	described	
previously		(Knotts,	Lau,	&	Peters,	2018)	.	Briefly,	for	each	participant	we	found	the	difference	in	
motion	discrimination	d’	between	central	and	peripheral	stimuli	for	all	36	combinations	of	central	
and	peripheral	coherence	levels.	We	then	plotted	the	percentage	of	trials	in	which	higher	
confidence	for	each	combination	of	central	and	peripheral	coherence	levels	against	the	
corresponding	difference	in	motion	discrimination	d’	(Figure	13b,c).	As	in	Experiments	1.1	-	1.3,	
cumulative	normal	functions	were	then	fit	to	each	participant’s	data	with	free	parameters	α	
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(threshold)	and	β	(slope),	and	fixed	parameters	γ	(lapse	rate)	=	0	and	δ	(guess	rate)	=	0	using	
the	Palamedes	toolbox		(Kingdom	&	Prins,	2010;	Prins	&	Kingdom,	2018)	.	Also	as	in	
Experiments	1.1	-	1.3,	from	these	curves	we	estimated	the	point	of	subjective	equality	(PSE;	
magenta	lines	in	Figure	13b,c)	and	the	point	objective	equality	(POE;	red	lines	in	Figure	13b,c)	
and	performed	two-tailed	one	sample	t-tests	to	see	whether	these	these	were	significantly	
different	from	0	or	50%,	respectively	(see	Data	Analysis	section	under	Experiment	1.1).		
	
According	to	the	inflation	hypothesis	we	predicted	a	significant	positive	shift	of	the	PSE	away	
from	0	such	that	when	participants	are	equally	confident	in	their	motion	judgments	at	center	and	
periphery,	they	will	be	better	at	discriminating	motion	at	center.	Similarly,	we	predicted	a	
significant	negative	shift	of	the	POE	below	50%	such	that	when	participants	are	equally	good	at	
discriminating	motion	direction	at	center	and	periphery,	they	will	be	more	likely	to	indicate	high	
confidence	in	their	peripheral	motion	judgments.	
	
Analyses	for	each	of	Experiments	3.1-3.4	were	conducted	in	Matlab	R2014a	(Natuck,	MA),	with	
the	exception	of	repeated	measures	ANOVAs,	which	were	conducted	in	SPSS	v22	(IBM,	
Armonk,	NY,	USA).	All	repeated	measures	ANOVAs	were		adjusted	for	violations	of	the	
assumption	of	sphericity	with	the	Greenhouse-Geisser	correction	when	necessary.	
	
Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
The	mean	±	s.d.	percentage	of	eyetracking	errors	across	all	subjects	on	the	main	task	was	5.18	
±	5.12%,	indicating	that	participants	were	efficient	in	keeping	their	gaze	fixated	throughout	the	
task.	One	subject	was	removed	from	the	main	analyses	due	to	failure	to	perform	the	central	
Type	1	task	above	chance,	despite	motion	coherence	values	for	central	stimuli	being	
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surprisingly	high	(up	to	90%).	Type	1	performance	scores	for	each	of	the	remaining	3	subjects	
fell	within	the	desired	range	(mean	±	1	s.e.m.	d’	center	:	0.47	±	0.12,	0.74	±	0.28,	1.33	±	0.38,	1.75	
±	0.42,	2.02	±	0.35,	2.90	±	0.26,	d’	periphery	:	0.34	±	0.10,	0.57	±	0.11,	1.26	±	0.29,	1.62	±	0.34,	2.16	
±	0.59,	2.94	±	0.75).	A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	dependent	variable	motion	
discrimination	d’	and	within	subjects	factors	motion	coherence	(6	levels)	and	eccentricity	(central	
versus	peripheral)	showed	an	expected	main	effect	of	motion	coherence	[	F(1.13,2.25)	=	26.194,	
p	=	0.028	]	,	i.e.	that	increased	motion	coherence	led	to	higher	performance.	The	ANOVA	also	
showed	no	main	effect	of	eccentricity	[F(1,2)	=	0.01,	p	=	0.93]	and	no	interaction	between	
coherence	and	eccentricity	[F(1.26,2.52)	=	0.161,	p	=	0.77].	These	data	suggest	that	d’	was	
effectively	matched	between	central	and	peripheral	stimuli.	
	
Previous	studies	on	feature-based	attention	have	shown	objective	performance	advantages	in	
discrimination	tasks	(e.g.,	orientation	and	motion)	for	covertly	attended	stimuli	when	
simultaneously	discriminated,	overtly	attended	stimuli	at	a	different	retinal	location	contain	
congruent	feature	information		(Lu	&	Itti,	2005;	Sàenz,	Buraĉas,	&	Boynton,	2003;	Sally,	
Vidnyánsky,	&	Papathomas,	2009;	White	&	Carrasco,	2011)	.	To	test	for	any	such	effect	of	the	
overt	attention	difference	between	central	and	peripheral	stimuli	in	our	task	we	ran	an	additional	
ANOVA	on	discrimination	d’	with	the	within-subjects	factors	motion	coherence	(6	levels),	
eccentricity	(2	levels:	central	or	peripheral),	and	motion	direction	congruence	(2	levels:	
congruent	or	incongruent).	The	ANOVA	showed	no	significant	interaction	between	eccentricity	
and	congruence	[F(1.20,2.41)	=	0.27,	p	=	0.69]	and	no	main	effect	of	congruence	[F(1,2)	=	7.63,	
p	=	0.11]	as	may	have	been	predicted	by	the	feature-based	attention	studies	above.	However,	
this	is	likely	due	to	the	fact	that	the	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	was	specifically	designed	to	
match	performance	between	central	and	peripheral	motion	discrimination	judgments	(see	
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Experiment	3.1	Methods).	To	determine	whether	central-peripheral	stimulus	congruence	had	
any	impact	on		subjective		awareness,	we	also	ran	a	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	the	
percentage	of	trials	in	which	higher	confidence	was	indicated	in	the	central	stimulus	with	the	
same	within	subjects	factors,	and	again	found	no	evidence	for	either	an	interaction	between	
stimulus	congruence	and	eccentricity	[F(1,2)	=	2.03,	p	=	0.29]	or	a	main	effect	of	stimulus	
congruence	[F(1,2)	=	0.02,	p	=	0.91].	
	
The	mean	±	s.e.m.	PSE	value	was	-1.15	±	0.12	d’	difference	units,	which	a	two-tailed	
paired-samples	t-test	confirmed	was	significantly	lower	than	0	[t(2)	=	-9.66,	CI(-1.66,-0.64),	p	=	
0.01].	This	suggests	that	when	participants	were	equally	confident	in	central	and	peripheral	
stimuli,	they	were		better	at	discriminating	motion	for	peripheral	stimuli	by	an	average	of	1.15	d’	
units.	Consistent	with	this	result,	the	mean	±	s.e.m.	POE	value	was	60.0	±	4.3%.	While	this	did	
not	reach	statistical	significance	[t(2)	=	2.26,	CI(41.3%,77.9%),	p	=	0.15],	the	fact	that	every	
participant	had	a	POE	of	at	least	55%	(subject	1	:	68.1%,	subject	2	:	55.4%,	subject	3	:	55.3%)	
means	that	when	motion	discrimination	d’	was	matched,	all	participants	were,	on	average,	more	
likely	to	indicate	higher	confidence	in	the	central	dot	motion	stimulus.	
	
This	result	was	surprising	in	that	it	is	the	opposite	of	what	we	predicted	based	on	previous	
studies	showing	subjective	inflation	in	the	periphery.	Nonetheless,	the	PSE	being	significantly	
lower	than	zero	is	indicative	of	relative	blindsight		(Lau	&	Passingham,	2006)	,	and	points	to	a	
tantalizing	question	about	peripheral	motion	perception:	can	participants	discriminate	motion	in	
the	periphery		unconsciously	?	We	examine	this	question	in	Experiment	3.2.	
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Experiment	3.2:	Peripheral	Two-Interval	Forced	Choice	Dot	Motion	Discrimination	With	
Null	Interval	
Methods	
Participants	
Four	participants	(all	female,	ages	18-21,	all	right	handed,	3	who	also	participated	in	Experiment	
3.1),	gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate.	All	participants	had	normal	or	
corrected-to-normal	eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$13.25	USD	per	
hour	plus	performance-contingent	bonus	money	for	their	participation.	
	
Apparatus,	Stimuli,	&	Procedure	
The	apparatus,	stimuli,	and	procedure	used	in	Experiment	3.2	were	the	same	as	those	in	
Experiment	3.1	with	the	following	exceptions.	While	the	task	in	Experiment	3.1	allowed	us	to	
examine	relative	blindsight	between	central	and	periph	eral	motion	judgments,	in	Experiment	3.2	
we	adapted	a	two-interval	forced	choice	approach		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	to	examine	absolute	
blindsight	for	dot	motion	discrimination	in	the	periphery	(Figure	14a).	Participants	were	again	
required	to	fixate	a	central	cross	for	1	s	to	initiate	a	trial	sequence,	after	which	the	cross	would	
remain	on	the	screen	for	a	variable	interval	from	100	to	150	ms.	This	was	followed	by	a	400	ms	
presentation	of	a	peripheral	dot	motion	stimulus	at	one	of	the	same	four	peripheral	locations	
from	Experiment	3.1	(dashed	circles	in	Figure	14a).	After	a	1		s	inter-interval	interval	(III)	another	
gaze-contingent	cross	appeared	and	was	followed	by	another	dot	motion	stimulus	at	one	of	the	
same	four	peripheral	locations.	Critically,	motion	coherence	in	one	of	the	two	intervals	(hereafter	
denoted	as	the	target-absent	interval)	was	always	zero,	meaning	one	interval	always	contained	
no	net	horizontal	motion.	We	refer	to	the	interval	containing	nonzero	net	horizontal	motion	as	
the	target-present	interval.	Following	presentation	of	both	dot	motion	stimuli,	participants	made	
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the	Type	2	judgment	of	indicating	the	interval	in	which	they	were	more	confident	in	their	ability	to	
discriminate	the	net	left/right	motion	of	the	dot	motion	stimulus.	They	then	made	the	Type	1	
motion	discrimination	judgments	for	the	dot	motion	stimuli	in	intervals	1	and	2,	always	in	that	
order.	
	
Participants	again	performed	10	practice	trials	and	an	80-trial	adaptive	procedure	with	four	
interleaved	staircases		(QUEST,	Watson	&	Pelli,	1983)	to	estimate	the	motion	coherence	that	
would	lead	to	75%	correct	motion	coherence	discrimination	performance.	Importantly,	in	both	
the	practice	and	adaptive	staircasing	procedures,	both	intervals	contained	nonzero	motion	
coherence.	This	was	intended	to	keep	participants	under	the	impression	that	both	stimulus	
intervals	contained	nonzero	motion	coherence	throughout	the	main	task.	This	also	allowed	for	a	
more	efficient	estimation	of	motion	thresholds	during	the	staircasing	procedure.	The	resulting	
thresholds	were	multiplied	by	ten	proportion	s	(mean	±	s.e.m.	proportions:	0.13	±	0.00,	0.23	±	
0.00,	0.31	±	0.007,	0.38	±	0.01,	0.45	±	0.01,	0.53	±	0.02,	0.61	±	0.02,	0.70	±	0.03,	0.80	±	0.05,	
0.12	±	0.01)	in	order	to	target	Type	1	performance	levels	in	the	range	from	roughly	53%	to	85%	
correct.	Subjects	received	trial-by-trial	feedback	regarding	the	accuracy	of	their	motion	
judgments	in	both	intervals	during	both	the	practice	and	adaptive	staircasing	parts	of	the	
experiment.	
	
We	used	a	randomized	full	factorial	combination	of	target	coherence	(10	levels),	interval	1	
peripheral	location	(4	locations),	interval	2	peripheral	location	(4	locations),	motion	direction	(2	
directions),	target	interval	(2	intervals),	with	8	trials	per	unique	combination	of	conditions	for	a	
total	of	5,120	trials	per	subj	ect.	Trials	were	divided	into	128	40-trial	blocks.	As	in	experiment	3.1,	
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participants	performed	the	man	task	over	the	course	of	several	days	(mean	±	s.d.	days	per	
subject:	13.8	±	1.7).	
	
	
Figure 14. Procedure and results for peripheral two-interval forced choice with null interval task	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(Experiment 3.2). a. On each trial participants saw a brief fixation cross followed by a random	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
dot motion kinematogram presented at one of four peripheral locations (dashed circles). After a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1000 ms interstimulus interval they then saw another fixation cross followed by another dot	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
motion kinematogram presented at one of four peripheral locations. Unbeknownst to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
participants, one interval always contained a net leftward or rightward motion coherence of zero.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Participants then indicated the stimulus interval (first or second) in which they were more	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
confident in their ability to discriminate the net direction (leftward versus rightward) of motion.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
They then judged the net direction of motion in the first and second intervals, respectively. Font	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
sizes are enlarged here relative to their actual size during the experiment for clarity. b. Individual	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Type 2 versus Type 1 responses. The percentage of trials in which the participant indicated	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
higher confidence in (or “bet on”) the target present interval (Type 2 judgment) is plotted as a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
function of motion discrimination percent correct scores for the target present interval (Type 1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
judgment). c. Group level Type 2 versus Type 1 data compared with that from Experiment 1.4.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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The mea	n ± s.e.m. percentage of trials in which participants bet on the target present interval in	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
each of seven evenly spaced bins from 50% to 85% Type 1 accuracy in Experiment 3.2 (solid	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
black line) is shown overlaid on the raw data (see panel b for mapping to individual subjects).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The binned means ± s.e.m. of the same measures from Experiment 1.4 are shown in gray.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Binned data are shown centered within each bin. Significant results from Wilcoxon rank-sum	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
tests comparing bin means between experiments are indicated with asterisks (*p<0.05,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
**p<0.01;	note	that	these	are	not	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons).	
	
Data	Analyses	
Removing	net	horizontal	motion	from	one	of	the	two	stimulus	intervals	in	every	trial	allowed	us	
to	investigate	unconscious	peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination	in	the	following	way	as	
described	above	in	the	Methods	for	Experiment	1.4.	Briefly,	we	plot	the	percentage	of	trials	in	
which	the	participant	indicated	higher	confidence	in	the	target-present	interval	as	a	function	of	
motion	discrimination	performance	for	the	target-present	interval	(Figure	14b,c).	If	a	line	plot	of	
these	data	shows	a	flat	region	such	that	x	becomes	substantially	larger	than	50%	correct	Type	1	
accuracy	while	the	percentage	of	trials	in	which	the	participant	indicated	higher	confidence	in	
the	target-present	interval	stays	at	50%,	then	it	would	suggest	that	despite	being	able	to	perform	
the	motion	discrimination	task	above	chance,	the	participant	was	not	able	to	subjectively	
distinguish	a	stimulus	with	a	discriminable	signal	from	one	with	no	discriminable	signal		(Peters	&	
Lau,	2015)	.	Such	behavior	could	therefore	be	interpreted	as	evidence	for	unconscious	motion	
discrimination.	
	
To	formally	analyze	the	flatness	of	these	Type	2	“absolute	blindsight”	curves	we	directly	
compared	the	data	from	Experiment	3.2	to	that	of	Experiment	1.4,	in	which	the	same	2IFC	
procedure	with	a	null	interval	was	used.	We	compared	the	data	in	two	ways.	First,	we	ran	a	
repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	%	correct	scores	with	the	within	subjects	factors	stimulus	
strength	(10	levels)	and	response	type	(Type	1	or	Type	2)	and	the	between	subjects	factor	task	
(peripheral	dot	motion	discrimination	or	orientation	discrimination	under	CFS).	If	the	Type	2	
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curve	in	Experiment	3.2	is	indeed	flatter	than	that	in	Experiment	1.4,	then	we	should	expect	an	
interaction	between	response	type	and	task.	
	
Second,	we	averaged	the	data	from	each	experiment	in	10	equally	spaced	bins	of	Type	1	
performance	(orientation	or	motion	discrimination)	from	50%	to	100%	correct	(Figure	15c).	Due	
to	the	lower	trial	number	per	participant	in	Experiment	1.4,	some	Type	1	percent	correct	scores	
were	lower	than	50	%	correct.	These	were	lumped	into	the	lowest	bin	from	50	to	55%	correct	on	
the	assumption	that	sub-50%	correct	scores	effectively	represent	chance	performance.	To	
ensure	equal	weighting	of	the	data	from	each	subject	in	a	given	bin,	we	first	computed	the	mean	
of	each	individual	subject’s	data	within	that	bin,	and	then	computed	the	average	of	those	means.	
In	the	case	of	a	significant	interaction	between	response	type	and	task,	post-hoc	Wilcoxon	rank	
sum	tests	can	be	performed	on	the	individual	subject	means	for	each	task.	Comparing	binned	
means	will	ensure	that	Type	1	performance	is	matched	when	comparing	between	tasks.	
	
Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
The	mean	±	s.d.	percentage	of	eyetracking	errors	across	all	subjects	on	the	main	task	was	
4.60%	±	5.09%,	indicating	again	that	participants	were	efficient	in	keeping	their	gaze	fixated	
throughout	the		task.	For	the	main	analysis	of	absolute	blindsight,	visual	inspection	of	individual	
data	suggests	that	each	participant	placed	confidence	judgments	on	th	e	target	present	and	
target	absent	intervals	roughly	equally	until	Type	1	performance	was	at	least	(Figure	14b,	
Subject	2)	about	65%	correct.	Group	data	was	binned	by	target	present	Type	1	accuracy	in	
seven	equally	spaced	(5%)	bins	from	50%	to	85%	correct		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	Again,	visual	
inspection	suggests	that	at	the	group	level,	participants	are	near	chance	in	their	confidence	
108	
judgments	until	at	least	the	5th	bin	of	motion	discrimination	accuracies,	the	lower	bound	of	
which	is	65%	correct.		
	
The	repeated	measures	ANOVA	comparing	Experiments	1.4	and	3.2	showed	a	significant	
interaction	between	response	type	and	task	[F(1,24)	=	17.44,	p	<	0.001].	The	nature	of	this	
interaction	is	clear	when	plotting	binned	means	of	Type	2	responses	as	a	function	of	Type	1	
accuracy	(Figure	15c).	When	subjects	perform	the	CFS	task,	they	appear	to	reliably	bet	on	the	
target	present	interval	as	soon	as	Type	1	performance	enters	the	second	bin	between	55%	and	
60%	correct	(Figure	15c,	gray	line,	second	bin).	This	is	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	peripheral	dot	
motion	task,	where	subjects,	on	average,	do	not	appear	to	be	able	to	reliably	bet	on	the	target	
present	interval	until	Type	1	performance	is	somewhere	between	70	and	75%	correct.	This	was	
confirmed	by	post-hoc	rank	sum	tests	betwetween	binned	Type	2	responses	for	each	task,	
which	showed	that	over	the	range	of	at	least	70%	to	85%	correct	Type	1	accuracy,	participants	
were	significantly	more	likely	to	bet	on	the	target-present	interval	when	performing	the	central	
orientation	discrimination	task	under	CFS	(Figure	15c).		
	
These	results	provide	some	preliminary	evidence	for	absolute	blindsight	for	dot	motion	
discrimination	in	the	periphery.	In	other	words,	if	the	target-present	interval	is	subjectively	
indistinguishable	from	the	target	absent	interval	up	to	Type	1	motion	discrimination	accuracies	of	
65%,	this	suggests	that	participants	may	be	able	to	perform	the	task	up	to	this	level	of	accuracy	
without	subjective	awareness.	However,	alternative	interpretations	are	considered	in	the	general	
discussion.	Importantly,	if	the	blindsight-like	effect	found	in	Experiment	3.2	is	critically	related	to	
the	dissociation	found	in	Experiment	3.1,	then	we	should	not	expect	to	find	a	similar	result	if	we	
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repeat	Experiment	3.2	with	all	stimuli	at	central	fixation.	We	asked	this	question	in	Experiment	
3.3.	
	
Experiment	3.3:	Central	Two-Interval	Forced	Choice	Dot	Motion	Discrimination	With	Null	
Interval	
Methods	
Participants	
Three	participants	(all	female,	ages	18-21,	all	right	handed,	all	of	whom	also	participated	in	
Experiments	3.1	&	3.2),	gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate.	All	participants	had	normal	
or	corrected-to-normal	eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$13.25	USD	
per	hour	plus	performance-contingent	bonus	money	for	their	participation.	
	
Apparatus,	Stimuli,	&	Procedure	
The	apparatus,	stimuli,	and	procedure	used	in	Experiment	3.3	were	identical	to	those	used	in	
Experiment	3.2	with	the	following	exceptions.	Instead	of	presenting	dot	motion	stimuli	in	the	
peripheral	locations	from	Experiments	3.1	and	3.2,	all	dot	motion	stimuli	were	presented	at	the	
central	fixation	point	(Figure	15a).	Furthermore,	the	total	number	of	trials	was	halved;	we	used	a	
full	factorial	combination	of	target	coherence	(10	levels),	motion	direction	(2	directions),	and	
target	interval	(2	intervals),	with	64	trials	per	unique	combin	ation	of	conditions	for	a	total	of	2,560	
trials	per	subject	(mean	±	s.d.	days	per	subject:	9.00	±	2.65).	Proportions	used	to	determine	
experimental	coherence	strengths	from	Quest-estimated	coherence	thresholds	were	equal	
across	all	subjects:	0.12,	0.19,	0.25,	0.32,	0.40,	0.49,	0.59,	0.71,	0.86,	1.05.	
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Data	Analyses	
Type	2	absolute	blindsight	curves	were	plotted	the	same	as	in	Experiment	3.2.	Given	that	all	
participants	in	Experiment	3.3	also	participated	in	Experiment	3.2,	we	tested	for	any	potential	
differences	in	the	relationship	between	Type	1	and	Type	2	performance	between	the	two	
experiments	using	a	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	%	correct	scores	with	within-subjects	
factors	motion	coherence	(10	levels),	response	type	(Type	1	versus	Type	2),	and	eccentricity	
(central	versus	peripheral).	
	
	
Figure 15. Procedure and results for central two-interval forced choice with null interval task	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(Experiment 3). a. The trial procedure was identical to those in Experiment 3.2 except that dot	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
motion stimuli were always presented centrally. Font sizes are enlarged here relative to their	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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actual size during the experiment for clarity. b. Individual Type 2 versus Type 1 performance	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
plotted the same as in Figure 14. c. Group level (N=3) Type 2 versus Type 1 performance data	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
at center (red, Experiment 3.3) compared to periphery (black, Experiment 3.2). Mean ± s.e.m.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Type	2	performance	scores	are	overlaid	over	the	raw	data.	
	
Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
The		mean	±	s.d.	percentage	of	eyetracking	errors	across	all	subjects	on	the	main	task	was	
4.49%	±	5.13%.	In	dividual	and	group	level	Type	2	absolute	blindsight	plots	are	shown	in	Figures	
15b	and	3.3c	(red	data	points	and	line),	respectively.	The	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	
no	significant	interaction	between	motion	coherence	and	eccentricity	[f(1.99,3.98)	=	2.60,	p	=	
0.19],	which	confirms	that	a	similar	range	of	Type	1	motion	discrimination	%	correct	scores	was	
observed	between	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	(see	ranges	of	overlaid	raw	central	and	peripheral	
data	in	Figure	15c).	Critically,	there	was	no	interaction	between	response	type	and	eccentricity	
[F(1,2)	=	1.16,	p	=	0.39].	This	suggests	that	the	extent	of	absolute	blind	sight-like	behavior	for	
foveal	dot	motion	discrimination	is	the	same	as	that	in	the	periphery.		
	
The	lack	of	a	difference	in	the	relationship	between	Type	1	and	Type	2	judgments	between	
Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	suggests	that	the	absolute	blindsight-like	behavior	found	in	these	
experiments	and	the	relative	blindsight	effect	found	between	central	and	peripheral	judgments	in	
Experiment	3.1	are	not	underlain	by	the	same	mechanism.	Perhaps	the	largest	procedural	
difference	between	the	relative	and	absolute	blindsight	paradigms	used	so	far	is	the	simultaneity	
of	the	dot	motion	stimuli.	In	the	relative	blindsight	task	(Experiment	3.1),	central	and	peripheral	
stimuli	are	presented	simultaneously,	whereas	in	the	absolute	blindsight	tasks	(Experiment	3.2	
and	3.3),	target	and	non-target	stimuli	are	presented	consecutively.	In	the	next	experiment,	we	
test	whether	this	simultaneity	difference	may	be	critical	to	the	relative	blindsight	effect	observed	
in	Experiment	3.1.	
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	Experiment	3.4:	Two-Interval	Forced	Choice	Center	Versus	Peripheral	Dot	Motion	
Discrimination	
Methods	
Participants	
Three	participants	(all	female,	ages	18-21,	all	right	handed,	two	of	whom	also	participated	in	
Experiments	3.1	&	3.2	and	one	of	whom	previously	participated	in	only	Experiment	3.2),	gave	
written	informed	consent	to	participate.	All	participants	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	
eyesight	and	normal	stereo	vision,	and	all	were	either	paid	$13.25	USD	per	hour	plus	
performance-contingent	bonus	money	for	their	participation.	
	
Apparatus,	Stimuli,	Procedure,	&	Data	Analysis	
The	apparatus,	stimuli,	and	procedure	used	in	Experiment	3.4	were	the	same	as	that	in	
Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	with	the	following	exceptions.	On	each	trial	the	dot	motion	stimulus	in	
one	interval	was	presented	centrally,	while	the	dot	motion	stimulus	in	the	other	interval	was	
presented	peripherally	(Figure	16a).	Every	dot	motion	stimulus	contained	nonzero	net	leftward	
or	rightward	motion	coherence.	An	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	with	the	same	structure	as	
that	in	Experiment	3.1	was	used	to	target	6	near-threshold	motion	coherence	levels	per	
eccentricity	condition	(see	Experiment	3.1	Methods).	We	used	a	full	factorial	combination	of	6	
coherence	levels	per	eccentricity	condition,	2	motion	directions	per	eccentricity	condition,	2	
interval	orders,	and	4	peripheral	stimulus	locations	with	2	trials	per	unique	co	mbination	of	
conditions	for	a	total	of	2,304	trials	(mean	±	s.d.	days	per	subject:	7.7	±	2.1).		Data	analysis	
procedures	followed	those	from	Experiment	3.1.		Mean	±	s.e.m.	proportions	of	Quest-estimated	
threshold	coherence	values	used	for	stimuli	were	as	follows:	Proportions	center		=	0.13	±	0.02,	0.25	
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±	0.01,	0.37	±	0.01,	0.59	±	0.01,	0.90	±	0.00,	1.28	±	0.08;	Proportions	periphery		=	0.12	±	0.02,	0.23	
±	0.02,	0.34	±	0.02,	0.55	±	0.04,	0.84	±	0.05,	1.19	±	0.05.	
	
Figure 16. Procedure and results for 2IFC central versus peripheral dot motion discrimination	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
task (Experiment 3.4). a. The trial procedure had the same temporal structure as Experiments	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3.2 and 3.3. On each trial one dot motion stimulus was presented centrally whereas the other	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
was presented at one of four peripheral locations, with the central vs peripheral location order	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
randomized across trials. Further, all dot motion stimuli contained net leftward or rightward	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
motion greater than zero. Font sizes are enlarged here relative to their actual size during the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
experiment for clarity. b. Individual psychometric curves. Individual Type 2 performance	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(percentage of trials in which participants indicated higher confidence in the interval containing	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the centrally presented stimulus) is plotted as a function of the difference between central and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
peripheral motion discrimination d’. Cumulative normal curves were fit to individual subject data	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
as in Figure 13b. c. Group level (N=3) data. Black circles represent group mean d’ difference	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
scores ± 1 s.e.m., while the black line shows the mean of the individual cumulative normal fits ±	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1 SD (gray). The 95% confidence intervals for estimated PSE and POE group means are shown	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
by	the	black	bars	near	the	x-	and	y-axes,	respectively.	
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Results	&	Interim	Discussion	
The	mean	±	s.d.	percentage	of	eyetracking	errors	across	all	subjects	on	the	main	task	was	4.45	
±	5.40%.	As	in	Experiment	3.1,	type	1	performance	scores	fell	within	the	targeted	range	(mean	
±	1	s.e.m.	d’	center	:	0.14	±	0.13,	0.57	±	0.16,	0.77	±	0.23,	1.12	±	0.23,	1.68	±	0.38,	2.38	±	0.29;	
d’	periphery	:	0.27	±	0.04,	0.50	±	0.09,	0.85	±	0.13,	1.34	±	0.07,	1.95	±	0.30,	2.78	±	0.64).	The	
repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	dependent	variable	motion	discrimination	d’	and	within	
subjects	factors	motion	coherence	(6	levels)	and	eccentricity	(central	versus	peripheral)	showed	
the	expected	main	effect	of	increasing	motion	discrimination	%	correct	scores	with	motion	
coherence	[	F(1.13,2.25)	=	26.194,	p	=	0.028	]	.	The	ANOVA	also	showed	no	main	effect	of	
eccentricity	[F(1,2)	=	0.01,	p	=	0.93]	and	no	interaction	between	coherence	and	eccentricity	
[F(1.26,2.52)	=	0.161,	p	=	0.77].	These	data	suggest	that	d’	was	effectively	matched	between	
central	and	peripheral	stimuli.	
	
Type	2	cumulative	normal	psychometric	fits	(Figure	16b,c)	showed	PSE	and	POE	shifts	that,	
contra	Experiment	3.1,	were	neither	consistent	across	participants	nor	significantly	different	from	
the	hypothetical	null	values	of	0	and	50%,	respectively,	at	the	group	level	[t	PSE	(2)	=	0.22,	95%	
CI	PSE		=	(-1.84,2.03),	p	PSE		=	0.85;	t	POE	(2)	=	-1.12,	95%	CI	POE		=	(40.3%,55.7%),	p	POE		=	0.38].	This	
therefore	suggests	that	relative	blindsight	effect	observed	between	center	and	periphery	in	
Experiment	3.1	is	task-specific.	This	result	is	also	consistent	with	the	lack	of	a	difference	in	the	
extent	of	absolute	blindsight-like	behavior	found	at	center	and	periphery	in	Experiments	3.2	and	
3.3.	
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General	Discussion	
Across	three	experiments	(3.1-3.3)	we	found	evidence	for	both	relative		(Lau	&	Passingham,	
2006)	and	absolute	blindsight		(Weiskrantz,	1986)	in	dot	motion	discrimination	in	human	
participants.	In	a	fourth	experiment	(3.4)	we	found	evidence	that	these	effects	are	likely	
independent,	and,	in	the	case	of	relative	blindsight,	task-specific.		
	
In	Experiment	3.1	we	found	that	when	objective	motion	discrimination	performance	was	
matched	for	central	and	peripheral	stimuli	in	a	simultaneous	central/peripheral	motion	
discrimination	task,	participants	were	more	likely	to	indicated	higher	confidence	in	their	central	
motion	discrimination	judgments	(Figure	13).	In	Experiment	3.2	we	found	that	even	when	
participants	could	objectively	discriminate	the	motion	direction	of	a	near-threshold	peripheral	dot	
motion	stimulus	at	accuracies	up	to	roughly	75%	correct,	they	could	not	subjectively	distinguish	
such	judgments	from	those	made	for	stimuli	with	no	net	coherent	motion.	This	may	provide	
evidence	for	absolute	blindsight	(Figure	14).	Further,	this	introspective	insensitivity	was	found	to	
be	significantly	worse	than	that	observed	when	the	same	paradigm	was	used	with	orientation	
discrimination	under	continuous	flash	suppression	(Figure	14c;	Experiment	1.4).	In	Experiment	
3.3	we	found	that	this	potential	absolute	blindsight	effect	was	not	limited	to	the	periphery;	
participants	were	equally	poor	at	introspecting	on	their	motion	judgments	when	the	same	task	
as	in	Experiment	3.2	was	performed	with	stimuli	presented	foveally	(Figure	15).	Finally,	in	
Experiment	3.4,	we	found	that	presenting	central	and	peripheral	stimuli	consecutively	in	a	2IFC	
paradigm	as	opposed	to	simultaneously	(Experiment	3.1),	removes	the	bias	towards	indicating	
higher	confidence	in	central	judgments	when	motion	discrimination	performance	is	matched	in	
the	periphery	that	was	observed	in	Experiment	3.1	(Figure	16).	
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While	Experiment	3.4	indicates	some	task	constraints	on	the	relative	blindsight	effect	observed	
in	Experiment	3.1,	this	effect	is	nonetheless	important	in	providing	preliminary	evidence	for	a	
reliable	method	for	dissociating	objective	and	subjective	awareness		(Lau,	2008)	.	Surprisingly,	
the	direction	of	the	observed	dissociation,	that	participants	showed	higher	confidence	in	central	
vision	when	objective	performance	was	matched	in	the	periphery,	was	the	opposite	of	what	we	
hypothesized	based	on	previous	reports	of	subjective	inflation	in	the	periphery		(M.	K.	Li	et	al.,	
2018;	Odegaard,	Chang,	et	al.,	2018;	Rahnev	et	al.,	2011;	Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	.	A	potentially	
important	difference	is	that	subjective	judgments	in	Experiment	3.1	involved	direct	within-trial	
comparisons	between	central	and	peripheral	motion	judgments,	whereas	previous	inflation	
effects	have	been	found	by	comparing	differences	in	the	average	magnitudes	of	single	stimulus	
confidence	judgments	across	separate	central	and	peripheral	trials.	However,	the	lack	of	Type	2	
bias	toward	either	eccentricity	condition	in	Experiment	3.4	suggests	that	the	Type	2	judgment	
being	a	direct	comparison	cannot	alone	explain	the	central	bias	observed	in	Experiment	3.1.		
	
Comparing	the	task	structures	of	Experiments	3.1	and	3.4	suggests	that	the	critical	factor	may	
be	the	simultaneity	of	the	central	and	peripheral	stimuli.	In	this	case,	the	underlying	mechanism	
may	be	attentional.	For	example,	previous	studies	of	feature-based	attention	have	found	that	
discrimination	performance	improves	when	overtly	attended	stimuli	are	congruent	with	
simultaneously	presented,	covertly	attended	stimuli	with	respect	to	a	specific	feature	(e.g.,	
motion	direction	or	orientation		(Lu	&	Itti,	2005;	Sàenz	et	al.,	2003;	Sally	et	al.,	2009;	White	&	
Carrasco,	2011)	.	However,	this	effect	has	only	been	studied	in	reference	to	objective	
performance	(e.g.,	discrimination	d’),	and	here	we	unsurprisingly	found	no	such	effect,	as	
objective	performance	was	deliberately	matched	between	eccentricity	conditions	via	staircasing.	
A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	further	revealed	that	stimulus	congruence	also	did	not	impact	the	
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likelihood	of	indicating	higher	confidence	in	central	judgments.	Together,	these	results	suggest	
that	a	feature-based	attentional	explanation	of	the	subjective	bias	observed	in	Experiment	3.1	is	
unlikely.	However,	this	does	not	preclude	the	dual-task	nature	of	Experiment	3.1	from	being	the	
critical	experimental	manipulation	underlying	the	subjective	bias	effect.	On	this	note,	future	
studies	should	also	examine	whether	established	peripheral	inflation	effects		(Rahnev	et	al.,	
2011;	Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	persist	under	such	dual-task	conditions.	
	
Another	possible	explanation	is	that	the	subjective	bias	observed	in	Experiment	3.1	is	decisional	
as	opposed	to	perceptual	or	sensory	in	nature		(Linares,	Aguilar-Lleyda,	&	López-Moliner,	2019;	
Witt,	Sugovic,	&	Wixted,	2012)	.	It	is	intuitive	that,	in	the	face	of	uncertainty,	participants	might	
default	to	indicating	higher	confidence	in	central	judgments	simply	based	prior	knowledge	and	
experience	that	visual	acuity	is	better	at	the	fovea	than	it	is	in	the	periphery.	While	it	is	not	clear	
that	there	is	a	definitive	method	for	disambiguating	sensory	and	decisional	interpretations	of	
perceptual	decision	making	biases,	future	studies	could	get	a	clearer	idea	of	the	nature	of	the	
central	bias	from	Experiment	3.1	by	seeing	if	it	persists	in	the	presence	of	experimental	
manipulations	like	trial-by-trial	feedback		(Rahnev	et	al.,	2011;	Solovey	et	al.,	2015)	or	button	
randomization		(Linares	et	al.,	2019)	.	
	
The	results	of	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	suggest	that	introspection	may	be	impaired	for	random	
dot	motion	discrimination	in	a	manner	that	is	independent	of	the	relative	blindsight-like	effect	
observed	in	Experiment	3.1.	Importantly,	the	flat	portions	of	the	Type	2	psychometric	functions	in	
Figures	14b,c	and	15b,c	provide	the	first	evidence	for	objective	performance	in	the	absence	of	
subjective	awareness	using	a	task	that	is	not	susceptible	to	criterion	bias		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	.	
Previous	studies	using	the	unbiased	2IFC	approach	here	for	orientation	discrimination	have	
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shown	no	such	evidence	for	objective	performance	without	awareness		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	;	
Figures	5	and	14),	suggesting	that	random	dot	motion	discrimination	may	be	an	ideal	task	for	
studying	subjective	awareness.	To	our	knowledge,	the	only	study	that	has	directly	examined	
differences	in	metacognition	between	different	types	of	discrimination		task	when	Type	1	
performance	is	matched	looked	at	differences	between	contrast	discrimination	and	orientation	
discrimination		(Song	et	al.,	2011)	.	Otherwise,	direct	comparisons	between	discrimination	tasks	
have	typically	focused	on	comparing	discrimination	accuracy		(Halpern,	Andrews,	&	Purves,	
1999)	.	Given	the	current	results,	future	studies	should	examine	more	directly,	within	subjects,	
whether	introspective	access	to	type	1	discrimination	sensitivity	is	really	more	impaired	in	
random	dot	motion	tasks	than	other	traditional	psychophysics	tasks	like	orientation	or	shape	
discrimination.	
	
It	remains	an	open	question,	however,	whether	the	failure	to	subjectively	distinguish	between	
the	target	present	and	target	absent	intervals	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	really	reflects	
unconscious	motion	discrimination.	An	alternative	explanation	is	that	participants	made	
subjectively	rich	false	alarms	in	the	target	absent	intervals.	In	this	case,	they	might	indicate	
higher	confidence	in	the	target	absent	interval	despite	being	subjectively	aware	of	the	externally	
valid	motion	in	the	target	present	interval.	If	this	interpretation	is	correct,	we	might	ask	why	this	
be	the	case	with	dot	motion,	but	not	orientation	discrimination.	One	possible	answer	is	that	a	
random	dot	motion	stimulus	contains	local	motion	information	(e.g.,	the	motion	of	a	single	dot)	
that	can	be	incongruent	with	the	stimulus’s	global	motion	information	(e.g.,	in	the	target	absent	
intervals	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3,	a	net	horizontal	motion	of	zero).	Therefore,	if	one	
selectively	attends	local	information,	it	might	lead	to	the	false	impression	of	a	global	motion	
signal	when	there	is	none.	An	oriented	gabor	patch,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	typically	
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contain	any	such	incongruence	between	local	and	global	orientation	information,	and	therefore	
does	not	present	this	kind	of	opportunity	to	make	false	alarms	based	on	local	information.	
	
One	way	to	control	for	attention	to	local	motion	signals	in	a	random	dot	motion	discrimination	
task	is	to	reduce	the	lifetime	of	dots	(i.e.,	the	amount	of	time	each	dot	is	on	the	screen	before	it	
is	redrawn	at	a	random	location;	see	Appendix	B).	While	a	previous	study	showed	that	changing	
dot	lifetime	does	not	affect	random	dot	motion	detection	thresholds		(Scase,	Braddick,	&	
Raymond,	1996)	,	the	influence	of	dot	lifetime	on	subjective	measures	of	perception	has	not,	to	
our	knowledge,	been	explored.	In	each	of	the	current	experiments,	the	dots	had	full	lifetimes,	
meaning	the	only	time	a	dot	was	redrawn	was		when	it	would	exit	the	boundary	of	the	stimulus	
and	then	reappear	on	the	other	side.	In	theory,	if	dot	lifetime	is	reduced,	then	it	should	be	more	
difficult	for	subjects	to	attend	to	local	motion	signals.	Future	studies	should	investigate	how	this	
and	other	stimulus	properties	might	modulate	introspective	access	on	this	task.	For	another	
example,	motion	blindsight	was	found	in	an	actual	blindsight	patient,	GY,	when	using	the	same	
dot	motion	speed	as	was	used	here	(1	dva/s),	but	not	at	higher	speeds		(Sahraie	et	al.,	1998)	.	If	
a	similar	pattern	is	found	in	healthy	observers,	it	may	provide	additional	evidence	that	the	
metacognitive	deficits	found	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	reflect	true	unconscious	processing.	
	
It	should	be	clarified	here	that	while	previous	studies	suggest	that	local	dot	trajectories	do	not	
significantly	affect	global	motion	perception		(Watamaniuk,	Sekuler,	&	Williams,	1989;	Williams	&	
Sekuler,	1984)	,	subjects	in	these	studies	were	not	presented	with	kinematograms	containing	
zero	net	motion	in	the	directions	available	for	forced	choice	responding.	We	believe	that	this	
may	be	an	important	distinction.	It	may	be	that	it	in	such	cases	when	there	is	no	global	signal	
available	to	sufficiently	suppress	evidence	accumulation	from	local	signals,	and	participants	are	
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forced	to	make	a	decision,	that	these	local	signals	have	the	strength	to	bias	either	the	relevant	
pooling	mechanisms	in	low	level	motion	processing	in	area	MT		(Britten	&	Heuer,	1999;	Britten,	
Shadlen,	Newsome,	&	Movshon,	1992;	Haberman	&	Whitney,	2012;	Newsome	&	Paré,	1988)	,	
or	later	stage	metacognitive	systems,	presumably	in	frontal	and	parietal	areas		(Stanislas	
Dehaene	et	al.,	2017;	Lau	&	Rosenthal,	2011)	.	Whether	one	of	these	two	loci	is	more	strongly	
implicated	in	causing	the	high	proportion	of	Type	2	false	alarms	observed	in	Experiments	3.2	
and	3.3	is	an	open	question	that	will	be	considered	in	the	general	discussion	of	this	dissertation.	
	
Regardless	of	the	locus	of	the	metacognitive	impairment,	we	can	see	that	the	subjectively	rich	
false	alarms	interpretation	of	Experiments	3.2	-	3.4,	whether	or	not	the	exact	mechanism	relies	
on	attention	to	local	motion	signals,	bears	a	resemblance	to	the	subjective	inflation	hypothesis.	
Of	course,	to	the	extent	that	inflation	is	operationally	defined	as	having	higher	subjective	ratings	
than	would	be	predicted	based	on	objective	performance	when	either	attention	is	reduced	or	
eccentricity	is	increased,	we		cannot	find	inflation	on	the	absolute	blindsight	tasks	here	(Expts	
3.2	and	3.3);	we	only	have	one	valid	objective	measure	in	each	of	these	tasks,	and	there	is	no	
manipulation	of	attention	or	eccentricity.	However,	as	mentioned	above,	global	motion	
discrimination	in	random	dot	motion	kinematograms	involves	pooling	of	local	motion	signals,	as	
has	been	established	in	visual	area	MT	in	monkeys		(Britten	&	Heuer,	1999;	Britten	et	al.,	1992;	
Haberman	&	Whitney,	2012;	Newsome	&	Paré,	1988)	.	On	the	lower	level	version	of	the	rich	
false	alarm	interpretation,	for	a	stimulus	with	zero	net	motion,	bias	in	evidence	accumulation	
from	local	signals	may	become	magnified	through	pooling	to	such	an	extent	that	the	observer	
subjectively	perceives	an	unambiguous	stimulus.	This	is	similar	to	the	presumed	contribution	of	
summary	statistic	computations	to	subjectively	inflated	percepts	discussed	above;	in	both	cases,	
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the	integration	and	compression	of	information	in	the	visual	system	leads	to	unexpectedly	high	
subjective	awareness	given	the	corresponding	objective	performance.		
	
Finally,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	theoretically	versus	operationally	defined	absolute	
blindsight	when	interpreting	the	current	data.	Theoretically	defined	absolute	blindsight	is	true	
unconscious	perception;	it	is	a	specific	dissociation	between	objective	performance	and	
subjective	awareness	in	which	subjective	awareness	is	at	zero,	and	objective	performance	is	
not.	Operationally	defined	absolute	blindsight,	here,	entails	betting	on	the	target	present	and	
target	absent	intervals	roughly	equally	when	objective	performance	in	the	target	present	interval	
is	above	chance.	This	is	important	because,	on	the	rich	false	alarms	hypothesis,	we	essentially	
have	operationally	defined	absolute	blindsight	without	theoretically	defined	absolute	blindsight.	
In	this	case,	subjective	awareness	is	presumably	nonzero	when	objective	performance	is	above	
chance;	it	is	only	because	the	Type	2	false	alarms	in	the	target	absent	interval	also	come	with	
rich	sense	of	subjective	awareness	that	participants	bet	evenly	between	the	two	interval	types.	
Therefore,	despite	the	observed	operational	absolute	blindsight	effect,	it	is	not	clear	whether	our	
results	reflect	true	unconscious	motion	discrimination,	or	a	strong	tendency	to	hallucinate	motion	
that	isn’t	really	there.	
	
One	possible	way	to	disentangle	these	interpretations	would	be	to	repeat	the	same	absolute	
blindsight	tasks	(Experiment	3.2	and	3.3),	but	have	subjects	make	absolute	confidence	
judgments	(e.g.,	on	a	scale	from	1	to	4)	in	each	stimulus	interval		in	addition	to	the	relative	
confidence	judgment	between	the	two	intervals.	If	absolute	confidence	ratings	are	at	floor	only	
within	the	range	of	motion	discrimination	percent	correct	scores	that	corresponds	to	the	flat	
portion	of	the	absolute	blindsight	curve	where	subjects	are	equally	likely	to	bet	on	target	absent	
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and	target	present	intervals	(e.g.,	from	50%	to	roughly	70%	in	Figure	14c),	it	would	provide	
some	evidence	that	the	metacognitive	impairment	reflects	true	unconscious	perception,	or	
absolute	blindsight.	
	
In	conclusion,	the	present	results	suggest	evidence	for	both	relative	and	absolute	blindsight	in	
normal	observers	performing	random	dot	motion	discrimination	tasks.	The	relative	blindsight	
effect,	which	found	that	participants	were	more	confident	in	central	than	peripheral	left/right	
motion	judgments,	appears	to	be	independent	from	previous	demonstrations	of	peripheral	
inflation		(Knotts,	Odegaard,	et	al.,	2018)	.	Further,	this	effect	may	arise	only	in	the	context	of	
simultaneous	dual-discrimination	tasks.	The	absolute	blindsight	effects	observed	here	suggest	
that	random	dot	motion	discrimination	at	both	central	and	peripheral	retinal	locations	may	be	
uniquely	associated	with	impaired	introspective	access.	But	future	studies	should	investigate	
whether	this	effect	reflects	true	unconscious	perception	or	a	tendency	to	make	rich	false	alarms.	
In	the	latter	case,	these	data	support	an	inflation-like	account	of	dot	motion	perception	across	
the	visual	field,	which	further	supports	the	intermediate	theoretical	position	(discussed	in	the	
background	section	of	this	chapter)	that	visual	perception	is	objectively	sparse	but	subjectively	
rich.	In	the	former	case,	dot	motion	perception	may	represent	an	ideal	task	for	isolating	
subjective	measures	of	awareness	in	the	scientific	study	of	consciousness.	
	
X.	General	Conclusions	&	Future	Directions	
	
The	three	lines	of	research	described	here	inform	each	other	in	several	ways.	Perhaps	the	most	
striking	of	these	concerns	the	difference	we	observed	in	performance	on	the	null	interval	2IFC	
task		(Peters	&	Lau,	2015)	between	orientation	(Experiment	1.4)	and	dot	motion	(Experiments	
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3.2-3.3)	discrimination	(Figure	14c);	introspective	access	to	objective	discrimination	judgments	
appears	to	be	significantly	worse	for	dot	motion	stimuli.		
	
In	Chapter	IX	we	briefly	discussed	potential	candidates	for	the	locus	of	this	introspective	
impairment	in	the	visual	system.	Given	the	task	difference,	an	obvious	choice	might	be	area	MT		
(Britten	&	Heuer,	1999;	Britten	et	al.,	1992;	Haberman	&	Whitney,	2012;	Newsome	&	Paré,	
1988)	.	This	fits	with	the	theory	that	motion	perception	is	less	conscious	due	to	its	processing	in	
the	dorsal	stream		(Goodale,	2011;	Milner	&	Goodale,	2008)	.	And,	as	discussed	above,	it	also	
fits	the	hypothesis	that	pooling	mechanisms	in	MT	may	be	vulnerable	to	inflation-like	effects	in	
the	absence	of	strong	external	motion	signals	just	as	we	propose	to	be	the	case	for	peripheral	
summary	computations		(Knotts,	Odegaard,	et	al.,	2018)	.		
	
The	neurofeedback	results	from	Chapter	VIII,	however,	suggest	that	the	locus	of	the	
introspective	impairment	for	dot	motion	may	be	a	later	metacognitive	stage	in	frontal	and/or	
parietal	cortex.	False	color	perception	was	associated	specifically	with	decoded	patterns	for	
perceptual	confidence	and	not	lower	level	decoded	patterns	for	color	(Figure	11).	Further,	this	
association	was	strongest	in	PFC	(Figure	A3).	Of	course,	this	was	a	color	task,	not	a	motion	
task.	However,	evidence	for	a	dissociation	between	perceptual	confidence	and	objective	
perceptual	decisions,		specifically	for	dot	motion	perception	,	has	been	reported	previously	in	both	
humans		(Cortese	et	al.,	2016)	and	monkeys		(Odegaard,	Grimaldi,	et	al.,	2018)	.	In	the	former	
study,	perceptual	confidence	was	decoded	from	the	same	frontoparietal	areas	as	in	the	main	
neurofeedback	study	discussed	in	Chapter	VIII.	Further,	this	study	found	that	perceptual	
confidence	could	be	selectively	increased	via	neurofeedback	without	affecting	objective	task	
performance.	This	very	nicely	suggests	flexible	frontoparietal	confidence	representations	as	
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both	a	potential	substrate	for	the	mechanism	of	subjective	inflation	and,	consequently,	a	
potential	locus	for	the	metacognitive	impairment	observed	in	our	behavioral	dot	motion	data.	
	
This	is	not	to	rule	out	the	idea	that	it	is	ultimately	an	interaction	between	frontoparietal	
metacognitive	mechanisms	and	low-level	motion	representations	that	underlies	the	observed	
metacognitive	deficits	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3.	At	the	beginning	of	Chapter	IX	we	discussed	
the	importance	of	expectation	in	mediating	inflation-like	effects	[Knotts	et	al.,	kouider,	pull	a	few	
others?].	This	idea	is	consistent	with	the	frontoparietal	interpretation	above,	as	there	are	several	
lines	of	evidence	that	expectation	signals	from	frontoparietal	cortex	bias	perception		(Gau	&	
Noppeney,	2016;	Gilbert	&	Li,	2013;	Gold	&	Shadlen,	2007;	Rao,	DeAngelis,	&	Snyder,	2012;	
Summerfield	&	Egner,	2009)	.	Of	particular	importance,	it	has	been	found	that	such	prior	
expectation	signals	can	bias	dot	motion	perception	with	corresponding	modulations	of	neural	
activity	in	area	MT	in	monkeys		(Schlack	&	Albright,	2007)	,	and	in	even	earlier	visual	cortex	in	
humans		(Kok,	Brouwer,	van	Gerven,	&	de	Lange,	2013)	.	On	this	note,	it	is	critical	to	point	out	
that	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3,	the	lack	of	an	external	stimulus	precluded	us	from	measuring	
objective	performance	in	the	target	absent	interval.	Therefore,	unlike	the	case	of	the	relative	
blindsight	tasks	(Experiments	3.1	and	3.4),	where	objective	performance	is	controlled	for,	it	is	
more	difficult	to	rule	out	the	biasing	of	low-level	motion	representations	as	a	critical	contributing	
factor	to	the	high	proportion	bets	on	the	target	absent	interval	that	we	observed.	
	
Future	neuroimaging	and	electrophysiology	studies	directly	comparing	dot	motion	discrimination	
with	other	perceptual	tasks	should	examine	the	question	of	this	task-specific	deficit	in	more	
detail.	In	any	case,	the	set	of	studies	conducted	for	this	dissertation	provide	evidence	that	dot	
motion	discrimination	represents	an	ideal	task	for	dissociating	objective	and	subjective	
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perception.	The	identification	of	such	tasks	is	critical	in	that	they	will	ultimately	give	researchers	
in	the	field	better	experimental	access	to	the	subjective	component	of	visual	perception.	
	
The	data	herein	further	help	arbitrate	in	the	debate	between	first	order		(Block,	1995,	2007;	
Lamme,	2003)	and	higher	order	theories	of	consciousness		(S.	Dehaene	&	Naccache,	2001;	
Stanislas	Dehaene	et	al.,	2017;	Lau	&	Rosenthal,	2011)	.	On	first	order	theories,	phenomenology	
is	rich,	and	maps	onto	activations	in	visual	cortex,	with	prefrontal	activity	playing	the	secondary	
role	of	granting	cognitive	access	to	that	phenomenology		(Block,	2007)	.	Conversely,	on	higher	
order	theories,	phenomenology	is	sparse,	and	maps,	at	least	in	part,	onto	cognitive	mechanisms	
in	frontal	and	parietal	regions.	The	neurofeedback	data	from	Chapter	VIII	clearly	support	the	
higher	order	view,	as	prefrontal	activity	was	uniquely	predictive	of	the	subjective	impression	of	
color	in	the	absence	of	external	color	stimulation.	Additionally,	the	operational	definition	of	
subjective	inflation	argued	for	in	Chapter	IX	supports	the	higher	order	view	that	cognitive	access	
exerts	a	direct	influence	on	the	content	of	phenomenology,	but	that	higher	order	mechanisms	
inflate	subjective	awareness	of	that	phenomenology	when	cognitive	access	is	limited.	While	we	
suggest	that	the	ultimate	position	offered	by	the	inflation	argument	is	intermediate	between	the	
traditional	Rich	and	Sparse	views,	the	implication	of	higher	order	cognitive	mechanisms	in	
inflation	are	clearly	in	conflict	with	first	order	theories	of	consciousness.		
	
To	conclude,	we	can	briefly	summarize,	in	decreasing	order	of	confidence,	where	this	
dissertation	lands	on	the	three	debates	in	consciousness	science	it	was	designed	to	clarify.	
First,	both	the	literature	review	and	the	association	between	decoded	perceptual	confidence	and	
false	color	detection	found	in	the	neurofeedback	study	in	Chapter	VIII	strongly	suggest	that	
prefrontal	cortex	is	indeed	critically	involved	in	conscious	visual	perception.	Provided	that	
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sensitive	analysis	methods	are	used,	the	evidence	for	this	connection	seems	to	be	clear.	Next,	
on	the	debate	about	phenomenological	richness,	we	conclude	that	an	intermediate	position	
based	on	the	operationally	defined	notion	of	subjective	inflation	provides	the	most	parsimonious	
account	of	the	empirical	literature.	On	this	account,	phenomenology		feels	rich	despite	its	sparse	
representational	foundations.		
	
Lastly,	where	we	land	on	the	debate	about	unconscious	perception	in	normal	observers	will	
depend	largely	on	disambiguating	the	absolute	blindsight	versus	rich	false	alarms	
interpretations	of	the	null	interval	2IFC	data	from	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	(discussed	at	length	
at	the	end	of	Chapter	IX).	At	the	present	time,	the	author	of	this	dissertation	leans	toward	the	
inflation-like,	rich	false	alarms	interpretation,	and	thus,	toward	the	conclusion	that	we	still	lack	
convincing	evidence	for	true	unconscious	perception	in	normal	observers.	The	author	bases	this	
leaning	on	both	the	existing	evidence	for	other	inflation	and	illusion	effects	in	the	literature,	and	
on	the	intuition	that	this	is	a	less	extreme	hypothesis	overall;	i.e.,	it	seems	more	likely	that	an	
observer	would	mistakenly	(from	an	external	perspective)	perceive	coherent	motion	in	an	
incoherent	dot	motion	stimulus,	than	objectively	perceive	the	motion	in	a	coherent	dot	motion	
stimulus	with	a	complete	lack	of	subjective	awareness.	However,	this	remains	a	topic	for	future	
investigation.	
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XI.	Appendices	
	
Appendix	A:	Supplementary	Information	for	Experiment	2,		Multivoxel	patterns	for	
perceptual	confidence	are	associated	with	false	color	detection	
	
Supplementary	Figures	&	Tables	
	
Figure A1. Task-by-task structure of Experiment 2. Tasks that were performed inside and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
outside	of	the	fMRI	scanner	are	shown	in	black	and	white	boxes,	respectively.	
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Figure A2. Median split analyses suggest that the association between high confidence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
induction and false alarms is not mediated by a bias for higher confidence in green decoder	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
construction stimuli. a) A median split was conducted on the difference in mean confidence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ratings for green stimuli and red stimuli. Because mean confidence ratings for red stimuli were	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
subtracted from those for green stimuli, positive values suggest that, on average, subjects had	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
higher confidence in green stimuli than red stimuli. As expected, the median split resulted in a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
significant difference in bias between the low bias group (white bar) and high bias group (gray	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
bar) [t(11) = -6.47, p < 0.001, CI = (-0.99,-0.49), two-tailed, two-sample t-test]. Importantly, a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
one-tailed, one-sample t-test suggests that bias in the low group is not significantly different	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
from zero at alpha = 0.05 [t(5) = 1.99, p = 0.052, CI = (-0.001,+inf)], although the low p-value	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
suggests a trend in this direction. b) Red induction likelihoods for false alarm and correct	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
rejection DecNef runs after median splitting on color-confidence bias. Median splitting showed	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
no effect of color-confidence bias on red induction likelihoods during either false alarm or	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
correction rejection runs. c) High confidence induction likelihoods for false alarm and correct	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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rejection runs after median splitting on color-confidence bias. Induction likelihoods for	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
participants in the low color-confidence bias group were significantly above chance (0.50) during	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
false alarm runs [t(5) = 5.20, p < 0.01, CI = (0.53,0.59), two-tailed, one-sample t-test] but not	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
during correct rejection runs. High confidence induction likelihoods were not significantly	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
different from chance for either false alarm or correct rejection runs for participants in the high	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
color-confidence bias group. d) Extent of color-confidence bias is inversely correlated with high	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
confidence	induction	likelihoods	during	false	alarm	DecNef	runs	[r(11)	=	0.63,	p	=	0.02].		
	
	
	
	
Figure A3. High confidence induction likelihoods during false alarm versus correct rejection	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
runs in individual prefrontal and parietal ROIs and one group prefrontal ROI. While the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
difference in induction likelihoods between false alarm and correct rejection runs in the IFS +	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MFS + MFG ROI does not survive Bonferroni correction (family-wise alpha for comparing high	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
confidence likelihoods between false alarm and correct rejection runs in each ROI = 0.01), the	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
pattern of results suggests that the difference in high confidence induction likelihoods between	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
false alarm and correct rejection runs found across all frontoparietal ROIs (Figure 9b) is	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
primarily driven by the prefrontal ROIs. IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFS, inferior frontal sulcus;	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MFG,	middle	frontal	gyrus;	MFS,	middle	frontal	sulcus.		*p	<	0.05.	
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Figure A4. Information leak analysis (N=13). The coefficient of determination (y-axis) is an	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
index of the extent to which voxel activities in a given “predictor” ROI (x-axis) can predict, via	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
sparse linear regression (SLiR), color induction likelihoods in V1-4 (A) and confidence induction	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
likelihoods in IPL (B)	, IFS (C)	, MFG (D)	, & MFS (E)	. The results show minimal “leak” of	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
information outside of target regions, suggesting that induction likelihoods in a given ROI were	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
minimally influenced by the activities of voxels in neighboring ROIs. This relationship is	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
particularly pronounced when looking at “leak” between ROIs in frontal and visual cortices. V1-4:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
combined visual areas V1, V2, V3, & V4; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFS, inferior frontal sulcus;	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MFG,	middle	frontal	gyrus;	MFS,	middle	frontal	sulcus.	
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Figure A5. Relationship between mean high confidence induction likelihoods and mean DecNef	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
confidence ratings across runs. High confidence induction likelihoods and confidence ratings	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
were averaged across all DecNef runs for each subject. Confidence ratings were averaged	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
across color for each DecNef run. The confidence decoder in V1234 was trained in the same	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
manner as those in the frontoparietal ROIs (see Methods), but was not used for neurofeedback.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Bonferroni corrected Pearson correlations suggest a relationship between DecNef confidence	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ratings and high confidence induction likelihoods in the collective frontoparietal ROI (middle	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
panel: IPL + IFS + MFS + MFG, r(11) = 0.68, p = 0.01) , and when looking at only the frontal	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ROIs alone (right panel: IFS + MFS + MFG, r(11) = 0.72, p = 0.006), but not in visual cortex (left	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
panel: V1-4, r(11) = 0.32, p = 0.29). IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IFS, inferior frontal sulcus; MFG,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
middle	frontal	gyrus;	MFS,	middle	frontal	sulcus.	
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Table A1. Subject-specific temporal windows and V1-4 localizer intersection status that led to	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
maximum decoding accuracy. A Y in the second column indicates that the maximum decoding	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
accuracy was obtained when the V1-4 ROI was intersected with the functional localizer ROI,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
while an N indicates that the maximum decoding accuracy was obtained when the entire V1-4	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ROI was used. Negative and positive numbers in columns 3 and 5 indicate temporal window	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
starting times before and after target stimulus onset, respectively. The decoding parameters	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
shown	here	were	used	to	train	the	decoders	that	were	subsequently	used	for	neurofeedback.	
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Table A2. Examples of DecNef induction strategies. Participants were asked what strategies	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
they	employed	during	the	DecNef	task	at	the	end	of	each	neurofeedback	session.	
	
Supplementary	Methods	
Flicker	fusion	task	
On	the	first	day	of	the	experiment	a	flicker	fusion	task		(Simonson	&	Brozek,	1952)	was	used	to	
determine	perceptually	equiluminant	red	and	green	RGB	triplets.	On	each	trial	of	the	flicker	
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fusion	task,	a	flickering	circle	(30	Hz,	diameter	~13.5	°)	alternated	between	either	red	and	neutral	
gray	(rgb[128	128	128])	(block	1),	green	and	neutral	gray	(block	2),	or	red	and	green	(blocks	3	
and	4).	The	screen	background	in	this	and	all	other	tasks	both	inside	and	outside	of	the	fMRI	
scanner	was	a	uniform	gray	(rgb[64	64	64]).	Participants	were	instructed	to	use	button	presses	
in	order	to	minimize	the	amount	of	flicker	they	perceived	in	the	stimulus	as	follows.	On	each	
trial,	one	of	the	two	colors	textures	was	used	as	a	reference	stimulus	while	the	test	stimulus,	
which	was	always	either	red	or	green,	had	the	corresponding	red	or	green	channel	of	its	RGB	
triplet	shifted	either	up	or	down	when	participants	pressed	either	the	‘I’	or	‘K’	key,	respectively.	
Participants	then	pressed	the	‘Y’	key	to	indicate	that	they	had	reached	a	point	of	minimal	flicker.	
Non-variable	RGB	channel	values	in	the	test	texture	(e.g.,	the	green	and	blue	channels	in	the	
red	test	texture)	were	arbitrarily	set	to	80.	On	half	of	the	trials	the	starting	value	of	the	variable	
channel	was	set	to	a	random	value	between	0	and	19,	while	on	the	other	half	it	was	set	to	a	
random	value	between	236	and	255.	
	
There	were	three	practice	trials	for	the	flicker	fusion	task,	after	which	participants	completed	4	
blocks	of	12	trials	each.	In	both	the	practice	and	12-trial	blocks,	trials	were	separated	by	a	2-s	
intertrial	interval	(ITI),	during	which	a	uniform	gray	screen	was	shown.	In	the	first	two	blocks	the	
test	textures	were	red	and	green,	respectively,	and	reference	textures	were	neutral	gray.	In	the	
third	block,	the	reference	texture	was	red	with	an	RGB	triplet	that	corresponded	to	the	mean	of	
all	of	the	12	selected	minimal	flicker	inducing	red	RGBs	from	block	1,	while	the	test	texture	was	
green	with	the	same	stimulus	parameters	as	the	green	test	textures	in	block	2.	In	the	fourth	
block,	the	reference	texture	was	green	with	an	RGB	triplet	that	corresponded	to	the	mean	of	all	
of	the	12	selected	minimal-flicker	inducing	green	RGBs	from	block	2,	while	the	test	texture	was	
red	with	the	same	stimulus	parameters	as	the	red	test	textures	in	block	1.	For	each	subject,	the	
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red	and	green	RGB	triplets	used	throughout	the	rest	of	the	experiment	were	computed	as	the	
mean	of	all	selected	minimal	flicker	inducing	RGBs	from	blocks	1	and	4	and	blocks	2	and	3,	
respectively	(mean	±	s.e.m.:	red	=	[218.6	80	80]	±	[3.11	0	0],	green	=	[80	149.1	80]	±	[0	0.98	0]).		
	
MVPA	Sessions	
For	each	task	performed	during	the	MVPA	sessions,	in	the	majority	of	trials	(83.7%	±		0.7%	of	
red/green	discrimination	trials	and	83.6%	±	0.7%	of	lightness	trials),	hereafter	described	as	
threshold	trials,	stimulus	strength	was	titrated	via	a	run-by-run	thresholding	procedure	in	order	to	
keep	performance	near	75%	correct.	This	was	intended	to	1)	facilitate	a	good	spread	of	low	to	
high	confidence	responses	on	the	red/green	discrimination	task,	and	2)	keep	participants	
engaged	in	the	lightness	task.	The	remaining	trials	either	had	relatively	high	stimulus	strength	
(lightness	range	=	38.4	RGB	units	in	the	lightness	task,	10.8%	±	0.9%	of	color	trials;	80%	of	
colored	pixels	for	the	red/green	discrimination	task;	10.7%	±	0.7%	of	confidence	trials)	or	zero	
stimulus	strength	(no	change	in	lightness	in	the	lightness	task,	5.6%	±	0.1%	of	color	trials;	zero	
colored	pixels	in	the	red/green	discrimination	task,	5.6%	±	0.1%	of	confidence	trials).	These	high	
and	zero	stimulus	strength	trials	were	randomly	interleaved	across	runs.	
	
The	difficulty	of	threshold	trials	in	the	color	decoder	task	(color	lightness)	was	modulated	by	
changing	the	range	of	lightness	values	across	which	the	colored	pixels	in	the	grating	stimulus	
increased	or	decreased.	For	a	given	run,	lightness	range	values	were	drawn	from	a	uniform	
distribution,	the	range	of	which	was	arbitrarily	set	to	3.84	RGB	units	when	the	median	of	the	
distribution	was	greater	than	or	equal	to	5.12	RGB	units,	and	150%	of	the	median	when	the	
median	was	less	than	5.12	RGB	units.	The	median	of	this	distribution	of	lightness	range	values	
was	adjusted	per	run	(with	the	exception	of	the	first	run	on	Day	1)	based	on	performance	in	the	
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preceding	run	according	to	the	following	rules.	If	the	percent	correct	score	on	threshold	trials	in	
the	preceding	run	was	greater	than	or	equal	to	95%,	between	80%	and	95%,	between	55%	and	
70%,	or	less	than	or	equal	to	55%,	then	the	median	of	the	current	run’s	distribution	of	possible	
lightness	values	was	scaled	by	70%,	80%,	120%,	or	130%,	respectively.		
	
For	the	first	color	decoder	run	on	Day	1,	the	median	of	the	distribution	of	possible	lightness	
range	values	for	threshold	trials	was	set	to	the	mean	lightness	range	across	all	lightness	task	
reversal	trials	from	the	Day	1		pre-decoder	construction	1-up	1-down	lightness	task	staircasing	
procedure	(see	above)	.		The	run-by-run	thresholding	procedure	succeeded	in	maintaining	group	
performance	on	threshold	trials	near	perceptual	threshold	(mean		±	s.e.m.		percent	correct		=	
7	3.7%		±	1.4%	,	d’	=	1.53		±	0.08)	.		
	
The	difficulty	of	the	confidence	decoder	task	(red/green	discrimination)	was	modulated	by	
changing	the	proportion	of	colored	pixels	in	the	grating	stimulus.	On	the	first	confidence	decoder	
run	of	Day	1,	the	proportion	of	colored	pixels	for	a	given	trial	was	drawn	from	a	uniform	
distribution,	the	minimum	and	maximum	of	which	corresponded	to	mean	Quest-estimated	
stimulus	threshold	from	the	Day	1		pre-decoder	construction	adaptive	staircasing	procedure	
multiplied	by	1.2	and	1.6,	respectively.	The	multipliers	in	this	case	were	both	greater	than	1	to	
account	for	the	observation	from	pilot	subjects	that	the	Quest	procedure	on	Day	1	tended	to	
underestimate	the	color	stimulus	strength	that	would	lead	to	75%	correct	accuracy	on	the	
red/green	color	discrimination	task	inside	the	scanner.	On	subsequent	runs,	the	range	of	this	
distribution	was	scaled	according	to	the	same	rules	as	those	in	the	color	decoder	task	(see	
above).	Group	performance	on	threshold	trials	in	this	task	was	also	maintained	near	perceptual	
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threshold	(mean		±	s.e.m.		percent	correct		=	74.3%	±	1.57%,		d’	=	1.67		±	0.10	,		confidence	ratings	
=	2.15	±	0.14)	.	
	
Because	the	confidence	decoder	was	trained	on	confidence	responses	from	a	red/green	
discrimination	task,	one	concern	is	that	the	confidence	decoder	may	be	confounded	with	color.	
Figure	A2	shows	that	indeed	confidence	responses	were	higher	on	average	for	green	stimuli	
compared	to	red	stimuli	in	all	but	one	DecNef	participant.	To	investigate	whether	this	bias,	
referred	to	hereafter	as	color-confidence	bias,	underlies	the	relationship	between	high	
confidence	induction	and	false	color	perception	during	DecNef	we	performed	a	median	split	on	
DecNef	study	participants	according	to	the	difference	in	their	mean	confidence	judgements	for	
green	versus	red	stimuli	(Figure	A2a).	Replotting	DecNef	color	induction	likelihoods	(Figure	
A4a)	after	median	splitting	suggested	that		DecNef	color	induction	was	not	affected	by	
color-confidence	bias	(Figure	A2b).		
	
To	specifically	test	whether	our	main	finding	that	high	confidence	induction	likelihoods	were	
higher	during	false	alarm	runs	was	affected	by	color-confidence	bias	we	ran	a	mixed	model	
ANOVA	on	high	confidence	induction	likelihoods	during	DecNef	with	the	within-subject	factor	run	
type	(2	levels:	false	alarm	runs,	correct	rejection	runs)	and	the	between-subjects	factor	
color-confidence	bias	(2	levels:	low,	high).	The	ANOVA	showed	no	main	effect	of	either	run	type	
[F(1,11)	=	2.62,	p	=	0.13]	or	color-confidence	bias	[F(1,11)	=	1.01,	p	=	0.34]	and	no	significant	
interaction	[F(1,11)	=	0.07,	p	=	0.80].	However,	post-hoc	Bonferroni	corrected	(	α	corrected		=	0.0125)	
two-tailed	one-sample	t-tests	for	each	of	each	combination	of	bias	group	and	run	type	showed	
that	high	confidence	induction	likelihoods	were	significantly	above	chance	(0.50)	in	the	low	
color-confidence	bias	group	during	false	alarm	runs	[	t(5)	=	5.20,	p	<	0.01,	CI	=	(0.53,0.59)]	,	
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while	high	confidence	induction	likelihoods	in	each	of	the	other	three	groups	were	not	
significantly	different	from	chance	[high	bias,	false	alarm	runs:		t(6)	=	5.20,	p	=	0.34,	CI	=	(0.47,	
0.58)	;	low	bias,	correct	rejection	runs:			t(5)	=	0.20,	p	=	0.85,	CI	=	(0.36,	0.66)	;	high	bias,	correct	
rejection	runs:			t(6)	=	-0.84,	p	=	0.43,	CI	=	(0.32,	0.59)	;	Figure	A2c].		Furthermore,	there	was	a	
negative	correlation	between	the	extent	of	color-confidence	bias	and	high	confidence	induction	
likelihoods	during	false	alarm	runs	(R	2		=	0.40,	p	=	0.02;	Figure	A2d).	Taken	together,	these	
results	suggest	that	color-confidence	bias	did	not	underlie	the	high	high	confidence	induction	
likelihoods	observed	during	false	alarms	DecNef	runs.	Conversely,	the	median	split	analysis	
suggests	that	this	effect	was	most	strongly	driven	by	the	study	participants	who	showed	the	
smallest	color-confidence	bias.	
	
fMRI	localizer	scans	
In	order	to	determine	the	subregions	of	V1,	V2,	V3	and	V4	that	retinotopically	mapped	to	the	
grating	stimuli	in	the	color	and	confidence	decoder	tasks,	during	the	second	decoder	
construction	session	(Day	2)	participants	were	presented	with	a	flickering	colored	checkerboard	
localizer	stimulus	that	occupied	the	same	subregion	of	the	visual	field	as	those	grating	stimuli	
(0.425	°-	6.75	°	eccentricity).	The	localizer	stimulus	was	presented	alternately,	in	8-s	periods,	with	
a	second	flickering	colored	checkerboard	stimulus	whose	dimensions	corresponded	to	the	black	
annulus	inside	of	the	grating	stimuli	in	the	color	and	confidence	decoder	tasks		(0.215	°-	0.425	°	
eccentricity).	Each	stimulus	was	presented	14	times	per	run	(224	s	total),	and	each	participant	
performed	3	runs.	To	ensure	that	participants	maintained	their	gaze	at	the	fixation	point	
throughout	each	run,	they	performed	a	change	detection	task	in	which	they	pressed	a	button	
every	time	the	fixation	point	changed	color.	
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Optimization	of	color	and	confidence	MVPA	
Color	and	confidence	decoders	were	constructed	using	sparse	logistic	regression	as	previously	
described		(Amano	et	al.,	2016;	Cortese	et	al.,	2016;	Yamashita	et	al.,	2008)	;	see	Methods	in	
main	text).	To	account	for	variability	in	hemodynamic	delay		(Buckner,	1998)	,	for	each	region	of	
interest	(ROI),	we	trained	separate	decoders	for	each	of	several	time	windows	for	each	type	of	
decoder	construction	run	(color	or	confidence).	All	decoding	windows	were	shifted	back	in	time	
to	account	for	an	assumed	average	hemodynamic	delay	of	6	seconds.	In	what	follows,	we	
indicate	the	time	window	according	to	the	event	to	which	the	time	window	is	supposed	to	
correspond	assuming	this	6-s	shift;	e.g.,	when	we	indicate	that	a	time	window	started	at	the	
target	stimulus	onset,	that	means	that	the	first	fMRI	image	that	was	analyzed	in	that	time	
window	was	the	one	that	was	captured	6	seconds	after	induction	cue	onset.	
	
For	color	runs,	where	the	target	stimulus	was	flashed	over	a	period	of	6	s,	we	trained	decoders	
over	nine	different	time	windows:	four	2-s	windows	starting	at	timepoints	-2	s,	0	s,	+2	s,	and	+4	s	
relative	to	target	stimulus	onset,	three	6-s	windows	starting	-2	s,	0	s,	and	+2	s	relative	to	target	
stimulus	onset,	and	two	8-s	windows	starting	at	-2	s	and	0	s	relative	to	target	stimulus	onset,	
where	negative	and	positive	numbers	correspond	to	earlier	and	later	time	points,	respectively.	
For	confidence	runs,	which	had	a	much	briefer	target	stimulus	display	time	(0.5	s)	we	trained	
decoders	over	three	different	time	windows:	two	2-s	windows	starting	at	timepoints	-2	s	and	0	s	
relative	to	target	stimulus	onset,	and	one	3-s	windows	starting	-2	s	relative	to	target	stimulus	
onset.	Further,	for	color	runs,	two	decoders	were	trained	over	each	time	window,	one	in	which	
the	V1-4	ROI	was	intersected	with	the	functional	localizer	ROI,	and	one	in	which	it	was	not.	This	
led	to	a	total	of	18	different	localizer/time	window	combinations	for	color	decoding.		
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For	each	decoder	type	for	each	participant,	the	time	window-localizer	combination	for	color	
decoding	and	time	window	for	confidence	decoding	that	resulted	in	the	highest	cross-validated	
accuracy	was	used	for	training	the	corresponding	DecNef	decoder	on	the	entire	dataset	
(summarized	in	Table	A1).	In	all	cases,	the	BOLD	signal	was	averaged	across	all	time	points	
within	a	given	time	window,	and	the	resulting	averaged	samples	were	used	for	the	iSLR	decoder	
training	procedure.	
	
For	confidence	decoding,	to	ensure	an	equal	number	of	samples	in	the	low	and	high	confidence	
classes	for	decoder	construction	we	used	the	following	downsampling	approach.	Confidence	
ratings	of	1	and	4	were	always	allocated	to	the	low	and	high	confidence	training	classes,	
respectively.	The	classes	to	which	confidence	ratings	of	2	and	3	were	allocated	were	
determined	so	as	to	minimize	the	difference	in	the	sample	number	between	the	two	classes.	
Thus,	confidence	ratings	could	be	divided	into	low	and	high	confidence	classes	in	the	following	
three	ways:	low	confidence	=	ratings	of	1,	high	confidence	=	ratings	of	2-4	(N	=	9),	low	
confidence	=	ratings	of	1	and	2,	high	confidence	=	ratings	of	3	and	4	(N	=	6),	and	low	
confidence	=	ratings	of	1-3,	high	confidence	=	ratings	of	4	(N	=	2).	After	assigning	confidence	
ratings	to	their	respective	decoder	classes,	the	class	with	the	higher	number	of	training	samples	
was	downsampled	to	equate	the	total	number	of	samples	between	classes.	The	to-be-removed	
samples	were	chosen	randomly,	over	four	separate	iterations.	Cross-validated	decoding	
accuracies	were	calculated	for	each	downsampling	iteration	as	described	above,	and	the	
training	samples	that	were	used	in	the	iteration	that	resulted	in	the	highest	decoding	accuracy	
were	subsequently	used	for	training	the	DecNef	decoder.	
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An	additional	confidence	decoder	was	trained	in	the	same	manner	using	the	visual	ROI	(V1-V4)	
that	was	used	for	color	decoding.	Confidence	decoding	accuracy	in	this	ROI	was	significantly	
greater	than	chance	by	a	one-sample,	two-tailed	t-test	[mean		s.e.m.	decoding	accuracy	=	65.5	
±	1.8	%;	t(16)	=	8.61,		p	<	0.001,	CI	=	(61.7,	69.3)].	However,	induction	of	high	confidence	
patterns	in	this	ROI	did	not	correlate	with	actual	confidence	judgments	during	neurofeedback	as	
was	the	case	with	the	frontoparietal	ROIs	[r(11)	=	0.32,	p	=	0.29;	Figure	A5,	left].		
	
Decoded	Neurofeedback	
For	a	description	of	the	main	components	of	the	decoded	neurofeedback	(DecNef)	procedure,	
see	the	Methods	section	in	the	main	text.	To	ensure	that	the	correct	voxels	were	targeted	during	
DecNef,	we	computed	the	correlation	between	the	detrended,	z-score	normalized	signal	in	each	
ROI	during	DecNef	(see	Methods	in	main	text)	and	the	mean	detrended,	z-score	normalized	
signal	in	the	corresponding	ROIs	across	all	decoder	construction	trials	for	each	subject.	Any	trial	
that	resulted	in	a	correlation	value	less	than	r	=	0.6	in	any	of	the	five	target	ROIs	was	excluded	
from	the	current	analyses	[median	(interquartile	range)	=	1.3%	(0.5%	-	4.3%)	of	trials	excluded	
per	participant].		
	
For	all	but	two	DecNef	participants,	a	small	proportion	of	DecNef	trials	[median	(interquartile	
range)	=	1.1%	(0.4%	-	1.8%)	of	total	DecNef	trials	per	participant	(N=13)]	motion-corrected	
BOLD	signal	data	could	not	be	retrieved	in	time	for	feedback	stimulus	presentation.	On	these	
trials	a	blank	gray	screen	was	presented	during	the	feedback	interval	(Figure	10a).	Participants	
were	instructed	beforehand	that	any	such	trials	would	be	the	result	of	computer	malfunctions	
and	should	be	ignored.	These	trials	were	omitted	from	all	data	analyses.	
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On	achromatic	trials,	normally	distributed	gray	RGB	triplets	for	pixels	between	the	black	vertical	
bars	in	the	induction	stimulus	were		generated	as	described	in	the	Red/Green	Color	
Discrimination	Task	section	under	Materials	and	Methods	in	the	main	text.	To	generate	red	and	
green	induction	stimuli,	the	same	procedure	was	followed,	but	a	value	of	12.8	was	either	
subtracted	from	the	green	and	blue	channels	or	added	to	the	green	channel,	respectively,	of	
each	dynamic	voxel.		
	
At	the	end	of	each	DecNef	session	participants	were	asked	what	strategies,	if	any,	they	used	
during	neurofeedback	to	try	to	maximize	the	size	of	the	feedback	circle.	Strategies	ranged	from	
actively	trying	to	think	nothing	to	imagining	the	induction	stimulus	being	the	top	of	a	barbecue,	
on	which	meats	were	being	grilled	(Table	S2).	
	
Appendix	B:	Peripheral	2IFC	with	null	interval		dot	motion	lifetime	control	
	
We	tested	whether	the	metacognitive	inefficiencies	observed	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	might	
be	due	to	attention	to	local	motion	signals	by	having	two	of	the	participants	from	both	
Experiments	3.2	and	3.3	repeat	the	task	from	Experiment	3.2	with	identical	stimulus	parameters	
except	for	the	following:	dot	lifetime	was	reduced	from	400	ms	to	80	ms	and	the	total	number	of	
trials	was	decreased	from	5,120	to	2,560.	Reducing	dot	lifetime	should	make	it	harder	to	
discriminate	local	motion	signals.	If	this	effect	contributes	to	the	flatness	of	the	observed	
absolute	blindsight	curves	(Figures	14b,c	and	15b,c),	then	we	should	see	a	higher	percentage	
of	bets	on	the	target	present	interval	when	dot	lifetime	is	reduced.	
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Figure B1. Peripheral 2IFC with null interval dot motion lifetime control results. The percentage	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
of trials in which higher confidence was indicated for the target present interval is plotted as a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
function of motion discrimination percent correct scores in the target present interval (Figures	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
14b,c, 15b,c). All experimental conditions were identical to those in Experiment 3.2 except that	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
the lifetime of the dot stimuli was reduced from 400 ms to 80 ms, and the total number of trials	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
was	reduced	from	5,120	to	2,560.	
	
Visual	inspection	of	the	absolute	blindsight	curves	in	Figure	B1	suggests	that	reducing	dot	
lifetime	led	to	no	clear	improvements	in	Subject	3’s	ability	to	discriminate	target	absent	and	
target	present	intervals,	while	it	appears	a	slight	improvement	occurred	for	Subject	5.	The	
current	data	are	thus	ambiguous,	and	more	participants	should	be	run	on	this	task	for	a	clearer	
picture	to	emerge.	As	such,	we	will	have	to	wait	to	draw	any	conclusions	about	whether	
attention	to	local	motion	signals	is	responsible	for	the	relatively	high	proportion	of	bets	on	the	
target	absent	interval	in	Experiments	3.2	and	3.3.	
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